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Executive summary
The 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) created, for the first time and
on an unprecedented scale, a mandate to change how groundwater is managed statewide
in California. While enacting SGMA was a tremendous step forward, communities and
water districts now face the considerable challenge of creating successful groundwater
management programs.
This report is aimed at helping California’s water managers, public water agencies, county
commissioners, city planners, and others better understand the suite of tools and approaches
that can be used to enhance the sustainable management of groundwater. Specifically, we
consider four categories of management tools—regulatory, incentive-based, agency supply
augmentation and protection, and education and outreach—to evaluate how these tools
are being used to address water quantity, water quality, and surface water and groundwater
interaction challenges. We present nine comprehensive case studies of groundwater
management across the Western United States to highlight how these tools have been used
to address those challenges. The case studies represent basins that have a range of water uses—
agricultural, municipal, or mixed water use, as well as basins with diverse hydrologic, political
and social settings.
Effective groundwater management takes time and requires significant resources and
commitment on the part of water managers and communities. Each groundwater management
program presented in this report relies upon a variety of interdependent tools and actions to
meet management goals. The case studies illustrate the importance of building trust, having
sufficient data, using a portfolio of management approaches, assuring performance, and
access to funding. Given the similarities between the goals of SGMA and those described in
the case studies, these themes emerge as crucial to the successful implementation of California’s
landmark groundwater legislation.
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Background
Groundwater provides about 40 percent of California’s total annual water supply and serves as a
critical buffer against drought and climate change. But while groundwater is an effective buffer
during dry periods, the resource needs time to recover after it has been pumped. At current rates
of groundwater use, flooding events and wet periods will not be sufficient to recharge ground
water in key basins to support long-term sustained use, as shown in Figure A.1 that highlights
cumulative groundwater loss in California’s Central Valley since the 1960s.
The trend of increasing groundwater use amid cycles of drought has exacerbated ground
water depletion, water quality degradation, land subsidence, and depletion of interconnected
surface water throughout the state. California’s SGMA arose out of a recognition that the
integrated management of the state’s water resources is essential to meeting its water manage
ment goals, and that when properly managed, groundwater resources will help mitigate the
effects of drought and climate change to communities, farms, and the environment.
FIGURE A.1

Cumulative groundwater loss in California’s Central Valley during periods
of wet and dry conditions
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Source: Union of Concerned Scientists with data from the University of California Center for Hydrologic Modeling (UCCHM). (2015). Sustainable Groundwater
Management in California. Retrieved from http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/regional-information/california-and-western-states/sustainable-groundwatermanagement-act. Design: EDF
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SGMA requires the formation of local groundwater sustainability agencies (GSAs) and the
development of groundwater sustainability plans to address the following “undesirable results”
as defined in the Act:
• Chronic lowering of groundwater levels
• Degraded water quality, including the migration of contaminant plumes that impair
water supplies
• Seawater intrusion
• Land subsidence that substantially interferes with surface land uses
• Reduction of groundwater storage
• Depletions of interconnected surface water that has significant and unreasonable adverse
impacts on beneficial uses of the surface water
While California has a long history of managing a complex surface water storage and
distribution system, managing surface water and groundwater as an integrated system presents
some very distinct challenges. Surface water typically involves public agency control of storage
and conveyance infrastructure, and groundwater often involves privately owned infrastructure
and land, which can present a challenge for water managers as they attempt to fulfill SGMA’s
requirements.
Fortunately, groundwater is being managed successfully in many places across the West,
and much can be learned from case studies of groundwater management in these areas
that include urban and agricultural settings. This report summarizes nine case studies of
groundwater management in six states—Arizona, California, Colorado, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Texas—and presents key lessons learned in an effort to inform and foster effective
groundwater management in California.
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RICHARD THORNTON/SHUTTERSTOCK

Growing consumer demand for almonds has led California farmers to plant hundreds of thousands
of acres of new trees over the past two decades. Almonds and other permanent crops do not have
the flexibility of forgoing water in a dry year, as do annual crops like tomatoes or strawberries.

Groundwater management
strategies
The case studies presented in this report focus on the tools and actions water managers use
to directly influence water use and availability and could be considered for inclusion in GSA
sustainability plans.

Tools used to achieve management goals
Groundwater management districts featured in the case studies generally rely upon a suite of
interdependent tools rather than a single policy or regulation to influence water user behavior.
Groundwater management tools fall into four distinct categories: regulatory tools, incentivebased tools, agency supply augmentation and protection, and education and outreach. Specific
tools are described in the case studies included in the appendix and, in every case, multiple
tools are used simultaneously.

Regulatory tools
Regulatory tools often form the backbone on which more sophisticated incentive-based tools
are built. Regulatory tools require water users to take certain actions and are not intended to
provide direct incentives, financial or otherwise, for water users. Examples include metering
of wells (whether self-reported or monitored), best management practices (BMPs) without
cost-share, and moratoria on new wells.
M
 oratoria (or limits) on new wells or irrigated acreage
P
 ermitting system for wells
Q
 uantified and allocated irrigation or pumping rights
C
 ertification of irrigated acreage
M
 etering of wells (self-reported or monitored)
B
 MPs without cost-share (user pays)
C
 ontinuing education requirements

Incentive-based tools
Some groundwater management tools are designed to provide incentives to influence change
in water use behavior. Taxes, fees, or surcharges, as well as energy management practices
(i.e., load control), are examples of tools that provide financial incentives for behavior change.
Other tools, such as land retirement projects, credit-based systems to offset new groundwater
development, water transfer systems that allow individuals to move water use to where and
when it is most needed (for example by trading groundwater storage credits or use permits
within a specific geographic area), and landowner-led recharge, also rely on economic
valuations of water or underlying land assets for users who participate. In instances where
groundwater managers seek to encourage users to adopt best management practices,
Groundwater management strategies
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cost-sharing programs can also provide financial incentives to participate while also fostering
trust between users and managers.
T
 axes, fees, or surcharges
L
 and retirement projects
M
 anaged aquifer recharge (land-owner is lead)
O
 ffset programs
T
 ransfer systems for credits, permits, or rights
B
 MPs with cost-share
E
 nergy management practices (i.e. load control)

Agency supply augmentation and protection tools
Water managers often take additional actions at the district or regional level to achieve
sustainable water use. Water supply augmentation and protection measures can support or
supplement other management tools that more directly influence water user behavior. For
example, water districts may pursue stream augmentation projects to enhance the effect of
water user conservation on instream flows, or invest in water recycling systems that contribute
to conjunctive use efforts by water users to recharge an aquifer. Conjunctive use efforts led by
agencies—for example, construction and maintenance of dedicated recharge basins—also fall
under this category.
S
 tream augmentation projects
M
 anaged aquifer recharge
A
 quifer storage and recovery
Infrastructure upgrades paid for by water supplier or rates
R
 eservoir operations
S
 eawater intrusion barriers
U
 se of recycled water

Education and outreach tools
Water managers can help users better understand the consequences of their behavior and
opportunities to improve groundwater sustainability via outreach and education initiatives.
Efforts focused on highlighting current and future basin conditions and challenges, such as
ongoing overdraft, can promote learning and enhance engagement within communities.
Such tools can take many forms, including informational reports, guidance documents, and
websites that aim to educate water users on best management practices or update community
members on relevant management initiatives and activities. Targeted trainings, workshops, and
conferences that engage participants around specific water-focused topics or the development
of educational curriculum that advance water education in schools are additional examples.
E
 ducational programs and community engagement events
P
 rogram reports and updates
B
 MP guidance documents
D
 ata tools and informational websites
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Overview of case studies
The following case studies demonstrate groundwater management strategies formed in
response to a variety of hydrologic challenges and social settings. The case studies bring
together research and local insight on the management tools and actions various regions
are using to address issues ranging from water quantity and quality to surface water
depletion challenges. Tables B.1 through B.4 (pages 10 and 11) highlight prominent
groundwater challenges faced across case studies, as well as key regulatory, incentive-based,
and agency supply augmentation and protection tools used to address these challenges,
respectively. All case studies also employ education and outreach tools to educate water users.
While it is often difficult to pinpoint a single policy or tool responsible for the success of each
program—and indeed, some of the cases have ongoing management challenges—the most
prominent elements of each case study are emphasized in the summary.
FIGURE B.1

Overview map
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TABLE B.1

Groundwater challenges across case studies
CHALLENGES ADDRESSED (SGMA UNDESIRABLE RESULTS)
Management
area

Dominant
water use(s)

Phoenix AMA

Ag/Urban

•

Verde River
Exchange

Ag/Urban

•

Kings Basin

Ag

•

Orange County
Water District

Urban

•

CO

Rio Grande Water
Conservation
District

Ag

•

•

•

NE

Upper Republican
NRD

Ag

•

•

•

OR

Deschutes River
Basin

Ag/Urban

Edwards Aquifer
Authority

Ag/Urban

•

Harris-Galveston
Subsidence District

Urban

•

State
AZ

CA

TX

Lowering of
GW levels

Seawater
intrusion

Land
subsidence

Reduction
of storage

•

•

Surface water Degraded
depletion
GW quality

•
•

•

•

•

•

•
•
•

•

•

•

•

TABLE B.2

Regulatory tools used across case studies
REGULATORY TOOLS

Management
area

Moratoria or
limits on new
wells/irrigated
acreage

Permitting
systems
for wells

Quantified
and allocated
irrigation/
pumping rights

Certification
of irrigated
acreage

Metering
of wells

Metering of
wells

(self-reported)

(monitored)

Phoenix AMA

•

•

•

•

•

BMPs without
cost share

•

Verde River
Exchange
Kings Basin
Orange County
Water District

•

Rio Grande Water
Conservation
District

•

•

•

Upper
Republican NRD

•

•

•

Deschutes River
Basin

•

•

•

•

Edwards Aquifer
Authority

•

•

•

Harris-Galveston
Subsidence
District

•

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

The tables on pages 10 and 11 include information collected during development of this report and are not necessarily comprehensive of all challenges faced or
management tools employed in each management area.
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TABLE B.3

Incentive-based tools used across case studies
INCENTIVE-BASED TOOLS

Management
area

Taxes, fees
or surcharges

Land
retirement
projects

Managed
aquifer
recharge
(landowner is lead
beneficiary)

Offset
program

•

Phoenix AMA
Verde River
Exchange

•

Orange County
Water District

•

Rio Grande Water
Conservation
District

•

•

•

Upper
Republican NRD

•

•

Deschutes River
Basin

•

•

•

•

Edwards Aquifer
Authority

•

•
•

•

BMPs with
cost-share

•

•

Kings Basin

Harris-Galveston
Subsidence
District

Recharge,
Transfer of
depletion or credits, permits
storage credits
or rights

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

TABLE B.4

Agency supply augmentation and protection tools across case studies
AGENCY SUPPLY AUGMENTATION AND PROTECTION TOOLS

Management
area

Stream
augmentation
projects

Phoenix AMA

Managed
aquifer
recharge

Infrastructure
upgrades

(agency lead)

Aquifer storage
and recovery

(paid for by agency)

Reservoir
operation

•

•

•

•

Seawater
intrusion
barriers

Recycled water

•

•

Verde River
Exchange
Kings Basin

•

•

•

Orange County
Water District

•

•

•

•

•

Rio Grande Water
Conservation
District

•

Upper
Republican NRD

•

•

Deschutes River
Basin

•

•

Edwards Aquifer
Authority

•

Harris-Galveston
Subsidence
District

Overview of case studies

•

•
•

•
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CASE STUDY 1 / ARIZONA

Phoenix Active Management Area
The Phoenix Active Management Area (AMA) encompasses a groundwater basin with
agricultural and urban water uses. To address declining groundwater levels and land subsidence
within the AMA, water managers established a goal to attain safe-yield, defined as the long-term
balance between annual groundwater withdrawals and recharge, by 2025. To work toward this
goal, AMA water managers developed a regulatory system to limit irrigated acres and estab
lished a system to enhance long-term storage through facilitated groundwater recharge, which
takes advantage of conjunctive use mechanisms by using surplus surface water as recharge.
While the AMA still struggles with localized areas of groundwater level declines, it has reached
its overarching goal of safe yield for the basin.

CASE STUDY 2 / ARIZONA

Verde River Exchange
Arizona’s Verde River Valley supports historically dominant agricultural water uses and a rapidly
growing, groundwater-dependent urban population. Significant increases in groundwater
pumping have lowered groundwater levels in some areas and threaten Verde River surface flows.
The Verde River Exchange, administered by local non-profit Friends of Verde River Greenway, is
a community-driven, voluntary groundwater mitigation pilot-program designed to support
continued development and growth, while protecting river flows and their cultural, economic,
and ecological benefits in the region. To do this, the Exchange creates credits by incentivizing
Verde Valley water users to voluntarily reduce their water usage. These credits can then be
purchased by other Verde Valley water users seeking to reduce their water footprint and the
impacts of their groundwater use. Launched in 2016, the Exchange could offer a scalable
solution for mitigating the impacts of groundwater pumping on the Verde River and for
stabilizing water supplies for future residents.

CASE STUDY 3 / CALIFORNIA

Kings Basin
The Kings Basin is a predominantly agricultural region wherein water managers seek to mitigate
groundwater quality degradation and groundwater level declines. To address these issues, the
Kings River Conservation District has placed a strong emphasis on community engagement through
data-driven educational outreach and other trust-building actions. The district assists growers in
irrigation system reviews and water use efficiency and also uses dedicated recharge facilities and
on-farm recharge to make use of floodwater. Recharge programs in the district have the capacity to
recharge over 100,000 acre-feet annually and have helped reduce rates of groundwater level declines.

CASE STUDY 4 / CALIFORNIA

Orange County Water District
The Orange County Water District is situated in an almost entirely urban area, with 98% of water
use going toward municipal and industrial sectors. The district goals are to protect and enhance
groundwater quality and availability, which have been impacted by groundwater level declines
and seawater intrusion. With no regulatory authority to control pumping, the district employs
a pricing mechanism as an incentive for water retailers to purchase water imported from
outside of the district rather than pumping groundwater. The District’s innovative pricing
scheme—in combination with basin recharge, seawater barriers, water recycling, and education
and outreach initiatives—exemplify a portfolio of approaches that work together to promote
cost efficiency, improved water quality and enhanced basin sustainability.
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CASE STUDY 5 / COLORADO

Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict No. 1)
Primarily an agricultural region, the San Luis Valley has experienced significant groundwater
level declines. The Subdistrict manages water within its boundaries to mitigate stream depletion
resulting from local groundwater pumping and thereby remain in compliance with an interstate
water use agreement for the Rio Grande and Conejos Rivers. The Subdistrict places a fee on
groundwater pumping to encourage irrigators to improve on-farm efficiency, switch to less
water-intensive crops, and take advantage of the federal fallowing program Conservation
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), which pays agricultural producers to take their land
out of production permanently or for a certain period of time. The program has succeeded in
recharging more water than required to offset surface water depletions.

CASE STUDY 6 / NEBRASKA

Upper Republican Natural Resources District
The Upper Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) manages groundwater level declines,
surface water depletion, and groundwater quality degradation in an almost exclusively
agricultural basin. Organized in 1972, the NRD uses multiple tools to mitigate groundwater
declines and satisfy requirements of an interstate compact with Colorado and Kansas pertaining
to surface water flows. Examples include a moratorium on drilling new wells, a well permitting
system, “land occupation” taxes, a strict cap on groundwater pumping with both formal and
informal water markets, and stream augmentation projects. The NRD also has strong
community involvement and support for monitoring and enforcement in the District.

CASE STUDY 7 / OREGON

Deschutes River Basin
The Deschutes Basin aims to maintain instream water rights and scenic waterway flows while
accommodating existing agricultural use and population growth through new groundwater
development. To accomplish these goals and meet requirements of the state Scenic Waterways

Overview of case studies

ISTOCK

When properly managed, groundwater resources will help mitigate the effects of drought and climate
change on communities, farms, and the environment.
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Act, the Deschutes Groundwater Mitigation Bank purchases existing surface water rights and
sells corresponding mitigation credits to new groundwater pumpers. These mitigation credits
have helped to preserve streamflow while allowing the approval of new groundwater permits
in the basin.

CASE STUDY 8 / TEXAS

Edwards Aquifer Authority
The Edwards Aquifer program was established to manage and protect groundwater levels and
groundwater-fed spring flows which are critical to the survival of several endangered species
in the basin. The Edwards Aquifer Authority uses an aggregate cap on groundwater pumping
for its mixed agricultural and urban user base, along with tradable permits to limit groundwater
withdrawal. The Edwards Aquifer Authority encourages participation in a water trading market,
which has resulted in the maintenance of minimum spring flows, despite a recent drought.
Water trading has succeeded as an effective management tool by minimizing transaction costs,
developing a functional online trading platform, limiting constraints as to how users divide their
allocations, and establishing specific caps in state law.

CASE STUDY 9 / TEXAS

Harris-Galveston Subsidence District
Water use in the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District is mostly industrial and municipal.
The District is addressing land subsidence, groundwater level declines, and seawater intrusion
by using fees and educational programs to encourage use of surface water in lieu of ground
water. Groundwater usage is limited to a percentage of an individual user’s total water demand.
If that percentage is exceeded, the user is subject to fees intended to discourage overuse of
groundwater. While the district lacks a growth management strategy, rates of groundwater
level declines have decreased.
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Summary of lessons learned
with implications for SGMA implementation
A review of the case studies reveals several lessons in effective groundwater management
that coalesce around five recurring themes: the importance of building trust, the need for
data to inform management decisions, using a portfolio of management approaches, assuring
program performance, and having sufficient funding. These themes, as described below, can
have significant implications for the successful implementation of California’s Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).

Building trust
Groundwater management often requires asking people to change what they do in a way that
has an actual or perceived financial impact. This requires establishing trust within that group
of people—acceptance of a fair system that will allow them to use a sustainable amount of
groundwater that supports their livelihood over the long-term.
In addition to broad community involvement from the early stages of planning, there
are specific things that water managers can do to build trust. Using data to illustrate current
groundwater conditions and simulate future impacts can lend credibility to water managers,
as well as create a sense of ownership in the future of the program. Water managers in the
Kings Basin in California, for example, used data-driven groundwater models to convey how

Summary of lessons learned

ISTOCK

Agricultural economies, as well as the communities and ecosystems they support, depend on having
clean, reliable groundwater resources.
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The need for data
As with the Kings Basin, the Edwards Aquifer Authority made water use data publicly available,
which increased transparency and helped ensure buy-in from program participants.
In addition to using open data to build trust, data are also critical for effective decisionmaking. In the Upper Republic Natural Resources District, for example, irrigation wells in the
District have been fully metered to measure water consumption since 1981 and the District has
also maintained a groundwater well measurement database since 1972. Water level monitoring
and water use tracking are used to detect trends and support groundwater policies.
One of the “undesirable results” that SGMA requires Agencies to address is the depletion
of interconnected surface water. Minimum thresholds—the rate or volume of surface water
depletions caused by groundwater use that has adverse impacts—need to be established and
supported by sufficient data that inform computer models or equally effective methods of
analysis. Regardless of the analytical method chosen, the case studies indicate that effective
groundwater management largely depends on the gathering, management and analysis of
sufficient water resources data.

Using a portfolio of approaches
Groundwater management cannot be achieved overnight, nor can it be accomplished by a single
policy, regulation or project. It is important to recognize that multiple tools, added and built

16
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ISTOCK

local areas and individuals’ properties could
be impacted by future groundwater declines.
This educational approach enabled people to
see and understand the connection between
the goals of the program and their personal
situation as landowners and agricultural
producers who rely on groundwater to
maintain their livelihood.
A second method of trust building
Effective groundwater management requires
involves including key stakeholder groups
sufficient water resources data that water users
and community members trust.
within the community in the planning
process so they can understand, support and
vouch for the groundwater management program. In the case of Kings Basin, water managers
included fisheries groups in the groundwater management process who used their positive past
experiences with the community to build trust for the new groundwater policies.
Lastly, providing beneficial resources to the community can strengthen relationships with
the same people affected by groundwater management programs. For example, the Upper
Republican Natural Resources District manages recreational areas and provides the community
with cost-sharing programs for planting trees intended for windbreaks. Such non-adversarial
community programs have helped the District build trust and acceptance of challenging
groundwater use restrictions in the face of interstate litigation.
SGMA requires sustainability plans developed by a Groundwater Sustainability Agency
(Agency) to include an explanation of Agency decision-making methodology and describe how
the Agency encourages active involvement of stakeholders in that process. Arguably the most
significant lesson learned from the case studies is that meaningful community and stakeholder
engagement early in the process helps build trust and cooperation that leads to more effective
groundwater management. And while the case studies demonstrate different ways to achieve
trust between parties, they all involve building trust slowly and intentionally, which can be the
difference between successful and unsuccessful groundwater management programs.

upon gradually, are necessary for successful groundwater management. In nearly every basin,
including those featured in this report, advances in groundwater management begin with some
form of permitting framework, tracking system, educational component, and revenue source for
management. After these are in place, additional tools can be added based on local conditions.
For example, prior to implementing a groundwater market in the Edwards Aquifer,
groundwater managers had to first establish a system of groundwater pumping permits and
then place a cap on overall groundwater use. Only after binding regulatory limits were placed
on groundwater did the incentive arise to participate in rights transfers, which could be either
permanent or temporary in nature. This example also illustrates that incentives can be a
component of a groundwater management portfolio, but they require many other policies to
support them. Furthermore, there are limits to what price mechanisms alone can do to reduce
water demand, especially in California. While groundwater users may not be required to pay for
water directly, they pay indirectly via energy costs and property taxes on irrigated land.
SGMA requires plans developed under the Act to include a description of the projects and
management actions the Agency has determined will achieve groundwater basin sustainability.
The lessons learned from the case studies clearly demonstrate the benefit of a portfolio
approach to groundwater management. Agencies that include a wide-range of actions in their
plans will greatly increase both their chances of success and the approval of their plans by the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR).

Assuring performance
The case studies demonstrate the importance of sufficient monitoring networks and enforce
ment protocols. Any policy is only as good as the monitoring and enforcement behind it.
Without adequate monitoring to detect noncompliance followed by subsequent enforcement
measures, there will often be an inclination to ignore regulatory requirements. Monitoring
and enforcement are an underappreciated aspect of groundwater management that incurs
monetary, social, and political costs. This is especially true in areas where groundwater
managers live and work alongside the very people whose actions they must manage. For this
reason, it is critical to have political and community support, as well as sufficient financial and

Summary of lessons learned
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Successful groundwater management requires a portfolio of approaches, developed and built upon
over time.
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personnel resources, to carry out monitoring and enforcement. When routine meter inspection
by the Upper Republican NRD revealed that a groundwater user was bypassing the flow meter
to irrigate in excess of the allocated amount, the district revoked the violator’s right to irrigate
their land indefinitely, which resulted in a penalty of millions of dollars of potential crop
revenue. The district received wide-spread support from the community for the decision
because it trusted and supported the district’s management of their valuable resource.
DWR will periodically review approved SGMA Plans to ensure they remain consistent with
the Act and are likely achieve the sustainability goal for their respective groundwater basins.
This review will include determining whether an Agency has 1) exceeded any established
minimum thresholds, 2) implemented projects and management actions consistent with its
Plan, and 3) addressed any data gaps to reduce levels of uncertainty.

Funding
It is difficult to imagine a scenario involving effective groundwater management without
sufficient funding to carry out appropriate management actions. Virtually all of the case
studies directly or indirectly demonstrate the need for sufficient funding to achieve
groundwater management objectives. Whether it is the need for infrastructure to shift from
groundwater use to surface water, as in the case of Harris-Galveston Subsidence District; the
development and use of computer models employed by Kings Basin; the monitoring network
established and maintained by the Edwards Aquifer Authority; or, the groundwater recharge
facilities constructed and operated by Orange County Water District, they all required significant
financial resources to achieve success.
When evaluating SGMA plans, DWR will determine whether the Agency has the financial
resources necessary to implement the Plan. Even at their most basic level, GSAs, as envisioned
under SGMA, require staff dedicated to engaging stakeholders and preparing groundwater
sustainability plans to succeed. Beyond that, significant funding is necessary for implementing the
projects and management actions contemplated in the SGMA plans. Securing sufficient funding
will be one of the biggest challenges faced by many GSAs as they work to achieve sustainability,
and the cases studies included in this report offer valuable insight on a variety of funding
mechanisms being used across the west to support successful groundwater management.
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Case studies

CASE STUDY 1 / ARIZONA

Phoenix Active Management Area
CHALLENGES FACED (SGMA UNDESIRABLE RESULTS)

Lowering
of groundwater
levels

Degraded
groundwater
quality

Land
subsidence

Reduction
of storage

PREDOMINANT WATER USES

Agricultural
AUTHORS

Paige Orcutt
Katherine Rittenhouse
Sandra Zellmer

Urban

TOOLS USED TO ACHIEVE MANAGEMENT GOALS
Regulatory
Metering of wells (self-reported)
System of grandfathered groundwater rights
with allotments
Permitting system for new and existing wells
Prohibition on new irrigated acreage
Best management practices (without costshare), including mandatory water conservation
requirements and water loss limitation
requirements
100-year Assured Water Supply requirement

Incentive-based
Transfer system for groundwater rights
Long Term Storage Credits
Agency supply augmentation and protection
Managed aquifer recharge
Reservoir operation
Infrastructure upgrades
Aquifer storage and recovery
Education and outreach
See page 26 for education and outreach tools to
achieve management goals.

LESSONS LEARNED
 n overarching safe yield goal for an entire
A
groundwater basin will not address localized
negative impacts associated with pumping
depressions; considering spatial resolution is
important to establishing a goal that will achieve
the desired results.
Basin management strategies that do not include
enforcement provisions for limiting extractions are
not likely to be effective in achieving safe yield.
Tools and analyses for establishing baseline
conditions and metrics are important for
evaluating the effectiveness of groundwater
management activities against external impacts.
Designing successive management plans around
evolving best management practices allows for
the gradual implementation of stricter regulations
and encourages the adoption of new technologies.
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 ell-structured regulatory mechanisms can
W
effectively and significantly reduce municipal and
agricultural demand. Tiering the implementation
of stricter regulations over time can give water
users time to adapt to the increased regulations.
Tiering also drives towards safe yield while not
cutting off rights or impeding growth.
Requiring demonstration of adequate water
supplies and other BMPs incentivizes the
creation of more data, modeling, and
measurement, because applicants have
incentives to develop increasingly sophisticated
information about the aquifer, information is
shared with the regulator and incorporated into
the ongoing understanding of the system.
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Background and governance
Historically, groundwater in Arizona has been pumped faster that it can be naturally recharged
(ADWR, 2008). Well pumping has caused groundwater depressions, and severe groundwater
overdraft has also caused a lowering of the land surface, known as subsidence (ADWR, 1999a).
Subsidence has led to extensive flooding and physical damage to the land surface and infra
structure (ADWR, 1999b). Groundwater depletion also has led to the loss of aquifer storage
space and some water quality issues. In addition, there are endangered species listings and
Endangered Species Act litigation over riparian fishes, birds, and habitat in Arizona; ground
water is an essential component in sustaining the streamflow and habitat of these ecosystems.
In 1980, the Arizona legislature passed the Groundwater Management Code (“the Code”),
a comprehensive legal framework for groundwater regulation (Arizona Groundwater Management
Code, 1980b). Prior to this point, there were minimal regulatory constraints on groundwater use
in Arizona. The Code established Active Management Areas (AMA) in the regions where ground
water overdraft was most severe. The five AMAs include Prescott, Phoenix, Pinal, Tucson, and
Santa Cruz (Figure 1.2, page 22).
The Arizona Legislature established a centralized state agency, the Arizona Department of
Water Resources (ADWR), to implement the Code (Arizona Groundwater Management Code,
1980a). One of the responsibilities of the Department under the Code was to develop a series of
management plans for each AMA. Plans were to be prepared for each of the five management
periods between 1980 and 2025 (1980–1990, 1990–2000, 2000–2010, 2010–2020, and 2020–2025)
to create the flexibility needed to meet the changing and growing needs of the AMAs.
The Phoenix Active Management Area (“Phoenix AMA” or “AMA”) covers 5,646 square miles
in Arizona and consists of seven groundwater basins, including the East Salt River, West Salt
River, Hassayampa, Fountain Hills, Rainbow Valley, Lake Pleasant, and Carefree sub-basins
(Figure 1.1). The climate in this area is semiarid, with an average annual precipitation of seven
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inches (ADWR, 1999a). Land use in the Phoenix AMA consists of large urban areas, agricultural
and industrial uses, and native desert. The largest urban center in the AMA is the City of
Phoenix, which is the most populous city in Arizona. Other population centers in the AMA
include Scottsdale, Chandler, Tempe, Mesa, Glendale, and Gilbert.
Water supply sources in the Phoenix AMA include surface water (Salt, Verde, and Gila rivers
on the east and the Colorado River from the northwest), groundwater, and effluent. Several
major canal systems transport surface water to and within the AMA, and several regulated water
storage reservoirs on the nearby river systems produce a reliable and safe water supply for many
areas within the AMA (ADWR, 1999a).
On average, annual water demand in the AMA is approximately 2.2 million acre feet. Of this
2.2 million, 1.5 million acre feet come from surface water sources and treated effluent (ADWR,
2011). Approximately 0.7 million acre feet are pumped from groundwater aquifers within the
AMA each year (ADWR, 2011). Approximately 45% of water demand comes from agricultural
users (including tribal agriculture), with 47% of demand from municipal users and the
remaining 84% from industrial users.
Water management in the Phoenix AMA is primarily carried out by the ADWR, in conjunction
with several additional entities. The ADWR administers state laws, explores management
methods, and develops management plans. The ADWR oversees the state’s surface water and
groundwater supplies and represents Arizona in interstate and federal issues.
The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) and the ADWR collaborate on
the Groundwater Quality Management Program. Groundwater quality directly impacts ground
water quantity, and vice versa. The ADEQ has the lead role in protecting the quality of the state’s
ground and surface waters. Federal laws such as the Safe Drinking Water Act, Clean Water Act,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act also impact water quality programs in Arizona.
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Finally, it is important to note that there are some Native Nations present within or surrounding
the Phoenix AMA, including the Gila River Indian Community, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community, and the Fort McDowell Indian Community. Native American Nations are
recognized sovereignties and are not subject to the same management structures as other water
right owners in the state.

Program management goals
The state-wide goals established by the Code are to control severe overdraft and to allocate
and increase groundwater resources in Arizona through the use of conservation measures
(ADWR, 2011).
The goal of the Phoenix AMA is to achieve safe yield by the year 2025 (ADWR, 2016). Safeyield, as defined in the Code, means “to achieve and thereafter maintain a long-term balance
between the annual amount of groundwater withdrawn in an active management area and the
annual amount of natural and artificial groundwater recharge in the active management area.”
A.R.S. § 45‑561 (12).
Safe-yield in the Phoenix AMA is defined as a state in which groundwater withdrawal does
not exceed recharge, and thus it is not a pre-determined amount. The allowable extraction
under safe-yield varies depending on natural, incidental and artificial recharge.
By achieving safe yield, managers hope to halt overdraft and its associated undesired
effects. The Phoenix AMA Management Plans implement management tools such as
conservation measures and augmentation measures to attain safe-yield, as discussed
in further detail below.

Tools used to achieve management goals
The portfolio of approaches used to meet the state and AMA goals include regulatory, incentivebased, and supply augmentation and protection tools, as well as education and outreach.
Phoenix AMA management plans include a variety of tools that have been adopted over time
for each water use sector to gradually implement new requirements and conservation targets
and adaptively meet the basin goals.

Regulatory tools
The Code contains regulatory provisions, some of which apply to all AMAs and some of which
are AMA-specific. Statewide regulations address well registrations, water quality, and transportation
of groundwater across basin and sub-basin boundaries. AMA-specific regulations address
groundwater withdrawal rights, new developments, and requirements for users to measure
and report groundwater use, all with the goal of creating a comprehensive program to manage
existing and new groundwater use.

Metering of wells (self-reported)
All non-exempt wells (wells which pump over 35 gallons per minute) in AMAs must use an
approved measuring device (i.e. meter) (ADWR, March 2016). Annual water use reports must
be submitted to ADWR and must include an accurate record of the amount of withdrawals,
delivery, and use of all water withdrawn from the well.

System of grandfathered groundwater rights with allotments
Certain historical uses may receive a type of “grandfathered” right, which allows continued
groundwater withdrawals based on the historical type and amount of the use. Irrigation
Grandfathered Rights (IGFR) are based on historical irrigation of two or greater acres of land.
Type 1 Non-Irrigation Grandfathered Rights are created when land has permanently been
Case Study 1 / Arizona / Phoenix Active Management Area
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retired from agriculture. Type 2 Non-Irrigation Grandfathered Rights were originally allocated
to those who withdrew groundwater from a non-exempt well historically for a non-irrigation
use between 1975 and 1979. Type 2 rights provide an allotment of water based on the highest
year of groundwater pumped for a non-irrigation use. Users must apply to the ADWR to create
all three types of grandfathered rights.

Permitting system for new and existing wells
All groundwater withdrawals within an AMA require a water right, permit, or service area right
from the state, except for groundwater withdrawn from exempt wells (which pump 35 gallons
per minute or less) (ADWR, 2008).
Withdrawal permits may be issued by ADWR for new withdrawals of groundwater in AMAs
that cannot be served by any of the grandfathered rights discussed above. Withdrawal permits
are limited to non-irrigation uses, and generally involve permits for uses such as industrial use,
mining, dewatering, and poor-quality groundwater withdrawal.
Service area rights authorize domestic water suppliers (cities, towns, private water companies,
and irrigation districts) to withdraw groundwater within defined service areas to supply to
their customers.

Prohibition on new irrigated acreage
Irrigated agriculture cannot be expanded beyond acreage irrigated during the late 1970’s
(ADWR, March 2016). Each farm using groundwater for irrigation purposes was issued an
IGFR, which allows the agricultural user to withdraw enough water to reasonably grow crops
that were historically grown on the land. The amount of acres that may be irrigated is limited
by the right; however, the quantity of water that may be extracted for use on those IGFR acres
is not limited by the farm’s annual allotment, unless the farm is enrolled in the best management
practices or BMP program (described below).

Best management practices without cost-share (user pays), including mandatory water
conservation requirements and water loss limitation requirements
The Code directs ADWR to create a management plan with specific, required management
practices meant to bring the basin into balance and meet the safe-yield management goal. The
Phoenix AMA management plan requirements differ by water user type (e.g. large municipal
water provides, agriculture, industries), and each category has specific water conservation
requirements that are adapted over time to meet the AMA management goals.
For example, beginning in 1987 as a part of the First Management Plan, large municipal
providers (a city, town, private water company, or irrigation district serving more than
250 acre‑feet of water per year) operating in an AMA were required to participate in a
Gallons‑per-Capita per Day program (GPCDP) that assigns an annual total gallons per-capita
per day allotment. In 2008, the Modified Non-per-Capita Conservation Program (MNPCCP)
was added, giving large municipal providers with an Assured Water Supply program (AWS,
described further below) the option to be regulated under the GPCDP or MNPCCP; large
municipal providers without an AWS were required to enter the MNPCCP (ADWR, March 2014).
Providers regulated under the MNPCCP are required to implement a public education program
and defined BMPs. The number of BMPs that a provider must implement (in addition to the
public education program) ranges from one to ten BMPs depending on the providers’ size
as determined by the number of connections it maintains (ADWR, October 2011). There are
fifty‑three BMPs to choose from ranging from BMPs that focus on public awareness to rebate/
incentives to research/innovation (ADWR, October 2011).
Agricultural users must manage water use with an allotment based on historic cropping
patterns or they can choose to opt into a regulatory agricultural best management practices
program (ADWR, March 2014). The BMP program allows the farm the flexibility to grow crops
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different from those historically grown, and to double crop in exchange for implementing
on-farm water efficiency improvements.
Industrial users (including water uses for turf facilities, dairies/feedlots, mines, electric
power plants, and sand and gravel operations) are required to implement the most currently
available conservation technologies that allow for reasonable economic returns (ADWR,
March 2014). Additionally, all industrial users are required to avoid waste and make diligent
efforts to recycle water.
Further, conservation requirements state that system losses for large municipal providers and
irrigation distribution system losses are not to exceed ten percent annually (ADWR, March 2016).

100-year Assured Water Supply requirement
The Assured Water Supply (AWS) Program puts into place regulations that limit the use of
groundwater by new subdivisions. In an AMA, anyone who offers subdivided or un-subdivided
land for sale or lease must demonstrate an assured supply of water to ADWR before the land
may be marketed to the public. To obtain a Certificate of AWS, the developer must demonstrate
that the water supply will be of adequate quality, will be available for the next 100 years, will be
consistent with the safe yield management goal of the Phoenix AMA and with the Management
Plan, and that the developer is financially capable to construct necessary water facilities.

Incentive-based tools
Most of the regulation under Phoenix AMA management plans is non-incentive-based in that it
mandates certain conservation requirements and other measures to control and offset ground
water use. However, the plans do provide flexibility in how water users can meet the requirements.

Transfer system for groundwater rights
Certain types of water rights can be transferred and marketed, allowing additional flexibility and
incentives to reduce or change uses. Type 1 Non-Irrigation Grandfathered Rights can only be
transferred with the land to which it is appurtenant. Type 2 Non-Irrigation Grandfathered
Rights, however, may be sold or leased anywhere within the AMA.

Long-term storage credits
In 1986, the Arizona Legislature established the Underground Water Storage and Recovery
Program which allows persons with surplus supplies of water to store that water underground
for recovery at a later date. When eligible water is stored for over a year, ADWR issues Long Term
Storage Credits. Credits can be recovered for various reasons, including establishing an AWS or
fulfilling replenishment obligations. Long Term Storage Credits can be transferred to another
long term storage account holder (ADWR, 2015). A market for long term storage credits has
emerged as a way for municipal and industrial users to satisfy increasing demands (West Water
Research, LLC, 2014).

Agency supply augmentation and protection
There are several major agency supply augmentation and protection initiatives underway
within the Phoenix AMA. Examples of managed aquifer recharge, reservoir operation,
infrastructure upgrades, and aquifer storage and recovery are mentioned below. These projects
allow the Phoenix AMA to better manage available surface water and groundwater resources
in a conjunctive manner.

Managed aquifer recharge
The Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District (CAGRD), which replenishes the
aquifer through recharge facilities for a fee, was developed as a way to prove an Assured Water
Supply. Established in 1993, The CAGRD is governed by the Central Arizona Water Conservation
Case Study 1 / Arizona / Phoenix Active Management Area
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District (ADWR, March 2016). The AWS and CAGRD provide some flexibility by allowing new
municipal developments to meet their requirement to prove an AWS by offsetting their
groundwater extraction.

Reservoir operation
The Salt River Project (SRP), the oldest multipurpose federal reclamation project in the United
States, serves as one of the primary water providers for much of Central Arizona. The SRP owns
and operates four reservoirs where it stores surface water from the Salt and Verde Rivers and it
also has the right to pump groundwater (Conjunctive Water Management, 2006). Both surface
and groundwater supplies from the SRP are used to meet area demands for water; surface water
being the primary resource in wet years and groundwater supplies being used extensively in
drought years. During wet years, surface water is also used to recharge the aquifer for future use
(Conjunctive Water Management, 2006).

Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by agency)
The Colorado River is the state’s largest resource for renewable water supplies. The Central Arizona
Project (CAP) brings 1.5 million acre-feet of water from the Colorado River to Central and Southern
Arizona along a 336-mile long system of aqueducts, tunnels, pumping plants, and pipelines
(ADWR, March 2016). The CAP, managed and operated by the Central Arizona Water Conservation
District, served to switch the source of supply for many water users, effectively reducing the
significant groundwater declines experienced in the AMA prior to construction of the canal.

Aquifer storage and recovery
The Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA) was established in 1996 to increase utilization of
the state’s Colorado River entitlement by providing facilities to bank under-utilized supplies
(sometimes as long term storage credits) by storing it in aquifers and in underground storage
facilities (ADWR, March 2016). Stored water is used to provide a buffer of supply to be used in
times of a shortage declaration on the Colorado River, for the purpose of securing water supplies
for the state.

Education and outreach
Management Plans provide information on best management practices that water users can
adopt as part of their required conservation measures. ADWR issues a low water use plant list,
and makes other conservation materials and reports available to the public. ADWR provides
conservation research tools and resources to encourage low water use lifestyles that targets
residents, businesses, water providers, and communities, to design and implement their own
water conservation strategies. ADWR also supports Arizona’s Project WET, which provides
workshops and curriculum for children’s water education and programs for community
engagement, as well as the Water Management Assistance Program which supports conservation
specialist positions, monitoring, planning assistance, community outreach and education
efforts (ADWR, 2014).

Monitoring and enforcement
The ADWR monitors the total quantity of water from any source (including effluent) that has
been withdrawn, diverted, received, used, and delivered, as well as an estimate of total lost and
unaccounted for water. Every irrigation district, city, town and private water company must
submit 1) an annual report that includes a map of the water distribution system, 2) the number
of miles of lined and unlined canals in the system or the water mains, storage and treatment
facilities, 3) the total quantity of water that was withdrawn, diverted, received, used and
delivered, and 4) estimate of total lost and unaccounted for water.
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The ADWR monitors IGFR water use through the use of annual reports, crop reports, energy
use records, aerial photography, and remote sensing satellite-based data (ADWR, 1999c). The
annual water withdrawal and use reports are the primary means for determining compliance
with conservation requirements (ADWR, 1999c). Well-measuring devices and equipment are
standardized and checked regularly. The ADWR reserves the right to conduct official audits of
annual reports to verify the accuracy of annual reports. The ADWR also reserves the right to
conduct field investigations and inspections. Budgeting constraints may strain the breadth and
availability of investigation or audit procedures.
The ADWR supports a voluntary “consent order” approach to enforcement. This approach
allows a water user in violation of the rules and programs to mitigate the violation in exchange
for a waiver or reduction of the civil penalties. Such mitigation can include agreeing to adopt
conservation measures, guarantee future compliance, or other strategies to mitigate the effect
and impact of the violation.
Minor violations or non-compliance may be met with an advisory letter upon
discontinuance of the violation (ADWR, 1999c). More serious violations may be met with fines,
probationary periods, the development of mitigation programs, contested hearings, cease and
desist orders, and civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day for violations directly related to illegal
withdrawals, transportation, or use of groundwater (ADWR, 1999c). Criminal penalties may be
imposed in extreme cases. A violation may bring further regulations upon a provider or user,
and continued violations could bring about criminal penalties. However, the ADWR aims to
promote cooperation, taking each violation on a case-by-case basis.
The ADWR publishes a report of Compliance and Enforcement Measures taken. For instance,
in fiscal year 2009, the ADWR collected approximately $333,000 in FY 2009 from compliance and
enforcement related activities. Within that year, there were 15 Irrigation Grandfathered Rights
out of compliance with their 2006 and 2007 flexibility accounts.

Financing
A portion of operating costs for the regulatory programs (permitting, Assured Water Supply,
etc.) are generated through program administrative fees (such as AWS application fees, permit
application fees, etc.). All other financing for the planning programs is derived from an annual
appropriation to ADWR from the legislature. Budgets for ADWR have seen significant cuts in
recent years, which has impacted ADWR’s staff capacity and its ability to institute management
plans pursuant to the statutory timelines.

Evaluation
For the Phoenix AMA, the goal of safe-yield is met when total annual basin extraction does not
exceed recharge. This definition evaluates success on a basin-wide level and thus may overlook
the localized impacts of pumping. Therefore, the AMA could meet its goal of safe-yield, and yet
see significant groundwater declines in particular areas, which may cause subsidence, fissures,
and/or increase the cost of pumping in those areas. Described as the “Swiss cheese” effect in the
aquifer – areas surrounding recharge facilities swell with recharge, while areas surrounding wells
see declining water levels. Recharging in the same areas that have significant pumping
depressions could help mitigate this effect.
The strategies used in the Phoenix AMA neither place a firm limit on the annual volume of
groundwater that may be pumped, nor for the most part, take into account the amount which
may be sustainably pumped in order for safe-yield to be met. The major exception is for new
developments, which must show they have a 100-year AWS that meets the goal of safe-yield. In
the case of municipal providers participating in the MNPCCP, there is the risk that participants
are incentivized by cost considerations to choose the lowest-cost BMPs, which may not be the
Case Study 1 / Arizona / Phoenix Active Management Area
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most effective option. Agricultural users, on the other hand, may already be incentivized to use
water efficiently, as the costs of pumping are quite high, and agricultural users are the first to
lose their CACP supply in times of shortage on the Colorado River.
ADWR officials have reported progress in reversing decades of groundwater mining
(Governor’s Water Management Commission, 2001). The ADWR asserts that overdraft
figures have not been climbing and the Phoenix AMA is near or has already attained
safe‑yield. However, it is not clear what the effect of the management strategies have
been on this achievement. For example, while aggregate municipal extraction has declined
as population has increased, it is not clear whether that is due to time trends, or to the
requirements on municipal providers. Efficiency is expected to improve over time, with
or without regulation.
In a few primary interviews, interviewees did not credit the AMA’s achievement of safe-yield
to the groundwater conservation measures specifically. Rather, credit has largely been given to
the excess CAP surface water that the AMA has enjoyed. Agricultural users, in particular, have
relied heavily on CAP water. However, by the year 2030, agricultural users will not have access
to an incentive pool of CAP water and may replace a portion of that source with groundwater.
In addition, CAGRD has earmarked CAP excess water for Assured Water Supply. However,
projected shortages on the Colorado River may lead to an elimination of any CAP excess.
Finally, the ADWR has in the past faced severe budget cuts, while evolving management
plans and their programs place more labor on the ADWR. For instance, each water provider
regulated under the MNPCCP plan must have its plan reviewed and approved by the ADWR
in order to be in compliance. Budget cuts are also to blame for the delay in adoption of the
Fourth Management Plan for the AMA.
Even with these challenges and the various factors contributing to the reductions in
groundwater declines, the aquifer underlying the Phoenix AMA has improved significantly
from where it was prior to the adoption of the Groundwater Management Code. The provisions
of the code, including the regulatory, incentive-based, and education and outreach tools,
together with significant supply augmentation and protection due to source-switching from
groundwater to Colorado River water via the Central Arizona Project, created the portfolio of
approaches that has been critical for stepping back from significant overallocation and overuse.
The Phoenix metropolitan area has essentially tripled in population since the code was enacted,
and despite that the region has made significant progress towards safe yield. The combination
of groundwater controls and the availability of a replacement supply created an environment
that was remarkably successful in shifting water use over time away from unsustainable
groundwater pumping.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Phoenix Active Management Area:
• An overarching safe yield goal for an entire groundwater basin will not address localized
negative impacts associated with pumping depressions; considering spatial resolution is
important to establishing a goal that will achieve the desired results.
• Basin management strategies that do not include enforcement provisions for limiting
extractions are not likely to be effective in achieving safe yield.
• Tools and analyses for establishing baseline conditions and metrics are important for
evaluating the effectiveness of groundwater management activities against external impacts.
• Designing successive management plans around evolving best management practices
allows for the gradual implementation of stricter regulations and encourages the adoption
of new technologies.
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• Well-structured regulatory mechanisms can effectively and significantly reduce municipal
and agricultural demand. Tiering the implementation of stricter regulations over time can
give water users time to adapt to the increased regulations. Tiering also drives towards safe
yield while not cutting off rights or impeding growth.
• Requiring demonstration of adequate water supplies and other BMPs incentivizes the
creation of more data, modeling, and measurement, because applicants have incentives to
develop increasingly sophisticated information about the aquifer, information is shared
with the regulator and incorporated into the ongoing understanding of the system.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Peter Culp (Managing Partner, Culp
and Kelly, LLP), Jennifer Diffley (Junior Partner, Culp and Kelly, LLP), Michelle Moreno
(Public Information Officer, Arizona Department of Water Resources), and Steve Olson
(Principal, Olson Policy Services) for their time and insights in constructing this case study.
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well as the diverse needs of water stakeholders,
is critical for developing mitigation structures
that are effective and feasible.
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Background and governance
Within Arizona’s growing Verde Valley region, which includes the cities and towns of Clarkdale,
Cottonwood, Camp Verde, and Sedona, groundwater is the sole potable water supply for residents.
The Verde River Basin (Figure 2.1) covers 6,230 square miles, and the Verde River is one the
last remaining perennial, free flowing rivers in the Southwestern U.S. A large portion of the
river—from Beasley Flat to Horseshoe Reservoir—is a federally designated “Wild and Scenic
River” (USDA, 2004). Nearly all of the river’s flow in the upper section near its headwaters,
which begins 21 miles north of Prescott, originates as spring water in two groundwater basins,
the Big Chino and Little Chino Basins.
The Verde provides important habitat for a large diversity of fish and wildlife species,
including the endangered Southwest Willow Flycatcher and the Razorback Sucker. The Verde
corridor contains one of the last remaining Fremont Cottonwood/Goodding Willow gallery
forests in the world (TNC, 2016). Research has found that up to 80% of species present in the
region rely in some way on the river’s riparian corridor in their life cycles (Neary et al., 2012).
The river is also critical in supporting the agricultural, rural lifestyle and high quality
of life found in the Verde Valley. Agriculture and ranching are prominent in the basin, and
agriculture is primarily composed of small and medium-sized farms and cattle ranches.
Primary crops grown in the valley include hay, corn, fruit trees, and wine grapes. In recent
years, the Verde Valley has gained recognition as a wine-producing region, with the industry’s
total economic contribution to the region estimated at about $25 million annually (Glenn,
2011). In total, researchers have suggested that 16% of the Verde Valley’s economy can be
directly attributed to the river—including around $90 million earned from river-related
recreation and tourism (Verde River Basin Partnership, 2016). The Verde River also is a
significant water supply for the Phoenix area.
In recent decades, communities in the Verde Valley have experienced rapid population
growth, increasing from about 15,000 residents in 1980 to 55,000 in 2000 and about 65,000
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residents in 2010 (Verde River Basin Partnership, 2016). As the Verde Valley region has grown,
the number of wells pumping groundwater has also grown, increasing from about 200 wells
registered in 1950, to over 6,000 wells registered in 2010. Over a recent ten-year period, the
Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) estimated that water tables at many locations
in the region have been declining, including in Clarkdale and Cottonwood (ADWR, 2009; Verde
River Basin Partnership, 2015). Further, since groundwater provides the base flow of the Verde
River (Leake & Pool, 2010), increased groundwater pumping reduces flows in the Verde River
over time. This is compounded by drought and other threats. In recent years during summer
months and at certain diversion points in the Verde Valley, some stretches of the river have
registered minimal or no flows, largely due to inefficient diversion structures that divert most
of the river’s flow.
In 1980, the Arizona legislature passed the Groundwater Management Act, an extensive
legal framework for regulating groundwater. Prior to this legislation, few restrictions were in
place to limit groundwater use. The law established Active Management Areas (AMAs) only in
the regions where groundwater overdraft was most severe (Figure 2.2), leaving groundwater
outside these areas largely unregulated. See the Phoenix case study (page 20) for more about
groundwater management within Arizona’s AMAs.
NOTE: With the exception of the Prescott AMA where groundwater within the AMA is regulated,
groundwater in the Verde River Basin, and throughout many rural parts of Arizona, remains
largely unregulated and the adjudication process for surface water rights is ongoing.
While the Groundwater Code does allow for creation of new AMAs, such propositions are
extremely controversial in most rural areas, and may be viewed by residents as unresponsive to
local needs or as an intrusion on property rights. In the San Pedro region there have been a
FIGURE 2.2
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number of efforts to create a more customized management structure, similar to an AMA,
but as of this writing, none of these efforts have succeeded.
In the Verde River Basin, and throughout many rural parts of Arizona, groundwater remains
largely unregulated and rights to surface water have yet to be finally adjudicated. The Prescott
AMA where groundwater within the AMA is regulated, is an exception in the Verde River Basin.
The Arizona General Stream Adjudication process was initiated in the 1970’s as a result of a
number of lawsuits seeking to clarify conflicting rights and address the need to establish claims
to water for tribal land based on Federal Reserved water rights. While the adjudications have
been ongoing for decades, the validity, quantity, and priority of most water rights in the state
remain unresolved.
One of the most complicated issues being addressed in the adjudications is the bifurcated
system of management of surface water and groundwater. In Arizona water law, there is
minimal recognition of the connection between surface water and groundwater. Therefore,
the courts must determine how and where tributary groundwater becomes surface water.
These two types of water are managed under two completely separate legal systems. Ground
water outside of established management areas, in non-AMA Arizona, is largely managed
under a “reasonable use” doctrine, meaning groundwater can be pumped regardless of impacts
if that water is put to reasonable and beneficial use. Surface water is managed under the prior
appropriation doctrine, a system of “first in time, first in right,” where the first person to put
the water to beneficial and reasonable use acquires a right superior to later appropriators. This
situation has been in place for so long that considerable financial commitments and investments
have been made and management planning has occurred around the ambiguities created by
this bifurcation.
Within the Verde Valley, many wells may be determined to be drawing water from the
Verde’s “subflow” zone (Pool et al., 2011). The Arizona Supreme Court has defined subflow
as “…those waters which slowly find their way through the sand and gravel constituting
the bed of the stream, or the lands under or immediately adjacent to the stream, and are
themselves a part of the surface stream.” (Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist.
No. One v. Southwest Cotton Co., 1931). This has significant implications on the in-process
adjudication of surface water rights in the Verde region. It is uncertain how many wells will
be found to be pumping “subflow” and thus to require a historic surface water right. At the
same time, even groundwater outside the legal subflow zone is ultimately hydrologically
connected to surface water resources in the area (Leake & Pool, 2010). If not mitigated,
continued and increased groundwater pumping will reduce flows in the Verde River over
time (Marshall et al., 2010).

The Verde River Exchange
The Verde River Exchange (the Exchange) is currently a small, voluntary, pilot groundwater
mitigation program. It arose from discussions among community leaders and water experts
concerned about the threats facing the Verde River and their implications for the long-term
prosperity of the region, as well as the lack of existing and workable management tools for
addressing these challenges. Starting in 2013, a small, diverse group of Verde Valley stakeholders
began an exploratory process and dialogue that eventually led to the creation of the Exchange.
The group agreed on a set of working principles, based on trust, respect, and the importance
of locally developed and managed solutions. All parties shared a broad interest in a prosperous
future for the Verde Valley that included a healthy Verde River. Ultimately, the group sought a
way forward that respected water and local property rights, that allowed for growth and
development to proceed in the Verde Valley, and that protected river flows.
While some Verde-area leaders have been involved in these issues for decades, and there had
been growing interest in determining what locally driven approaches might offer a viable way
forward to deal with water challenges in the Verde region (i.e., Garrick et al., 2011; Limbrunner
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et al., 2011), there are few relevant pilots and programs within the state of Arizona from which
to learn. Consequently, the stakeholder group in the Verde Valley invested significant time and
effort in detailed examination of Arizona water policy, rights, and institutional context, and in
sharing information about solutions that had previously been discussed in the watershed. The
group also invested in learning from other parts of the American West where communities were
confronting similar water supply challenges. As a result of this shared vetting effort, the group
agreed to further pursue a groundwater offset approach based on voluntary mitigation and
market-based concepts. Using market-inspired concepts as a base, the group worked to specify
a locally viable mechanism and procedure by which current or existing groundwater users
could voluntarily offset the impact of their pumping on the Verde River’s flows. To implement
this mechanism, the group developed a program to test, demonstrate, and implement the offset
mechanism, called the Verde River Exchange (verderiverexchange.org).The Exchange builds
on similar groundwater mitigation programs in other states (though these have typically been
in a regulatory, rather than voluntary, context). The group itself also evolved into a local Advisory
Council to help govern the Verde River Exchange and to develop the incentives, guidelines,
and procedures for the mitigation program. The Exchange is administered by local non-profit
Friends of Verde River Greenway, and the Advisory Council consists of a group of local stake
holders, including partner non-profit organizations, water users, experts, and community
leaders. The Exchange was launched in the summer of 2016 with the announcement of two pilot
mitigation projects. Two vineyards, Page Springs Cellars & Vineyards and Caduceus Cellars/
Merkin Vineyards purchased credits through the Verde River Exchange to offset a portion of
their groundwater use for the year. The credits were created when another irrigator agreed to
forego nearby water use on their pasture. As of spring 2017, the Exchange program is working
to expand the program and increase the number of projects and program participants.
NOTE: EDF is a partner on the Verde River Exchange Advisory Council, along with The Nature
Conservancy and a number of representatives from other local interests.

Program management goals
The Verde River Exchange works toward achieving the following goals:
• Provide an opportunity for local water users in the Verde Valley to voluntarily reduce their
water footprint while protecting river flows and water supplies for the future.
• Ensure a prosperous future in the Verde Valley by demonstrating a voluntary groundwater
mitigation tool that could allow for continued development and growth while protecting
river flows and their cultural, economic, and ecological benefits.
• Develop and demonstrate a locally-based, solutions-oriented program that can provide an
example of a viable approach for addressing groundwater challenges in rural Arizona.

Tools used to achieve management goals
The Exchange is a voluntary program, and thus relies on incentive-based tools and education
and outreach to help manage groundwater in the Verde Valley.

Incentive-based tools
Voluntary groundwater offset program
The Exchange provides an incentive-based mechanism for current and future water users in the
Verde River watershed to voluntarily offset the impacts of increased water use. The Exchange
aims to reduce the total amount of water removed from the river and its connected groundwater
Case Study 2 / Arizona / The Verde River Exchange
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system through a “balancing,” or offset mechanism. To do this, the Exchange works with a water
user who is willing to voluntarily reduce their recent and historic water usage. This unused
water is then recorded by the Exchange as a “water offset credit”—water that has been returned
to the Verde River system. These credits are purchased by another water user who seeks to
reduce their “water footprint” and the impacts of their groundwater use. Through this offset
mechanism, the voluntary program demonstrates how new and continued uses of groundwater
may be maintained while minimizing net impacts on the system.
The offset mechanism employed by the Exchange functions through supply and demand.
Mitigation “supply” refers to projects that reduce consumptive use, thus “supplying” credits
to the program. Mitigation “demand” is created by a groundwater pumper who purchases the
credit that has been generated based on a supplier’s reduction in use.
Supply and demand need to be thoughtfully matched to ensure that the mitigation supply
is appropriate to offset the mitigation demand. The geographic location of a specific water use
is a major determining factor for its suitability as a mitigation project. To address this issue, the
Exchange divides the Verde Valley into three distinct mitigation zones based on hydrologic and
water use characteristics. A buyer must purchase mitigation in an appropriate mitigation zone.
Matching mitigation supply and demand by zone ensures that water offset credits created and
retired on behalf of the buyer will offset their use in a nearby location, and thereby advance the
goals of the Exchange.
Mitigation supply projects involve making temporary changes to existing surface water or
groundwater uses to reduce consumptive use and generate mitigation credits. The Verde River
Exchange and its partners select supply projects based on established program criteria and due
diligence that includes a review of relevant water use and water right information.
Although other types of supply projects will be explored in the future, forbearance agreements
are currently the primary contractual tool for mitigation projects. A forbearance agreement is
a contract with a water user to abstain from the use of all or portion of their water for a given
period. Currently the Exchange records credits based on forbearance agreements that involve
reducing or ceasing water use (generally irrigation water use) for a few months to a full irrigation
season. The volume of unused water resulting from the supply project is estimated based on a
standard set of procedures and guidelines that have been developed, and is recorded as a “water
offset credit” by the Verde River Exchange.
On the “demand” side, mitigation buyers purchase water offset credits for a given year,
allowing others to be paid to use less. The Exchange uses conservative trading ratios to account
for uncertainties and assumptions in the calculation of consumptive use: the mitigation buyer
is required to purchase mitigation that is 1.25 times the amount of the groundwater use that is
being offset.
Generally, mitigation buyers are groundwater users within the Verde River Exchange project
area who are interested in reducing their “water footprint.” To be eligible to purchase credits,
buyers either have an existing groundwater use; or are new users (with uses beginning after
January 1, 2015) whose groundwater withdrawal location is outside of the mapped floodplain
Holocene alluvium. Thus far (as of spring 2017), the Exchange has worked only with existing
(as opposed to new) groundwater users as buyers. To effectively offset uses associated with new
development, different and longer-term sources of supply will need to be developed
Mitigation buyers receive a Water Offset Certificate that commemorates their participation
in the Exchange and documents their purchase of water offset credits. Certificates represent an
offset of water use, in acre-feet, for the calendar year in which the certificate is issued. The offset
can be renewed annually, contingent on available supply. Recognizing that participants may
include numerous types of water users (for example irrigators such as vineyards; hospitality
industry users; other commercial water users; and individual domestic users), the Exchange has
developed policies and guidelines that facilitate the involvement of specific types of water uses
and users such as residential, agricultural, and other specific types of commercial users.
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Education and outreach
Targeted education and community outreach are an important part of the strategic mission
of Friends of Verde River Greenway and its Verde River Exchange program. Transparency and
building local trust have been and continue to be important focus points of the new program.
The Exchange’s Advisory Council includes a diverse set of local stakeholders and water interests,
and members play an important role ensuring that the Exchange continues to play a valuable
and constructive part in the local Verde Valley community. The Exchange recognizes mitigation
credit buyers in public forums, events, and on its website and provides buyers with certificates
that can be displayed publicly and that draw attention to the contribution the buyers have
made in helping to offset the negative impacts of groundwater pumping in the region. Exchange
representatives also regularly meet with stakeholders individually and in small groups, and
give presentations to various water and community interests regarding the new program.
The Exchange is also continuing to produce educational materials for both credit sellers and
buyers who are interested in participating in the program, and further uses its materials and
presentations as a platform to engage the community more broadly and enhance awareness
of water issues in the region.

Monitoring and enforcement
Mitigation supply projects are typically implemented through contracts that include monitoring
provisions to verify contract compliance and successful project implementation. The Exchange
has also partnered with the Bonneville Environmental Foundation (BEF) in order to provide a
means of third-party verification of mitigation supply projects. The verification process, while
still evolving, currently involves a review by BEF based on a project evaluation checklist, to
ensure that projects meet program criteria. The Exchange is also exploring the potential of
registering credits with Markit™ Environmental Registry through a partnership with BEF’s
Water Restoration Certificate program.

Financing
The Verde River Exchange program aims to be financially sustainable in the long term, and
is working towards this goal as a part of its strategic plan. While individual groundwater
users purchase water offset credits, general program activities are currently funded through
philanthropic partners and supporters of Friends of Verde River Greenway and its partners.

Evaluation
While in its early stages, in general the initial pilot projects and the launch of the Verde River
Exchange program have been received positively by the community. The Exchange has made
extensive and thoughtful efforts from the beginning to discuss the program with interested
parties, solicit feedback, and share information about the mechanics and benefits of the
program. The Verde River Exchange has made a successful start in demonstrating that
groundwater mitigation concepts can work in the Arizona context- as evidenced in part by
the selection of the Exchange as one of five finalists in Arizona’s state-wide Water Innovation
Challenge in 2016, an event that was sponsored by The Arizona Community Foundation, the
Morrison Institute for Public Policy, and Republic Media. The Exchange has developed the tools,
internal policies and procedures, and management structure to continue building a robust
program into the future. To build on the initial success of the program, the Exchange and its
Advisory Council have developed a longer-term strategic plan and continue to reflect on the
first year of success along with what, if any, adjustments to internal program policies and
procedures might be needed as the program expands into the future. Since the Exchange is
Case Study 2 / Arizona / The Verde River Exchange
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housed within Friends of Verde River Greenway, the Exchange undergoes a standard, regular
program evaluation and strategic planning processes, and engages in ongoing dialogue with
community members and stakeholders about the program’s strengths and challenges.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Verde River Exchange:
• Transparency and thoughtful local engagement provide an essential foundation to build
trust and successfully implement new programs to deal with groundwater issues.
• Carefully convening and facilitating diverse local interests can over time provide a
powerful platform to discuss, deliberate, and implement locally-appropriate and
acceptable solutions.
• Groundwater mitigation can be done in a way that allows growth and development, while
securing water supplies for the future.
• Developing groundwater mitigation policies and procedures that are effective and
workable takes time and requires a deep understanding of local places and state level
context.
• Respecting local water and property rights, as well as the diverse needs of water
stakeholders, is critical for developing mitigation structures that are effective and feasible
• Despite a complex array of state and federal water law and water rights structures, workable
mitigation structures can still be developed to overcome broader institutional hurdles.
• Effective mitigation requires a dedicated and committed group of individuals to provide
ongoing support and management, as well as dedicated staff and program resources.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Benjamin Bryce (Law and Sustainability
Fellow, Arizona State University), Jocelyn Gibbon (Principal, Freshwater Policy Consulting, LLC),
Chip Norton (President, Board of Directors, Friends of Verde River Greenway), Steve Olson
(Principal, Olson Policy Services, LLC), Kim Schonek (Verde River Water Transactions Manager,
The Nature Conservancy), and Anne Mariah Tapp (Principal, Canyon Country Consulting, LLC)
for their time and input in constructing this case study.
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LESSONS LEARNED
 ata-driven models and robust outreach efforts
D
can demonstrate that local groundwater
problems often require basin-level solutions.
This helps unite stakeholders around common
management goals.
Inclusive regional management plans can
encourage, prioritize, and help fund integrated,
collaborative tools to achieve multiple basin
management goals.
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 eveloping and implementing regional projects
D
is key to building trust among basin
stakeholders.
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Background and governance
The Kings Basin, a sub-basin of the San Joaquin Valley Groundwater Basin, covers 1,540 square
miles, including parts of Fresno, Kings and Tulare Counties (Figure 3.1). The basin is in chronic
overdraft. On average, it loses between 100,000 and 160,000 acre-feet of groundwater each year
from an estimated total storage capacity of 93 million acre-feet (Kings Basin Water Authority,
2012). In some portions of the basin, this pattern of over-extraction has created the threat of
total dissolved solids (TDS) and nitrate migration in the water table. Water quality degradation
associated with these contaminants has compromised water security for several communities
that rely exclusively on groundwater (Kings Basin Water Authority, 2012).
Groundwater in the basin generally flows from the northeast, where soils are more rechargeable,
to the southwest, where thick clay in some portions of the region limits recharge potential (Water
Resources and Information Management Engineering, Inc., 2007). The two major sources of
surface water are the San Joaquin River and the Kings River. Both provide water for irrigation and
groundwater recharge, distributed through an extensive canal network maintained by federal
and local agencies. The Kings River and its tributaries also support habitats for fish (though
never a consistent anadromous fishery) and migrating birds (Kings Basin Water Authority, n.d.-b).
The Kings Basin supports significant agricultural production, with crops ranging from grapes
and figs to nuts and stone fruit. Irrigated lands are the largest source of water demand in the
basin and comprise roughly 75% of the total basin area; 12% is in urban use and the remaining
13% is undeveloped (D. Orth, personal communication, November 14, 2016). The largest urban
center is Fresno with a population of 980,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Anticipated shifts
from agricultural to urban land use and from temporary to permanent crops within the
agricultural sector can have profound impacts on water use within the basin, but it remains to
be seen how much the passage of the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA)
will affect these trends going forward. SGMA created the first statewide mandate in California to
manage groundwater sustainably. It will require several parts of the state to reduce water use
from historic levels.
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Groundwater management efforts by several agencies and private entities in the Kings
Basin have been underway for some time prior to SGMA. Among many others, the Kings River
Conservation District (KRCD), the Kings River Water Association (KRWA), and the Kings Basin
Water Authority (KBWA) have facilitated water management planning, groundwater monitoring
and data collection, regional project development, water delivery and recharge, and more.
Historically, however, local agency efforts were not well aligned as each managed only for the
water resources within their respective boundaries. This lack of coordinated data collection and
planning efforts limited the potential for meaningful solutions to the shared issues threatening
groundwater resources (Tufenkjian, 2013).
Senate Bill (SB) 1938, passed in 2002, spurred creation of four groundwater management plans
in the basin. These plans formalized existing management efforts, in partnership with the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR) and other local entities, to regularly study
groundwater levels and to execute voluntary recharge projects. They reflected a statewide effort
to increase coordination to address groundwater issues, which persisted in the basin.
FACT: The California state legislature passed Assembly Bill (AB) 3030 in 1992 to provide local
water agencies resources to manage groundwater and encourage coordination between local
entities through joint-power authorities or a Memorandum of Understanding. SB 1939, passed
in 2022, created requirements for groundwater management plans as eligibility criteria for state
funding, including documentation of public involvement, Basin Management Objectives, and
monitoring protocols.
KBWA emerged from efforts by KRCD, Alta Irrigation District, Consolidated Irrigation
District, and Fresno Irrigation District in 2009 to expand regional collaboration and planning
beyond the SB 1938 plans (Tufenkjian, 2013). As of 2012, the Authority was comprised of
17 official members and 37 interested parties, representing cities, counties, water districts, and
environmental and environmental justice organizations. Together, they developed the Kings
Basin Integrated Regional Water Management Plan (IRWMP). The plan provides a forum for
assessing regional needs, joint management planning, and prioritizing applications to state
IRWMP funding for water management projects. However, participation in the Plan is voluntary
and does not require local jurisdictions to meet any objectives related to the groundwater
depletion, supply reliability, and water quality challenges facing the basin.

Basin management goals
The Kings Basin has been operating under severe overdraft conditions for many years (Figure 3.2,
page 43). California’s five-year drought, as well as operational changes to statewide water
delivery systems resulting from endangered species protections in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River Delta and pumping actions in adjacent basins, has exacerbated this rate of depletion.
Groundwater quality, closely tied to water availability, is another ongoing challenge for the
Kings Basin. In several areas, declining water tables have resulted in the migration, infiltration,
or concentration of contaminates—in particular, TDS and nitrates (KBWA, 2012).
The IRWMP for the Kings Basin was developed to achieve the following goals:
• Halt, and ultimately reverse, current overdraft and provide for sustainable management of
surface and groundwater;
• Increase water supply reliability, enhance operational flexibility, and reduce system constraints;
• Improve and protect water quality;
• Provide additional flood protection; and
• Protect and enhance aquatic ecosystems and wildlife habitat.
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FIGURE 3.2

Change in Kings Basin groundwater storage by year
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Tools for achieving management goals
Water managers in the Kings Basin use an array of strategies to encourage more sustainable
water use.

Incentive-based tools
Managed aquifer recharge (landowner lead)
On-farm irrigation and distribution systems help reduce overdraft when surface water intentionally
delivered in excess of demand seeps through unlined ditches or fields to replenish groundwater.
Both local water agencies and landowners have a strong incentive to manage available water
resources conjunctively because capturing flood flows for recharge, for example, can be a much
less expensive source of water to replenish groundwater supplies that basin water users depend
upon than water purchased in dry years from the state water market at premium prices.
More recently, in 2011, KRCD and Sustainable Conservation, an NGO, initiated a pilot project
to spread high-flow floodwaters across farmland (J. Choperena, personal communication,
August 19, 2016). Such projects, like the Terranova Ranch On-Farm Flood Capture and Recharge
Project, have the potential to boost the basin’s average annual water supply by tens of thousands
of acre-feet (California Roundtable on Water and Food Supply, 2015). This approach also
preserves croplands by preventing their conversion to single-use recharge areas.
Nitrate levels in many groundwaters in the Kings Basin have increased over the past several
decades due to the expansion of agricultural practices and other human sources like wastewater
treatment plants. Some irrigation districts in the region are concerned about applying flood
water on farmland due to the potential to infiltrate nitrates from agricultural soil into the
water table and consequently further degrade water quality. Targeted pumping efforts, recharge
of clean water sources, and proper nutrient management practices, however, may have the
potential to help dilute or mitigate contaminant concentrations in some cases (Harter, et al., 2012).
Case Study 3 / California / Kings Basin
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Other complications associated with recharging croplands include the potential for floodwater
to damage or kill crops, depending on the time of year and type of crop. Farmers would like
compensation for bearing this risk. Some irrigation districts in the Kings Basin are currently
discussing a program to provide this incentive (D. Orth, personal communication, August 17, 2016).

Transfer systems for surface water rights
Aging infrastructure, urban growth, diminishing supply, and rising treatment costs pose water
quality and quantity challenges to Kings Basin municipalities that rely entirely on groundwater
(KRCD, 2007). The Cities of Clovis and Fresno have constructed surface water treatment
facilities and implemented a water transfer program with Fresno Irrigation District (FID) to
reduce reliance on stressed groundwater resources. Use of existing surface water, delivered by
FID to the cities in-lieu of groundwater, helps reduce overdraft and leaves more water in the
aquifer for withdrawal during dry years. The incentive driving this exchange is the cost of
developing alternative water supplies for each use.
Similarly, Alta Irrigation District (AID) is developing a water exchange program to
simultaneously address water quality issues and recharge the basin (AID, 2012). Disadvantaged
communities with limited potable groundwater will receive treated surface water from the Kings
River to help meet their drinking water needs. In exchange, these communities reduce their
groundwater use, effectively banking groundwater reserves for irrigators to draw from later. This
system should reduce localized hydraulic mounds in and surrounding some small communities
that may be high in nitrites and relocate the water to agricultural areas in the region for
irrigation and nitrogen uptake (E. Osterling, personal communication, May 19, 2017).

Best management practices (with cost-share)
Water agencies in the Kings Basin have supported implementation of a number of best manage
ment practices in the region through individual district subsidy programs, in particular funding
well meter installations and irrigation system reviews to optimize delivery efficiency for water
users. Water agencies also provide support in applications for state funding, such as the IRWMP
grant program. Basin agencies have provided funding matches for IRWMP projects involving
basin water users that advance water recycling, well metering, floodwater capture and
utilization for recharge, and more.

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Managed aquifer recharge (agency lead)
A number of basin agencies have invested in dedicated recharge basins to enhance groundwater
supplies. Currently, agencies in the Kings Basin maintain over 10,000 acres of recharge ponds
and flood control basins with the capacity of recharging over 100,000 acre-feet of water in a
single year (E. Osterling, personal communication, May 19, 2017).

Reservoir operation
Three entities manage the Pine Flat Reservoir on the Kings River through a cooperative
agreement: (1) The U.S. Army Corps determines flood releases, (2) KRWA manages the
conservation storage, and (3) KRCD operates the hydropower plant. The reservoir successfully
captures, conserves, and manages the runoff from the Kings River that is not released to retain
reservoir capacity for flood control; downstream water agencies can capture flood releases for
groundwater recharge when they occur, as discussed above.

Education and outreach
Groundwater management in the Kings Basin is largely a stakeholder-driven process. The
IRWMP began identifying and engaging stakeholders—including water agencies, counties,
environmental justice communities, recreational interests, fishery advocates, and others—in
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FIGURE 3.3
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2004 to help develop the plan (KRCD, 2007). The governance structure for the KBWA today
fosters collaborative resource management by providing opportunities for participation and
joint project development. For example, local disadvantaged communities that cannot afford
the cost of becoming official members of the joint powers authority can still participate in
IRWMP planning as non-paying Interested Parties (KBWA, 2012). Following the Community
Affairs Plan (Figure 3.3), an Outreach Work Group now leads stakeholder engagement efforts
for the IRWMP. These include maintaining a website, public meetings, and distribution of
numerous newspaper articles, e-mails, and printed materials.
Outreach involving the Kings Integrated Groundwater and Surface Water Model (Kings
IGSM) was instrumental in bringing the IRWMP’s diverse parties together. The data-driven,
analytical tool reveals groundwater and surface water interactions in the basin and helped
IRWMP members collectively understand groundwater conditions, both locally and regionally.
Using the model, IRWMP members could evaluate how different water management strategies,
such as distributed recharge, would affect water supply and quality. That understanding helped
spur joint action towards basin management goals.
NOTE: Well permitting is not included in this case study as a tool used by the local water
management agencies to achieve management goals because cities and counties in the Kings
Basin are responsible for permitting well construction, alteration, and destruction activities
Permits to drill wells in unincorporated areas in the basin are issued by the Fresno County
Department of Public Health, Division of Environmental Health; the Kings County Community
Development Agency, Building Division; and the Tulare County Environmental Health Services
Division. Incorporated cities in the counties issue permits for wells drilled within their boundaries.

Monitoring and enforcement
To inform management efforts, KRCD began monitoring groundwater trends in 1987 using
voluntarily submitted data from various local, state, and federal agencies. Today, KRCD
Case Study 3 / California / Kings Basin
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publishes annual groundwater level reports based on data obtained from about 1,100 production
wells and dedicated monitoring wells across the region based on monitoring records
from 19 different agencies (KBWA, 2012). KRCD does not maintain a database of metered
groundwater-use data, but approximates use by tracking water-table depth.
KRCD well level data helped inform development of the Kings IGSM by the KBWA, discussed
above, which simulates surface water and groundwater systems in the entire Kings Basin
(KRCD, 2007). The model, developed in 2007, evaluates water supply and flood management
outcomes under different scenarios, such as climate change and increased pumping.
KRCD and other water agencies are currently discussing how or if a local numeric model
could be utilized for SGMA. Discussions are also underway regarding how to continue to
balance privacy interests of well owners with the need to better understand basin conditions in
order to create solutions to persistent threats created mostly by overdraft. The district would like
to collect more depth data by installing additional dedicated monitoring wells and daily data
loggers, but that effort may soon be carried forward instead by newly formed Groiundwater
Sustainability Agencies (E. Osterling, personal communication, May 19, 2017).
In 2003, the Regional Water Quality Control Board initiated the Irrigated Land Regulatory
Program (ILRP) to prevent agricultural runoff from impairing surface waters. The program
expanded to include groundwater in 2012. Growers in the Kings Basin (and throughout
California) are now required to monitor their water quality and take corrective actions when
impairments are found. Using ILRP data and on behalf of the Kings River Water Quality
Coalition Authority, KRCD is in the process of establishing regional accounting of on-farm
nitrate use in an effort to keep surplus nitrates from leaching into the water table (D. Orth,
personal communication, August 16, 2016).
Beyond ILRP, there has been no regulatory driver for groundwater data collection in the
Kings Basin. Efforts by KRCD and others to maintain information on groundwater conditions
and develop groundwater models have only informed the voluntary management efforts
described above.

Financing
Water agencies in the Kings Basin accrue funds through various methods. Irrigation districts
raise revenue through water delivery charges based on the volume of surface water delivered to
customers. KBWA, though, is funded by an annual dues payment paid by each member (KRCD,
2007). IRWMP stakeholders also contribute the use of facilities, such as canals, and volunteer
their time for plan operations and implementation.
FACT: Proposition 218 in California, passed in 1996, constrains local agencies’ abilities to raise
funds beyond the cost of service (i.e., the cost of water delivery) by requiring a vote on any
increases in tax, assessment, or certain user fees. This limits the availability of many management
strategies for local agencies. Districts may also issue bonds of indebtedness to finance projects,
though highly leveraged districts, subject to debt limits, may have only limited capacity to do so.
The IRWMP also receives funding from state, federal or private grants and loans, which
typically help fund infrastructure projects. Since 2001, the Authority has leveraged over
$35 million in financial support for use toward planning activities and to construct projects
that address multiple program management goals, from water conservation to critical water
quality needs of disadvantaged communities (DACs) in the basin (KBWA, n.d.-a). Some DACs,
especially smaller ones, lack the resources to cover the full cost of preparing funding appli
cations for such grants. KBWA charges a nominal amount to some of these communities to
cover application preparation costs. This provides a demonstrated financial commitment from
DAC beneficiaries while welcoming their active engagement in addressing water issues.
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A variety of other entities have helped fund implementation of water management tools in the
basin. Recharge projects beyond the IRWMP are sometimes funded by private foundation grants.
Companies such as Coca-Cola and General Mills have funded some recharge projects to ensure
that their supply chain is resilient to future water shortages and that they can continue sourcing
crops in California (J. Choperena, personal communication, August 19, 2016). The Almond Board
of California has partnered with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory to better understand
the potential of using California’s almonds orchards for groundwater recharge (Nidver, 2016).

Evaluation
The Kings Basin suggests what is possible when diverse interests in water management
recognize their interdependency and work together towards common goals. Prior to
the IRWMP, independent management efforts among the many basin water agencies
only exacerbated groundwater problems (Tufenkjian, 2013). Although the IRWMP is nonregulatory and participation in projects is optional, as consistent with state law, the forum
provided by the KBWA helped promote common goals and mutually beneficial solutions.
One of the most important factors in bringing the many IRWMP stakeholders together was
outreach conducted with the Kings IGSM. By displaying current groundwater conditions and
projecting future basin impacts associated with individual actions, the data-driven model
illustrated the need to make local management decisions from a basin perspective (D. Orth,
personal communication, January 25, 2017). Over time, the diverse IRWMP stakeholders came
to respect each other’s distinct objectives, overcame initial mistrust, and began to develop common
goals for the basin. Importantly, these established relationships now reinforce trust in and
commitment to the IRWMP’s efforts. Members vouch for each other even in the face of external
criticisms of water management efforts (D. Orth, personal communication, January 25, 2017).
Ironically, development of the Kings IGSM itself proved the need to establish common goals.
Data used to develop it was largely collected under confidentiality agreements to protect well
owner information, but some IRWMP stakeholders later wanted to use the model’s predictive
ability to assess water management scenarios at a scale that would compromise that privacy.
There is ongoing discussion about how the model should be used to respect these differing
perspectives, which reveals the value of creating unifying visions for basin management up
front (D. Orth, personal communication, January 25, 2017).
As outlined in the IRWMP and pursuant to other existing authorities, groundwater managers
and users from different agencies have succeeded in recharging some areas of the Kings Basin.
These efforts have provided one of the best examples of how to realize win‑win solutions, for
example through collaborative on-farm recharge programs between water agencies and
landowners. Extensive, voluntary water level monitoring among water agencies and landowners
was an important additional management tool in these efforts, as it informed what parts of the
basin were experiencing the most severe overdraft. These have been critical steps towards
reaching sustainability goals and could be a model for groundwater managers across the state.
However, the IRWMP is nonbinding and does not require that local jurisdictions meet any
objectives to curb overdraft and reverse declining groundwater levels. Despite the expansion of
recharge projects in the basin and some associated slowing of groundwater decline, overdraft
conditions have persisted. Figure 3.4 (page 48) shows that groundwater levels declined across
the majority of the basin from 2003-2014, with large areas subject to a 20 or 40 foot drop in water
table elevation and smaller areas showing a 60, 80, and even 100 foot decline. The estimated change
in storage from 2003–2014 is a decrease of 3,166,439 AF, or 287,858 AF per year on average (KRCD,
2014). Larger reductions of groundwater in storage occur during drought years when surface
water supplies are constrained, even exhausting water recharged in wetter years (KRCD, 2014).
The IRWMP faces some additional challenges. The Kings Basin has considerable capacity to
absorb additional wet-year floodwaters, but there are constraints in expanding conjunctive use
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FIGURE 3.4

Change in Kings Basin groundwater storage
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facilities, including access to and cost of prime recharge lands, limited conveyance capacity, and
access to surface water (KRCD, 2005). These must be balanced with considerations of how to use
recharge to address water quality impacts and depletions of interconnected surface water and
groundwater. Future state funding for IRWMPs is also uncertain. Proposition 1 provided $34 million
to IRWMPs in the Tulare/Kern area, but funds from Proposition 50 and 84 are nearly exhausted.
Paying members are exploring alternative funding and seeking ways to reduce their own fees,
which, according to KRCD, could impact programmatic funding for the IRWMP. Keeping the
IRWMP’s stakeholders cooperatively engaged will likely be an ongoing challenge as well.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Kings Basin:
• Data-driven models, coupled with robust outreach efforts, can demonstrate that local
groundwater problems require basin-level solutions, which helps unite diverse
stakeholders around common management goals.
• Clarifying objectives for model use prior to model development will help manage
expectations and avoid misunderstandings regarding its use.
• Inclusive regional management plans can encourage, prioritize, and help fund integrated,
collaborative tools to achieve multiple basin management goals.
• Developing and implementing regional projects is key to building trust among basin
stakeholders.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Joe Choperena (Senior Project Manager,
Sustainable Conservation), David Orth (Former General Manager, KRCD), Eric Osterling
(Manager of Water Resources, KRCD), and Cristel Tufenkjian (Manager of Community and
Public Relations, KRCD) for their time and input in constructing this case study.
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CASE STUDY 4 / CALIFORNIA

Orange County Water District
CHALLENGES FACED (SGMA UNDESIRABLE RESULTS)

Lowering
of groundwater
levels

Seawater
intrusion

PREDOMINANT WATER USES

Urban
AUTHOR

Drew Palmer

TOOLS USED TO ACHIEVE MANAGEMENT GOALS
Regulatory
Metering of wells (self-reported)
Incentive-based
Fees and surcharges on groundwater pumping
Agency supply augmentation and protection

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Managed aquifer recharge (agency lead)
Recycled water
Seawater intrusion barriers
Reservoir operation
Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by agency)
Education and outreach
See page 58 for education and outreach tools to
achieve management goals.

LESSONS LEARNED
 trong and comprehensive legislation, such as
S
the Act that created the Orange County Water
District, gives the groundwater manager the
authority to implement a suite of management
tools – from metering wells to controlling water
supply to implementing large-scale recharge
and recycling projects – all of which are essential
to the basin’s success.
Innovative pricing mechanisms can promote
equity, flexibility, and sustainable groundwater
use within a basin – without capping water use.
However, success is dependent on access to
imported water, which is not an option for many
basins.
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 ollaborative and transparent management
C
processes through annual reports, regular
meetings, and purposeful community engage
ment promote participation and enhance trust
within the basin.
Financial resources are vital to supporting basin
management and operational activities.
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Background and governance
The Orange County groundwater basin (Figure 4.1) serves as the primary water source for
approximately 2.4 million residents of the northern and central portions of Orange County,
California (OCWD, 2015d). The groundwater basin contains an estimated 66 million acre-feet (af)
of water (OCWD, 2015d)—over one million of which is considered “usable capacity” (OCWD,
2014)—and covers approximately 350 square miles (Herndon & Markus, 2014).
The basin is primarily recharged by the Santa Ana River, which flows from the San Bernardino
Mountains through Orange County into the Pacific Ocean (OCWD, 2015d). The river provides
the largest source of natural recharge of the groundwater basin, though its flow can fluctuate
considerably depending on annual precipitation and amount of flow siphoned off for use
upstream in San Bernardino County (Herndon & Markus, 2014).
FACT: The Orange County Water District was formed out of the Santa Ana Basin Water Rights
Protective Association, which was established by the local Farm Bureau to combat diminishing
water supply, prevent flood damage, restore basin water quality from ocean seepage, and
protect water pumping rights. The new District was granted authority to litigate for water rights,
import supplemental water, and capture flood and runoff water for the basin. District directors
were elected according to property ownership, one vote for each $100 of property owned.
When Orange County doubled in population in the 1920s, the groundwater basin proved
unable to meet the growing water demands of the area. Residents were spurred to action
when it was discovered that declining water levels in the basin were leading to seawater
intrusion and contamination of the portions of the basin nearest the ocean. This threat,
together with the need to reduce overdraft, combat seasonal flooding of the Santa Ana River
and curtail “outsider” pumping from Los Angeles, led to the formation of the Orange County
Water District (OCWD or District), in 1933, through state legislation (District Act) (OCWD, 2014).
FIGURE 4.1
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The primary task of this new authority was to safeguard the sustainability of the basin, both in
volume and quality.
Since its inception, the District has grown in size and population—from around 160,000
acres to over 240,000 and from 120,000 residents to around 2.4 million (OCWD, 2015d). As a
result of the rapid suburban development in Orange County since 1950, the use of basin water
for agricultural production has fallen from 86% of water extracted (Maven, September 3, 2013)
to only around 1% in 2016 (OCWD, 2016). As of 2016, almost all water pumped from the basin is
for residential and commercial use.
OCWD does not directly provide water for homes and businesses, but instead manages
the basin for 19 local municipal water retailers who pump from the basin from approximately
400 groundwater wells. The District is responsible for all aspects of managing the basin and
its operations—determining and assessing pumping fees, monitoring and forecasting basin
conditions, and conducting recharge and conservation operations.
OCWD is governed by a 10-member board of directors, each of whom represents a
geographic division of the District. Seven of these members are elected from their respective
divisions, while the directors from the cities of Anaheim, Fullerton, and Santa Ana are appointed
by their respective city councils. Board members serve four-year, renewable terms (OCWD,
2015b). Water retailers—mostly local municipalities—who pump from the basin work closely
with the OCWD Board to monitor usage, report demand forecasts, and advise on management
strategy and operations. With a full-time staff of over 200 (OCWD, 2015c), and funding through
a mixture of property tax and groundwater pumping revenues, the OCWD is a robust authority,
fully equipped with the resources needed to manage the basin and its operations.
OCWD fills the need for cooperative groundwater management as groundwater use
remained largely unregulated within the State until the passage of California’s 2014 Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). The Act was designed to alleviate problems associated
with the lack of formal management and regulation of many California basins. The law requires
the state Department of Water Resources to publish data on groundwater levels as well as a set
of “best management practices” for local groundwater users. In turn, those users must come
together and create Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) and Plans (GSPs) over the next
three to five years so that they attain basin sustainability within 20 years of adopting the plans.
Both the District and municipal retailers were heavily involved in the development of the
SGMA law, and OCWD’s current management structure is almost completely compliant with
the new legislation. Under a special SGMA provision, OCWD has already been designated an
“exclusive local agency” in the Act, and therefore does not have to formally become a GSA or
develop a GSP. The only requirement of SGMA that is currently unmet by the District is the
inclusion of all DWR Basin 8-1 land in a management program. There are currently several
small portions of the DWR Basin 8-1 that are not under OCWD jurisdiction, and the District is
currently developing plans to collaborate with entities in those areas to fulfill the new legislative
requirements (Herndon, 2016). OCWD, in collaboration with other agencies, submitted an
Alternative submittal to DWR in December 2016 per CA Water Code Section 10733.6 to comply
with SGMA. Aside from submitting the Alternative, OCWD is not planning any significant policy
or organizational changes due to the new legislation (G. Woodside, personal communication,
July 15, 2016).

Program management goals
Undesirable effects (as defined in the Act) within the basin relate to groundwater quality and
declining groundwater levels. The key threat to groundwater quality is seawater intrusion from
the Pacific Ocean on the western edge of the basin. Key threats to groundwater levels in the
basin include water overdraft by basin pumpers, lack of natural recharge due to droughts or
reduced stream flow, and leakage of groundwater out of the basin.
Case Study 4 / California / Orange County Water District
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OCWD has three stated goals concerning groundwater basin management:
• Protect and enhance groundwater quality;
• Protect and increase the basin’s sustainable yield in a cost-effective manner;
• Increase the efficiency of District operations (OCWD, 2015d).
The District also promotes environmental goals of nature conservation and sustainable care
of the ecosystems around District-owned land and facilities, particularly in the Prado Basin, an
area of constructed wetlands below Prado Dam.

Tools used to achieve management goals
Regulatory tools
Metering of wells (monitored)
Within the basin, wells operated by municipal water districts, cities, and one private water
company are fitted with calibrated flow meters—collectively, this accounts for 97% of all basin
water use. These entities report this use to OCWD on standardized forms (OCWD, 2015d).
NOTE: In California, regulatory authority over well construction, alteration, and destruction
activities rests with local jurisdictions (cities, counties, or water agencies). In Orange County,
permits to drill wells are issued by the Orange County Division of Environmental Health in all
parts of the County except in the Cities of Anaheim, Buena Park, Fountain Valley, Orange, and
San Clemente. These cities issue permits for wells drilled within their boundaries. Therefore,
well permitting is not included in this case study as tool used by the water management agency,
OCWD, to achieve management goals.

Incentive-based tools
Fees and surcharges on groundwater pumping
OCWD charges water users per acre-foot of water pumped to regulate over-pumping. Since
there is no formal cap on the aggregate quantity that can be pumped nor specific allocation to
different water retailers, the District instead uses a pricing mechanism to incentivize individual
retailers to use the optimal amount for their municipality and not to over-pump.
In a typical year, the basin (augmented by existing systems for enhancing groundwater
recharge) can sustainably meet about 70% of the District’s total water demand. The remaining
water demand cannot be sustainably extracted, and so municipal retailers independently
purchase imported water from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
through the Orange County affiliate organization, the Municipal Water District of Orange
County (MWDOC). This water is transported to Southern California using aqueducts from the
Colorado River and the State Water Project and is routed to the municipalities inside the District.
MWD serves as a reliable source of water, and OCWD and municipal retailers do not currently
face threats of supply shortages when contracting with MWD (G. Woodside, personal communi
cation, July 15, 2016). There are long-term supply shortage concerns with imported water due to
climate change and other factors.
FACT: The State Water Project is a state-run system of aqueducts and reservoirs that bring water
from central and northern California down to the water-scarce areas of Southern California. MWD
is the largest contractor of State Water Project water.
OCWD uses three main mechanisms to ensure that the basin is not overdrawn in any given
year (i.e., relative to the annual aggregate pumping target): the Basin Pumping Percentage (BPP),
the Replenishment Assessment (RA), and the Basin Equity Assessment (BEA) (OCWD, 2014).
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FIGURE 4.2
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FACT: The Replenishment Assessment was established as the original price mechanism in 1954,
allowing the Orange County Water District to purchase supplemental water from the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California. The Basin Equity Assessment and Basin Pumping
Percentage were subsequently introduced in the 1960s as additional controls to preserve
basin supply, as shifting basin conditions and over-pumping threatened the aquifers.

In order to determine the BPP, OCWD first estimates a quantity of water than can sustainably
be drawn from the basin that year using monitoring wells and computer modeling. OCWD
updates the basin model every 3–5 years and the model is approved by a Model Advisory Panel
made up of groundwater modeling experts. OCWD has set a policy that short-term pumping
may exceed water recharge as long as the accumulated overdraft stays within a predefined
“safe operating range” (Figure 4.2).
Once determined, this number is then divided by the projected demand for water in the
District to calculate the BBP, the percent of total annual water demand that can be safely provided
by the groundwater basin (Figure 4.3, page 56). The District aims for this percentage to be as
high as possible, and it has recently hovered around 70% (OCWD Groundwater Management
Plan, 2015). OCWD must hold a public hearing each year to set the BPP (OCWD, 2015d).
Each water retailer that draws from the basin pays the flat RA rate for each acre-foot of water
they pump up to the BPP percentage of their total (actual) demand. A retailer whose percentage
of water pumped from the basin (i.e., relative to their total demand) exceeds the BPP pays
the BEA cost in addition to the RA on the percentage of pumped groundwater in excess of the
BPP. For example, for a BPP set at 70%, a municipality projecting a demand of 50,000 af for the
upcoming water year (July 1–June 30) would pay the RA for the first 35,000 af, and the RA+BEA
for any additional water pumped. The BEA rate is set so that the RA rate plus the additional BEA
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FIGURE 4.3

Calculation of the basin pumping percentage
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rate adds up to the cost of imported water. This mechanism is designed to make water retailers
indifferent between pumping above the BPP and importing water, which limits the amount
of basin water drawn. For the 2015–16 water year, OCWD set the BPP at 70%, the RA at
$322/af, and the BEA at $587/af (OCWD, 2015a). Figure 4.4 (page 57) shows the historical
costs of the RA fee, the cost of producing groundwater, and the cost of importing water from
MWD. The RA fee closely mirrors the full cost of producing groundwater, but is slightly lower
due to additional capital and operational costs of pumping. To recover the difference between
the revenue generated by the RA and BEA and the overall cost of operating, the District utilizes
a small portion of the property tax levied in Orange County along with income from leases
of District property. Some projects are also partially funded through state and federal grants
(OCWD, 2015d).

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Since Orange County is largely decentralized and suburban, an organization like OCWD
can function well as a centralized authority since there is no one large municipality to take
on that leadership role. There are several major basin management operations that are run
by the District and funded using the revenues from the RA and BEA fees described above.

Managed aquifer recharge (agency lead), including use of recycled water
Since the basin provides approximately 70% of the annual water demand inside the District,
OCWD’s foremost priority is adequate recharge of the aquifer to ensure sustainable levels of
pumping into the future. The District owns a six-mile section of the Santa Ana River—the main
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FIGURE 4.4

Cost of OCWD basin water and MWD imported water
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source of natural basin recharge—as well as a robust system of recharge basins, pipelines, and
dams that collect and recharge runoff from the river basin. These facilities are located on the
eastern, inland side of the groundwater basin, where proximity to the mountains results in
coarser soil more suitable for water percolation (OCWD, n.d.) In total, the District operates about
1,100 acres of these infiltration basins—almost two square miles (Maven, September 3, 2013).
In addition to natural recharge, OCWD recharges imported water purchased from MWDOC
into the aquifer—using surface recharge basins—to boost total recharge. OCWD also injects
recycled wastewater into the basin directly through injection wells. A growing portion of this
artificial recharge comes through the District’s innovative Groundwater Replenishment System
(GWRS). This joint project with the Orange County Sanitation District (OCSD), the largest of
its kind in the world (OCWD, 2015c), recycles wastewater from homes and business in the
District—water that normally would be dumped in to the Pacific Ocean—using a three-step
process: microfiltration, reverse osmosis, and an ultraviolet light/hydrogen peroxide treatment.
The resulting water after this treatment is certified drinking-water quality and can be injected
back into the basin. Recycled water can currently be produced at approximately half the cost
of importing water from the MWD, while also using less energy (OCWD, 2015c). OCWD aims
for the GWRS to supply an ever-larger share of water recharge into the basin (G. Woodside,
personal communication, July 15, 2016).

Seawater intrusion barriers
The preeminent risk to the basin’s water quality is seawater intrusion. Well-known since
the creation of the District, the problem of seawater contamination in the aquifer has been
a key consideration in the infrastructure design, pumping locations, and pricing scheme of
water extraction. Portions of the shallow aquifers close to the Pacific coastline are especially
vulnerable to intrusion. After low water levels caused the ocean to intrude several miles
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inland into the basin in the 1950s, OCWD began construction of freshwater hydraulic “barriers”
equipped with injection wells that pump supplemental freshwater directly into the basin to
hold back the sea (OCWD, 2014). The Talbert Seawater Intrusion Barrier and the Alamitos
Seawater Intrusion Barrier are the two major barrier sites, comprising 36 and 43 injection wells,
respectively (OCWD, 2015d). Currently, water injected at Talbert is exclusively recycled water
from OCWD’s wastewater reclamation facility, while water at Alamitos is approximately 50%
recycled and 50% imported from MWD (OCWD, 2015d).

Reservoir operation
OCWD engages in a variety of natural resource conservation initiatives, most notably in the
Prado Basin. The Prado Dam, which spans the Santa Ana River upstream from the District, was
built for flood control and flow management; OCWD owns and manages around 2,000 acres in
the flood plain just behind the dam (G. Woodside, personal communication, July 15, 2016). To
mitigate potential environmental damage caused by temporary stormwater capture behind
Prado Dam, OCWD has funded and operated conservation efforts since the 1980s—including
planting native wildlife, controlling invasive plants, and providing special protection for
several threatened species. In addition to this significant work in the Prado Basin, OCWD
also actively participates in habitat management and wildlife preservation initiatives when
building and expanding its facilities throughout the District (G. Woodside, personal communi
cation, July 15, 2016).

Education and outreach
OCWD actively works to engage residents and communities inside its borders through
various water education and outreach programs. A public affairs team with five full-time
staff is dedicated to operating these programs, which reach over 7,000 people annually. For
example, staff have given more than 70 off-site presentations and over 200 on-site tours to
community leaders and groups (G. Woodside, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Other
programs include tours of the groundwater recycling facility, educational programming for
kids about water conservation, and annual outreach events like the Children’s Water Education
Festival, Groundwater Adventure Tour and the OC Water Summit. Further, OCWD publishes
annual reports on its operations and promotes stakeholder participation through regular
hearings, requests for comment, and workshop sessions—all to engage retailers who use
basin water.

Monitoring and enforcement
OCWD collects pumping data from municipal water retailers, who collectively operate
approximately 400 pumping wells. All entities pumping more than 1 af/year from the basin
are required to report production data to the District every six months. For each of the
approximately 200 large-capacity municipal and privately-owned supply wells operating
within the basin, production data must be reported monthly, and production volumes are
verified by OCWD field staff (OCWD, 2015d).
These reports help OCWD stay on track to match their expected pumping projections, and
are used for fee assessment and storage capacity maintenance. In addition to this verification
process, the District also uses a network of over 500 District-owned monitoring wells to conduct
more comprehensive well monitoring every year in June (Maven, September 3, 2013), with smaller
samples done quarterly and monthly (G. Woodside, personal communication, July 15, 2016).
Data is aggregated into an electronic database called the Water Resources Management
System (WRMS). Individual well data is not made publicly available in real time (G. Woodside,
personal communication, July 15, 2016), but the annual Engineer’s Report issued by OCWD
gives detailed, aggregated basin metrics from the previous year. OCWD provides any and all
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data upon request. OCWD also provides a summary of basin storage conditions on its web site
that is updated monthly.
The robust authority given to the District and the careful design of the pricing scheme deters
water retailers from falsifying or failing to report usage. While the need for enforcement
mechanisms does not appear to be a pressing concern for the District, mechanisms exist in the
legislation to punish those who fail to report or willfully misrepresent their pumping activity in
the basin. For example, under the District Act, filing a fraudulent water production report and
tampering with basin equipment are classified as misdemeanor crimes. Failing to pay the RA
fees on time results in a 1% interest fee per late month, and failing to file a production report
on time results in a penalty of 10% of the amount owed to OCWD. In an interview, an OCWD
representative noted that retailers almost never commit such violations, and described the
relationship between the District and the water producers in positive terms (G. Woodside,
personal communication, July 15, 2016).

Financing
For the 2015 fiscal year, the Replenishment Assessment paid by water retailers provided almost
$90 million in operating revenue—a significant majority of its $103 million total operating
revenue. The BEA accounted for a much smaller share (less than 1%), an indication of the
effectiveness of the equity assessment in discouraging over-pumping. OCWD also collected
$23 million from Orange County property taxes, as well as other sources of revenue including
investment income and capital gains. The District’s operating expenses—$125 million in 2015—
were spilt between water purchases (30% of operating expenses), water recycling (24%),
depreciation/amortization (23%), and administrative costs (23%). Supplemental water purchases
from MWD, the largest single operating expense, reached $38 million (OCWD, 2015c). While
these expenses and revenue net out to a small loss, the District reported almost $180 million in
cash and investments in 2015 (OCWD, 2015c), a substantial cushion that meets the District’s
required reserve holdings as well as covers expenses between the twice-annual RA payments
from retailers (G. Woodside, personal communication, July 15, 2016).
In addition to year-to-year costs of purchasing MWD water, maintaining infrastructure,
and well management, OCWD also invests in long-term capital projects such as expansion
of the GWRS, construction of new surface recharge basins, and new seawater barrier injection
wells. The District reported over $950 million in assets in 2015, almost $700 million of which
were capital assets (OCWD, 2015c). OCWD obtains a large share of its capital financing
through 20- and 30-year infrastructure loans from the State of California (G. Woodside, personal
communication, July 15, 2016). Long-term debt totaled almost $550 million (OCWD, 2015c),
and debt payment is factored into budgeting when the District sets RA rates each year.

Evaluation
The Orange County groundwater basin is a unique example of a successful groundwater
management partnership between urban municipalities. The District’s innovative pricing
scheme, in combination with basin recharge, seawater barriers, water recycling, and education
and outreach initiatives—exemplify a portfolio of approaches that together work to promote
cost efficiency, improved water quality, and enhanced basin sustainability.
The mechanisms described above give OCWD the flexibility to adapt to changing supply
conditions. In times of drought—or when other factors prevent full recharge of the basin—
the District can lower the BPP to incent the water retailers to pump less and import more.
The adaptive pricing scheme also allows the District to adjust pumping in response to one of
the biggest threats to the aquifer—seawater intrusion into the basin. In 2003, OCWD created
the Coastal Pumping Transfer Program (CPTP). This program modifies the RA/BEA pricing
Case Study 4 / California / Orange County Water District

59

structure to incent less pumping in portions of the basin near the ocean which are vulnerable
to seawater intrusion (PR Newswire, October 13, 2003). The CPTP adjusts the BEA for different
municipal retailers based on location, to incent producers near the coast to pump less water
than the BPP and inland producers to increase their pumping above the BPP by a corresponding
amount. Lower pumping near the coast prevents seawater contamination and reduces
groundwater loss to Los Angeles (OCWD, June 19, 2013).
Since the District Act establishing the OCWD became law over 80 years ago, the District has
a broad and stable mandate to exercise its statutory authority to manage pumping rates, control
supply, monitor water use, and build projects (OCWD, January 2015). The decentralized political
geography of the area—as well as the relatively small geographic area of the basin—strengthens
relationships among municipalities in the District, who have a long history of shared
governance in the absence of a clear urban center of the county. In phone interviews, both
OCWD and a water retailer described the relationship between the District and pumpers in
largely favorable terms.
However, one potential drawback to the District’s pricing approach is that while the pricing
mechanism creates the correct incentive to limit groundwater pumping, the BPP somewhat
erodes the incentive for municipalities to limit their total water demand. The District’s definition
of demand – limited to pumped groundwater and purchased surface water – does not incent
municipalities to privately invest in water-saving innovations, such as water recycling facilities.
More generally, as the price difference between basin groundwater and replacement surface
water from MWD increases, OCWD may face greater pressure from water retailers to allow
unsustainable withdrawals from the basin.
One currently unresolved policy disagreement in the District—what should be counted
as water demand?—provides a general illustration of the tensions that can arise when policy
choices have distributional consequences. OCWD determines how many acre-feet each retailer
may pump at the RA based on the BPP share of “water used.” OCWD includes water pumped
from the basin and supplemental imported water in this measure, but does not include, for
example, recycled water. This definition has created a conflict with Irvine Ranch Water District
(IRWD), which owns and operates its own water recycling facility. In accordance with the OCWD
Act, OCWD does not consider IRWD’s recycled water supply when calculating IRWD’s “total
water demand” for the BPP. IRWD filed a suit against the District in 2016 to fight this policy,
which, if reversed, would increase the amount IRWD can pump out of the basin at the RA rate
before the BEA kicks in (IRWD, n.d.). Other retailers in the District claim that they stand to pay
more if IRWD prevails, thus raising tensions.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Orange County Water District:
• Strong and comprehensive legislation, such as the Act that created the Orange County
Water District, gives the groundwater manager the authority to implement a suite of
management tools—from metering wells to controlling water supply to implementing
large-scale recharge and recycling projects—all of which are essential to the basin’s success.
• Innovative pricing mechanisms can promote equity, flexibility, and sustainable
groundwater use within a basin—without capping water use. However, success is
dependent on access to imported water, which is not an option for many basins.
• Collaborative and transparent management processes through annual reports, regular
meetings, and purposeful community engagement promote participation and enhance
trust within the basin.
• Financial resources are vital to supporting basin management and operational activities.
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Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Paul Weghorst (Executive Director of
Water Policy, Irvine Ranch Water District) and Greg Woodside (Executive Director of Planning
and Natural Resources, Orange County Water District) for their time and input in constructing
this case study.
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Background and governance
The San Luis Valley, situated between the San Juan and Sangre de Cristo mountain ranges in
southern Colorado, lies above two aquifers. One of the aquifers is confined, which means it is
pressurized and separated from the overlying unconfined aquifer by relatively impermeable
layers of clay. These aquifers, along with surface water from the Rio Grande, Conejos and other
rivers and streams, have historically sustained the production of potatoes, alfalfa, and small
grains in the region. Groundwater is a critical resource since the valley’s average rainfall is only
seven inches per year.
Within the valley, the Rio Grande Water Conservation District (“RGWCD” or the “District”),
a Special District created by the Colorado General Assembly in 1967, protects and enhances
water resources within most of the Rio Grande River basin (Figure 1). The District encompasses
all or portions of five counties in Colorado: Alamosa, Rio Grande, Conejos, Saguache and
Mineral Counties. Within this five-county region, approximately 35% of water withdrawals are
from groundwater resources and 65% are from surface water resources. Over 98% of water in
the valley is used to irrigate crops. Of the remainder, half is used for aquaculture, and the rest
is distributed between domestic use, livestock, public supply and mining (USGS, 2010).
The groundwater system in the basin is generally hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande
River and other surface water systems, which flow through the valley. Historically, a portion
of the unconfined aquifer underlying the valley has been separated from the Rio Grande by a
shallow groundwater divide, known as the “Hydraulic Divide.” This historically hydrologicallydistinct area within the San Luis Valley is known as the “Closed Basin” (RGWCD, 2014). However,
over-extraction of groundwater from the unconfined aquifer of the Closed Basin and
diminished inflows from prolonged drought have caused the divide to move closer to the river,
joining the Closed Basin in the San Luis Valley to the Rio Grande in some areas, and thus
creating a link between groundwater withdrawals in the Closed Basin and surface water
depletions in the Rio Grande River.
FIGURE 5.1
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Water rights in Colorado are governed by prior appropriation law, often described with the
phrase “first in time, first in right” (DWR, n.d.-b) Farmers have been using surface water to
irrigate their crops in the area since the 1800s. Mainly in response to a severe drought in the
1950s, coupled with development of available electricity and improvements in turbine pumps,
farmers began drilling wells to access the vast groundwater supplies under the valley. However,
pumping groundwater only further reduced the surface water available to those with senior
rights due to the interconnected nature of the surface and groundwater (C. Simpson and
A. Davies, personal communication, July 13, 2016). Colorado has officially recognized this link
between groundwater and surface water since 1965, when legislation was passed requiring the
State Engineer to evaluate a well’s potential injury to surface water rights holders before granting
new permits (DWR, n.d.-a). In 1972, in order to restrict the impact of groundwater withdrawals
on senior surface water rights holders in Division 3, the Colorado State Engineer imposed a
moratorium on new wells in the Rio Grande Basin outside of the Closed Basin, and in 1981
that moratorium was extended to include new wells within the Closed Basin (Johnson, 2008).
Colorado is legally obligated under the 1938 Rio Grande Compact (“Compact”) to deliver
water from the Rio Grande and Conejos rivers downstream to New Mexico and Texas. In 1966,
those states sued Colorado for violation of the Compact, but agreed to stay their litigation on
the condition that Colorado would use all available measures to meet its obligation under
the Compact going forward. Water management in the area is motivated in large part by this
obligation (Johnson, 2008).
In light of this obligation, and in an effort to protect surface water rights holders, the
Colorado General Assembly required the State Engineer to adopt rules governing groundwater
use in the valley. Since the early 1970s, the Rio Grande has gone through a number of stages of
water management. The first attempt by the State Engineer to restrict groundwater use was
litigated, and eventually rejected by the courts. A federal project to reclaim water in the Valley
which was otherwise lost to evaporation, known as the Closed Basin Project, was envisioned to
provide water to the Rio Grande and Conejos River systems to offset the effect of well pumping
on the surface water supply. The Closed Basin Project ultimately failed to provide the necessary
additional water to completely offset groundwater use. The Rules Governing the Withdrawal of
Groundwater in Water Division No. 3 (the Rio Grande Basin) (“Rules”) are the latest step in this
process. While not yet approved by the courts, the Rules are expected to come into force in a
form close to their draft version (Rio Grande Groundwater Use Rules, 2015). They will require
all non-exempt well users (essentially all wells except for domestic, livestock, fire, and small
commercial wells) in the Rio Grande Basin to either take part in a subdistrict, which must
replace or otherwise remedy all injurious depletions of surface water caused by groundwater
pumping within its boundaries and provide for the sustainability of the aquifer(s), or conduct
such replacement and sustainability on an individual basis through an augmentation plan.
NOTE: Injurious Stream Depletions are defined in the Rules as “Stream Depletions that deprive
senior surface water rights in [the Rio Grande Basin] of water that would have been physically
and legally available for diversion in the absence of the Stream Depletions and that must be
replaced or Remedied to prevent material injury to senior surface water rights; it also means
Stream Depletions that unreasonably interfere with the State’s ability to fulfill its obligations under
the Rio Grande Compact, with due regard for the right to accrue credits and debits under the
Compact.” (Rio Grande Groundwater Use Rules, 2015).
RGWCD will oversee and advise any subdistricts within the boundaries of the District,
which form to comply with the forthcoming Rules. Special Improvement District No. 1
(“Subdistrict 1” or “the Subdistrict”) was the first to form, and is the only subdistrict currently
operating under an approved management plan within the Rio Grande basin. It is proactively
complying with the Rules before formally required to do so (C. Simpson and A. Davies, personal
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communication, July 13, 2016). Water users in the Subdistrict recognized that it was in their
interests to use their resources sustainably and are attempting to do so in a way which causes
the least harm to the agricultural economy.
The Subdistrict, composed of 174,000 irrigated acres and approximately 3,000 irrigation
wells in portions of three counties, was recognized as a legal entity in 2006 (San Antonio,
Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District
No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District, Colo. 2011). The supervising and decisionmaking body in the Subdistrict is a Board of Managers, consisting of ten landowners or legal
representatives of landowners within the Subdistrict, and one member of the RGWCD Board
of Directors. Landowners within the Subdistrict voted on the composition of the Board of
Managers, deciding that it must at all times include members who reside in each of the counties
with portions in the Subdistrict, as well as stockholders and water users from several ditch
companies. The Board created the overall Management Plan for the Subdistrict and the more
detailed Rules and Regulations that put this plan into effect (RGWCD, n.d). While the Board may
update the Rules and Regulations as they see fit within the scope of the Management Plan, any
changes to the Management Plan must be confirmed by the State Engineer and, if that decision
is appealed, by the Colorado courts. The current Management Plan was approved by the State
Engineer, whose decision was appealed, and then went through the Division 3 Water Court,
The Water Court approved the Management Plan with some minor revisions. This decision was
further appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the Division 3
Water Court.
FACT: In Colorado, there is a state court system dedicated entirely to water-related issues. There
are seven water courts, corresponding to the seven major river basins in the state. Among other
things, these water courts may grant surface and groundwater rights (Hoffman and Zellmer, 2013).

Program management goals
In the effort to protect stream flows and restore and maintain groundwater levels, the
Subdistrict has set the following goals:
• Restore groundwater levels in the unconfined aquifer to only 200,000-400,000 acre-feet (af)
below storage levels in 1976 (from over 1,000,000 af below in 2006), and thereafter
“maintain a sustainable irrigation water supply.”
• Address surface water concerns to “protect senior surface water rights,” and “avoid
interference with Colorado’s obligations under the Rio Grande Compact.”
• Avoid state-imposed curtailment of water use, by developing its own management plan
that leverages economic incentives (Subdistrict No. 1, 2009).
NOTE: This range (200,000–400,000 af below storage levels in 1976) was chosen because it
encompassed the groundwater level during a relatively stable period in the 1990s, when it was
widely acknowledged that there was enough water to irrigate crops throughout the valley.
Although water managers do not know for sure, it is thought that this level will also be high
enough to restore the Hydraulic Divide (C. Simpson and A. Davies, personal communication,
July 13, 2016).

Tools used to achieve management goals
The portfolio of approaches used to meet the Subdistrict goals include regulatory tools, incentivebased tools, agency supply augmentation and protection, and education and outreach.
Case Study 5 / Colorado / Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict No. 1)
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Regulatory tools
Moratorium on new wells
In recognition that the confined and unconfined aquifers were over-appropriated, the
Colorado State Engineer placed moratoriums on the issuance of permits to construct new
groundwater wells, in order to prevent impacts to existing water rights and the state’s prescribed
water deliveries under the Rio Grande Compact. The Confined Aquifer New Use Rules for
Division 3 allow for new uses of groundwater in the basin, but only in those specific and limited
circumstances where 100% of the new water diversions will be replaced to the aquifer. This
allows for the potential of a changed use while satisfying the intent of the moratorium—to
manage groundwater to prevent stream depletions that impact other water rights and water
delivery obligations.

Permitting system for wells
The State Engineer will only issue a well permit for a new or expanded use of groundwater
if such a plan is in place to offset 100% of the new depletions and only after that plan has
been judicially approved by the Division 3 Water Court. Permits are also conditional upon
applicants submitting pertinent well construction information to the State Engineer (DWR,
June 30, 2005).

Quantified pumping rights
Anyone applying for a new right to withdraw groundwater from the confined aquifer or
confined aquifer system must either acquire and retire an existing right that uses an equivalent
amount of water from the same hydrologic zone, or develop an aquifer recharge system
replacing the entire amount of new depletions, so that there is no net increase in diversions
from the confined aquifer, thereby preventing injury to other users. Water savings from crop
shifting do not qualify as a permitted offset (DWR, June 30, 2005).

Metering of wells (self-reported)
Wells that are subject to the Rules and Regulations within Subdistrict 1 are also subject to the
Colorado State Engineer’s Rules Governing the Measurement of Ground Water Diversions in the
Rio Grande Basin (DWR, June 30, 2005). These rules require all non-exempt wells in Division 3
to have installed and to maintain a totalizing flow meter at the well owner’s expense, or use an
alternative method to measure annual water flow (DWR, June 30, 2005). Whichever approach is
taken, the rules require that measurement is accurate within 5% of the actual volume pumped,
which must be verified by a certified well meter tester a minimum of once every four years. Well
owners must report their groundwater use to the Subdistrict and to the Colorado Division of
Water Resources annually.

Incentive-based tools
Fees
Subdistrict 1 incents agricultural groundwater users to reduce their pumping by assessing
a fee on the net volume of groundwater withdrawn. The Board of Managers is authorized
each year to set the fee at a level up to $75/acre-foot of net groundwater withdrawn;
currently it is at this maximum price. Groundwater users may reduce their pumping
by switching to less water-intensive crops, increasing on-farm efficiency, or planting
fewer crops.

Offset program with transferable recharge credits
Agricultural water users may offset their groundwater pumping and avoid the associated
fee by acquiring Surface Water Credits. These Credits are earned for each acre-foot of water
imported into the Subdistrict and used to recharge the unconfined aquifer. Credits are earned
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for any water which is brought into the Subdistrict, not consumed for beneficial purposes, and
is introduced into the unconfined aquifer (Subdistrict No. 1, 2009). Any Credits that a
water user receives first go towards offsetting groundwater pumping, giving them a value
of $75/acre-foot. If the total amount of Surface Water Credits a water user receives is greater
than the total volume of groundwater pumped for the year, the excess credits may be banked
for use in the next year, or sold directly to other groundwater users. However, the choice to
bank or sell only applies to Credits leftover after fully offsetting groundwater pumped for the
year. By December of each year, the Board of Managers publishes a list of all Credits available
for exchange, trade, lease or sale. Anyone interested in purchasing a Credit can then independently
contact the Credit sellers, and negotiate a price. All transactions are reported to the Subdistrict
by the purchaser, as part of the annual farm unit data (Rule and regulations of the RGWD
Subdistrict No.1, January 15, 2013).

Land retirement projects
Subdistrict 1 also offers agricultural groundwater users the choice of receiving payment in
exchange for fallowing their land through the federal Conservation Reserve Enhancement
Program (CREP). Typically, acres eligible for participation in CREP are those which have been
irrigated with at least six inches of groundwater in at least four of the years within the period
2002–2007, and meet one of the following criteria: (1) were irrigated with six inches within the
last 24 months, or (2) were enrolled in a voluntary fallowing program within the last 24 months
and physically and legally capable of irrigation, or (3) are currently enrolled in a voluntary
fallowing program (CREP, n.d.).
Generally, CREP offers a standard price per acre fallowed, with the requirement that the land
is fallowed for 15 years. Lands located in areas with a greater impact on stream flow (the Focus
Area), as well as lands that are permanently retired, are eligible for a higher price per acre
fallowed. CREP does not take total water savings from fallowing a particular acre into account
in its pricing scheme.
As part of the fallowing contract, acres fallowed through CREP must engage in approved
conservation practices. Options include: establishment of permanent native grasses and forbs,
permanent wildlife habitat, shallow water areas for wildlife, and wetland restoration. CREP will
pay for 50% of the costs of implementing these conservation strategies on participating acres
(Factsheet: CREP—Colorado Rio Grande, February 2015).
Fallowing contracts are awarded equally to all eligible lands on a first come, first served basis.
As of February, 2016, 48 landowners with a total of over 5,000 acres had contracted with CREP
on either a temporary or permanent basis. The estimated rate of groundwater savings for
fallowing previously irrigated land is two acre-feet per fallowed acre (C. Simpson and A. Davies,
personal communication, July 13, 2016).

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Stream augmentation projects
The Subdistrict is required to replace or otherwise remedy depletions to surface water caused
by groundwater pumping within its boundaries, and that cause harm to surface water rights
holders or interfere with Colorado’s obligations under the Compact. The amount of surface
water depleted by pumping is determined through the Rio Grande Decision Support System
(“RGDSS”) model, based on well-level data from the Subdistrict, amount of recharge to the
aquifer, and other factors. Once the total amount of injurious depletions caused by groundwater
pumping is determined, the Subdistrict is responsible for either replacing that amount, or
contracting with senior surface water rights holders to remedy the reduction in some other
manner (i.e., paid compensation). In 2015, approximately 59% of surface water depletions from
groundwater pumping were remedied by the Subdistrict through means other than replacing
that water to the stream (RGWCD, 2016).
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NOTE: The Rio Grande Decision Support System (RGDSS) inputs historical and observed
climate, agricultural, groundwater, and streamflow data (including the observed change in aquifer
storage data) to the groundwater model MODFLOW. MODFLOW is a U.S. Geological Survey tool,
and an international standard, for modelling groundwater systems and groundwater-surface
water interactions (USGS, June 5, 2017). The State Engineer’s Rules for groundwater pumping
in the Rio Grande specify the RGDSS model as the method for determining impacts on surface
water flows. Surface water rights holders have challenged these rules in the courts, claiming
that the model under-represents the effect of groundwater pumping on surface water resources.
However, the model and its development were successfully defended in the courts, with only
minor changes required (D. Wolfe, personal communication, July 15, 2016).

Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by agency), including managed aquifer recharge
The Subdistrict finances new infrastructure developments to enhance recharge capacity, for
example by purchasing dedicated recharge basins, and maximizes allowable diversions from
the Rio Grande River, for example by improving the operation of ditches and headgates
(Subdistrict No. 1, 2009).

Education and outreach
RGWCD’s management efforts include public education on, and research into, water
conservation, water use efficiency, improved water management, and agricultural water use
(Subdistrict No. 1, 2009). It maintains a website with other outreach materials publicizing
upcoming events, management efforts, and other information for local stakeholders in
individual subdistricts.

Monitoring and enforcement
Water users report their volume pumped annually in order to calculate the amount they owe
to the Subdistrict in fees. By the State Engineer’s rules, flow meters must be verified to be in
working condition by a licensed pump installer, a representative of the meter manufacturer, or
a qualified well tester at the time of installation—and by a qualified well tester every four years
thereafter. A qualified well tester is defined as “a person or entity who is annually certified by
the State Engineer as qualified to determine the accuracy of a flow meter, perform a power
conversion coefficient test on a Well, and perform a Well efficiency test” (DWR, June 30, 2005).
The self-reported readings from the measurement devices are reviewed by the Division of Water
Resources, and a large portion of them are independently field verified by Division personnel
each year. Failure to comply with the rules may subject the well owner/user to court proceedings
and to the costs of the state in enforcing the rules.
CREP participation requires monitoring and compliance reviews, which can include
inspections of diversion structures and fields to ensure irrigation is not occurring.

Financing
The Subdistrict earns revenues by assessing fees upon groundwater users and landowners.
All acres in the Subdistrict that were groundwater irrigated as of 2006 are subject to an
Administrative Fee of up to $5/acre, and a CREP Fee of up to $12/acre, regardless of whether
they currently use groundwater for irrigation. In addition, groundwater use is subject to a
Variable Fee of up to $75/acre-foot pumped (the groundwater assessment).
Revenue from the Administrative fee goes to fund the Subdistrict’s operations, and revenue
from the CREP fee helps to fund the fallowing incentives offered to irrigators. While the majority
of the CREP fallowing incentives are funded with federal dollars, there is a requirement that the
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Subdistrict provides 20% of the total project cost, including additional annual incentives, annual
water retirement payments, and bonus payments for land in high-impact areas (CREP, n.d.).
Funding has been secured to enroll up to 40,000 acres in 15-year or permanent fallowing
contracts in Subdistrict 1 through CREP. Revenues from the Variable Fee, fund protection of
surface water rights through the replacement or remedy of surface water depletions caused by
groundwater pumping, as well as infrastructure improvements (Subdistrict No. 1, 2009).

Evaluation
The goals of Subdistrict 1 are to restore groundwater levels, maintain a sustainable irrigation
supply, and address surface water concerns. The Subdistrict has utilized two approaches to
achieve its goals—a price-based approach and participation in CREP. The fee per net unit of
groundwater pumped incents groundwater users to reduce the amount of water they use to
irrigate crops. It does not suggest or require a method for that reduction, but allows water users
to take advantage of the lowest-cost opportunities to reduce water use. These may come in any
form, including efficiency improvements, crop switching, or technology innovations. CREP
incents landowners to fallow their irrigated acres. Water users in the basin thus have a portfolio
of options to choose from to reduce groundwater pumping.
Subdistrict 1 began operations in 2012. Water levels in the unconfined aquifer of the
Closed Basin in the San Luis Valley have been monitored since 1976, through 27 RGWCD
monitoring wells (Davis Engineering Service, Inc., n.d.). The Subdistrict uses the running
five‑year average to gauge the storage level in the aquifer, and measures that level against
its goals. This metric allows for the fact that short-term fluctuations may not be indicative
of medium- and long-term trends.
Conservative approaches and assumptions in every plan year since inception have resulted
in the surface water system impacts by Subdistrict well operations being slightly overcompensated
for its injury. Though drought conditions contributed to the further decline of water levels in
the aquifer at the beginning of the Subdistrict’s operations, levels have been on the rise since
a low in 2013. Near historical average annual runoff of streams in 2014 and 2015 coupled with
groundwater withdrawal declines of 32%—from 300,000 acre-feet in the 2011 irrigation year
to 205,000 acre-feet in 2015 are major contributors to the aquifer recovery. The groundwater
withdrawal decline can be attributed to a combination of land fallowing through participation
in CREP and efficiency enhancements in response to the Variable Fee. In 2015, 5,854 acres had
been enrolled in CREP, including 2,762 acres which were permanently fallowed, and 3,092 acres
enrolled in temporary (15-year) contracts. The Subdistrict estimates that in the past these acres
were irrigated with a total of approximately 10,000 acre-feet annually (RGWCD, 2016). This
transition was possible in part because of the community’s support for program management
goals. Residents largely recognize that historic water use was unsustainable and have been
willing to make changes to maintain their old way of life as much as possible.
The program has not been without challenges, however. These include the intrusion and
cost to farmers in an agricultural area where the profit margin is already small. Another
potential challenge is well owner self-reporting. Well owners are required to have a verified
monitoring device to determine the water pumped from the well. However, they self-report
the meter readings, which determine the amount that they will pay under the Variable Fee. The
self-reporting may lead some to misreport their meter reading in order to pay less for their water
use. However, the Subdistrict does monitor total water applications by farm and commodity for
anomalies (C. Simpson, personal communication, August 8, 2016). In addition, the Division of
Water Resources has a team of six employees specifically tasked with ensuring that meters are
working correctly and that readings are accurate. There is generally a high degree of compliance
with metering requirements, and major anomalies can be checked against power data, with
which water use is correlated (D. Wolfe, personal communication, July 15, 2016). The Subdistrict
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and the Division of Water Resources have monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to assist in
the program’s operation.
The multiple strategies employed by the Subdistrict will ensure that surface water depletion
caused by groundwater withdrawals are replaced or remedied. Fallowing land and assessing fees
on groundwater use will also aid in the goal of restoring and maintaining groundwater levels,
although the level of the fee or the amount of land slated for fallowing will likely need to be
adjusted as the Subdistrict learns more about how water users respond to the current incentives.
In addition, since Subdistrict 1 is part of a larger water basin, it is crucial that other well users
comply with the forthcoming state Rules in a timely manner.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Rio Grande Water Conservation District Subdistrict No. 1:
• Fees on groundwater pumping and incentives to fallow land can be effective methods to
reduce groundwater use.
• Community support for water management goals helps enable successful implementation
of programs, such as land retirement and pumping fees.
• Water users will rely on surface water to avoid groundwater pumping fees.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Craig Cotton (Division Engineer,
Colorado Division of Water Resources), Allen Davey (Engineer, Davis Engineering Service, Inc.),
Cleave Simpson (General Manager, Rio Grande Water Conservation District) and Dick Wolfe
(State Engineer/Director, Colorado Division of Water Resources) for their time and input in
constructing this case study.
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 trong enforcement of regulations is possible,
S
even in tight-knit communities, when the
regulations are supported through outreach
and communication.
Projects that provide regulatory certainty may
be preferred to incentive-based systems despite
relatively high costs.
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Background and governance
The Upper Republican Natural Resources District (URNRD) encompasses Chase, Dundy,
and Perkins counties in southwestern Nebraska, totaling 1.73 million acres of land (See
Figure 6.1) (URNRD, 2016b). Approximately 56% of the total acreage is used as cropland
while rangeland accounts for 40% of total land area. Nearly half of cropland is irrigated,
most of which is irrigated using groundwater (99.3%). URNRD is located in the Republican
River Basin, which spans Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado. The URNRD overlies the High Plains
Aquifer, which is one of the largest aquifers in the world and covers parts of eight states, from
Texas to South Dakota. Much of the basin has interconnected groundwater and surface water.
The area has a semi-arid continental climate where average annual precipitation is 17"–20"
with annual evapotranspiration of 53" (URNRD, 2016b). Extensive agricultural land use is
complemented by pockets of industrial and urban development to sustain the farming families
in the area. There are fourteen communities in the District, with a total combined population of
about 9,000 residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). Residential and commercial water use in the
district is minimal (Jenkins, 2012). The primary crops grown in the region are corn, wheat, and
soybeans. There are acres of sunflowers, millet, potatoes, alfalfa, forage sorghum and sugar
beets as well.
Groundwater levels have been declining for decades in the URNRD. Estimates of
declines since the 1950s are as much as 50 feet in localized areas (McGuire, 2014).
Groundwater use across the three states in the broader Republican River Basin has impacted
surface water flows, prompting interstate litigation. Groundwater quality has been impacted
by fertilizer use in the predominantly agricultural area, as evidenced by elevated concentrations of
nitrate in groundwater.
Since their creation in 1972, Nebraska’s 23 Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) have had the
responsibility of managing groundwater quantity and quality in the state. The NRD system is
unique to Nebraska with boundaries based on Nebraska’s major river systems, allowing Districts
FIGURE 6.1
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to better tailor management practices to local conditions (NARD, 2016). Further, in
contrast to a number of western states that specifically designate geographically confined
groundwater management areas, Nebraska’s NRD network covers the entire state. They were
created to manage a range of natural resource concerns including flood control, soil erosion,
irrigation run-off, and groundwater quality and quantity issues. NRDs have the power to raise
revenue through taxing, fees, and fines, as well as set rules and enforce them when necessary
(NDNR, 2011).
Other agencies in Nebraska with water management roles are the Nebraska Department
of Natural Resources (DNR), which has chief responsibility for surface water quantity, and the
Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality, which is responsible for surface water quality
and point source pollution of surface water and groundwater. Surface water use in Nebraska is
controlled by prior appropriation, best explained as the “first in time, first in right” doctrine,
with preference set during shortage (NDNR, 2012). Groundwater is owned by the state for
the benefit of the public, and the state follows the American Reasonable Use Rule with a
“correlative” twist (NDNR, 2011). This means that overland owners may put groundwater to
any beneficial use on their land so long as they do not create harm to other users in the area
(Getches, Zellmer, & Amos, 2015).
Groundwater management in the District is complicated by the need to remain in compliance
with the Republican River Compact of 1942. The Republican River Compact is an interstate
agreement between Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado that allocates virgin surface water supply
from the Republican River Basin among the three states. Compliance with the compact is
overseen by the Republican River Compact Administration (RRCA). Groundwater was not
widely used in the basin when the Republican River Compact agreement was first drafted and
was therefore not a factor that the parties considered. This omission created future problems
between the states when well irrigation became feasible. Following a 2002 settlement,
depletions to stream flows caused by all groundwater use are accounted for in Republican River
Compact calculations (URNRD, 2016d). Importantly, the Compact does not specify an instream
flow right in Nebraska, although under the Compact, the state is obliged to limit or offset
depletions to stream flow in aggregate. While the states have engaged in significant litigation
over the past two decades, relations have improved in recent years—with all three states signing
joint resolutions seeking a long-term strategy for renewed cooperation in the Basin.
Due to conflict between groundwater and surface water users, Nebraska established an
integrated surface water and groundwater management law (integrated management law). The
law requires the DNR to establish hydrologic connection of surface water and groundwater and
to determine whether a basin is fully appropriated. The Republican River Basin is currently
designated as a fully appropriated basin. As such, the NRDs in the Basin, including the URNRD,
are required by state law to develop an Integrated Management Plan (IMP) with the DNR to aid
in management of surface water and groundwater in the basin (NDNR, 2011).
The URNRD has maintained a groundwater well measurement database since 1972
(URNRD, 2016c). The District measures more than 400 irrigation wells twice annually, in
the spring and fall, to monitor static water level (URNRD, 2016c). These wells are a combination
of private and public wells. Data from monitoring wells are compiled and used to detect
trends in the region, for Republican River Compact compliance purposes and general
awareness within the basin. Additionally, the RRCA maintains a comprehensive groundwater
model, the Republican River Compact Administration Ground Water Model (RRCA model),
which was originally developed to understand groundwater use and the spatial distribution
of groundwater pumping impacts on streamflow (RRCA, 2003). The RRCA model uses
MODFLOW-2000 with additional modules and is managed by the three states under the
compact. MODFLOW estimates streamflow depletions over a 50-year time period. The model
is updated on a regular basis and the data are available online. The information is used to
inform the Basin’s IMP.

74

THE FUTURE OF GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA

Program management goals
While managing groundwater depletion for the sake of water users within URNRD is a top
priority, compliance with the Republican River Compact is the driving force behind the many
of URNRD’s management tools. Management goals for the URNRD are:
• Protect groundwater quantity and develop management programs to extend groundwater
reservoir life to the greatest extent practicable.
• Reduce the potential for non-point source contamination of groundwater and surface water.
• Manage impacts on surface water related to interstate surface water compact.
• Reduce groundwater use by 20% from the 1998-2002 average for Republican River Compact
compliance.

Tools used to achieve management goals
Regulatory tools
Moratorium on new wells
The quantity of wells in the URNRD is capped through a moratorium. In 1997, the URNRD
put in place a well-drilling moratorium on new wells (replacement wells are allowed) (URNRD,
2015). Domestic wells and range livestock wells that pump less than fifty gallons per minute are
exempt from the moratorium. These two categories account for negligible amounts of water use
compared to irrigation wells.

Permitting system for wells
All replacement wells require a permit before construction, with the exception of wells that
pump less than fifty gallons per minute. Permits must be approved by the Board and replace
ment wells are subject to the same provisions as the wells being replaced, as outlined in the
District’s rules and regulations (URNRD, 2015).

Metering of wells (monitored)
Permitted wells must be equipped with a flowmeter to monitor water use (URNRD, 2015).
District technicians are allowed access to these meters and manually inspect and take readings
from the meters (see “Monitoring and enforcement, page 77).

Certification of irrigated acreage
A cap on irrigated acres was initiated at the same time that the district placed a moratorium on
new wells (URNRD, 2015). The district limits the number of certified irrigated acres allowed in
the district and no new irrigated acres are allowed. Acres that are now certified were certified to
represent the area that is actually irrigated. For example, corners of a field would not be certified
if an irrigator was using only center-pivot irrigation. Each irrigated acre is allocated a specific
number of inches of groundwater that the operator is allowed to pump. Regulating the volume
of groundwater pumped helps to ensure that water quantity goals are met. This level of
regulation provides a level of certainty around water use projections that regulating irrigated
acres and wells alone cannot.

Quantified and allocated irrigation rights
In 1978-1979, the URNRD became the first NRD in the state to regulate groundwater use
(URNRD, 2016a). The URNRD allocated each acre the right to irrigate with 20 inches of
groundwater per year. Since then, the District has increased the stringency of its regulations
by reducing the annual allocation. For the 2013–2017 period, each certified irrigated acre is
allocated 13 inches per year, or 65 inches over the five years. Irrigators may choose to distribute
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their allocation over the five years in any way they choose (URNRD, 2015). In determining
the five-year allocation, the Board considers water availability, Republican River Compact
compliance as determined by the most recent IMP, and how much water is reasonably needed
to grow crops.
Groundwater users who pump less than their total allocation in the five-year allocation
period carry forward the unused balance to subsequent allocation periods (URNRD, 2015).
Currently, for every 1" of carry forward used beyond 7.5" per acre, 2" of carry forward is lost.
This "2–1" penalty also applies to all borrowed allocation (URNRD, 2015).

Incentive-based tools
Taxes
While URNRD levies taxes on irrigated property and irrigators themselves primarily to fund
District projects, these taxes provide incentive for agricultural water users to transition to nonirrigated cropping systems (see “Financing,” page 78).

Best management practices with cost-sharing
The URNRD has subsidized the cost of soil moisture probes since 2011. While the District
received funding for the program from the Nebraska Environmental Trust and U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation in the past, it is now solely funded by the URNRD. The URNRD also provides a well
decommissioning cost-share program.

Transfer system for groundwater rights
The District allows limited transfer of groundwater rights. All transfers must be approved by
the URNRD Board of Directors (URNRD, 2015). Allocations must remain within a “floating
township,” defined in the Rules and Regulations as “a set of thirty-six (36) sections lying in a
contiguous block,” equal to 36 square miles. Transfers may not result in an increase in water use
from the historic consumptive use, defined broadly as “the amount of water that has previously
been consumed under appropriate and reasonably efficient practices” (URNRD, 2015). In
addition, any increase in 50-year streamflow depletion that will occur as a result of the transfer
must be offset by decertifying sufficient certified acres (URNRD, 2015).
A specific form of informal transfer allowed in the District is pooling. Pooling is defined
in the Final Rules as “any contract approved by the Board in which groundwater allocations
are combined.” The Board may approve pooling of groundwater allocations granted to irrigated
tracts with a common interest in ownership or tenancy. No pool may include more than
one floating township. At the end of each irrigation season, water use within the pool will be
averaged across the tracts in the pool to determine carryforward. Such carryforward is limited
to three years of annualized allocation.

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Stream augmentation projects
URNRD helps increase streamflow to ensure compliance with the Republican River Compact
through stream flow augmentation projects and land retirement. The first such project, the
Rock Creek Augmentation Project, was completed in 2012, at a cost of $21 million (URNRD,
2016d). In 2011, the URNRD purchased and converted to rangeland over 3,000 irrigated acres.
The land purchased for retirement was chosen in part because it was determined (using
MODFLOW) that pumping groundwater from that location has little negative impact on
streamflow. The water that otherwise would have been used for irrigation on those acres is
piped to the Republican River to enhance streamflow in years that action is required for Nebraska
to maintain compliance (McCabe, 2013). The acres purchased were located entirely within the
URNRD, with funding coming from the NRD’s taxing authority. The project has pumping
capacity of approximately 20,000 acre feet per year.
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Another irrigation retirement and augmentation project is the trans-basin Nebraska
Cooperative Republican Platte Enhancement Project (N-CORPE), located in Lincoln County,
Nebraska, within both the Republican River Basin and Platte River Basin. In 2012, four of
Nebraska’s NRDs (the Upper Republican, Middle Republican, Lower Republican, and Twin
Platte) purchased 16,000 irrigated acres for $83 million when a corporate farm went on the
market in Lincoln County (N‑CORPE, 2015). The approximately $120 million land and
infrastructure project is funded by an occupation tax on irrigated acres. Similar to the Rock
Creek project, the irrigated cropland was retired to rangeland so water that would otherwise be
used for irrigation can instead be piped into the Republican Basin (URNRD, 2016d). However,
roughly half of the wells involved are from outside of the Republican River Basin, providing
benefits to the basin while minimizing negative impacts on its groundwater. The annual
capacity of this project is about 65,000 acre feet. The state may use water from either or both
of these projects to help ensure Republican River Compact compliance in a given year.

Education and outreach
The Upper Republican NRD has maintained education and outreach programs since first
regulating groundwater use in the 1970s. Monthly board meetings are open to the community
and are well attended, especially when new policies are announced. URNRD maintains a high
level of transparency and produces press releases at least biweekly to keep the community
up-to-date on issues in the district. These press releases are printed in the local newspaper as
well as distributed by mail. The District works with local schools and student camps to teach
youth about groundwater (for example, younger students create “edible aquifers” while older
students learn about decommissioning wells) and the NRD’s role. URNRD collaborates with
the nearby Natural Resource Conservation Service district conservationist to provide trainings
and workshops regarding soil health and soil moisture probe use. Lastly, the District has
recently started hosting an annual Water Conference. The conference brings in water engineers,
lawyers and policy experts, and other water resource professionals to discuss water issues in
the District and across the state and U.S. In its second year as of 2017, the conference has been
well-received and provides a space for dialogue about water management. Due to the District’s
long history of groundwater management and continual education efforts, the community in
URNRD is well-informed on local issues.

Monitoring and enforcement
Irrigation wells in the District have been fully metered to measure water consumption since 1981
(URNRD, 2016c). Staff of the District manually inspect every meter annually to confirm their
working condition and meter readings. If the District finds that a user has damaged a meter or
misreported their consumption, the Board has the authority to enforce the allocation requirements.
Its powers of enforcement are broad, ranging from issuing a warning to revoking water rights.
The URNRD has revoked irrigation rights for intentional misrepresentation of consumption and
received support from the community for such stringent enforcement of District regulations.
In 2010, it was discovered that several irrigators installed underground piping to bypass
the meters used by the district to measure water use. URNRD responded with unprecedented
penalties including the permanent loss of irrigation rights for nearly 1,500 acres of cropland
and decertification of another 800 acres for 10 years. In total, these penalties were estimated at
roughly $3 million. The community was supportive of URNRD’s decision. Following the 2010
case, the general manager of URNRD stated that the district’s enforcement rules “are written for
the 0.1 percent of people who are willing to cheat society. The rest of folks are willing to accept
the rules and live by them”(Hovey, 2010).
Water quality testing services are provided by the URNRD and public and private wells
across the District are sampled each year for contaminants (URNRD, 2016e). Private well
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monitoring is primarily left to the well owner or water user. However, the URNRD encourages
private well owners to monitor their water quality by providing test kits to individuals in the
District for domestic and livestock water wells at no charge (URNRD, 2016e).

Financing
The NRDs have multiple sources of funding (property, occupation, and grants) and their
mandate includes flood management, recreation, soil conservation, education, as well as
groundwater management. The Nebraska Legislature empowered the Natural Resources
Districts to levy taxes on taxable property in their districts, including taxes whose revenues
may be used for groundwater management activities. The URNRD also uses an occupation
tax leveled against all irrigators in the district to fund projects such as N-CORPE. Currently,
the rate is $10 per irrigated acre, the highest amount the state allows. In the URNRD, occupation
taxes generate $4.4 million annually (Fanning, 2012). The 2015 income from tax was $4.4 million
from occupation tax and $2 million from property tax assessment. Additionally, the District
also occasionally applies for various grants to supplement its revenue.

Evaluation
The Upper Republican NRD has implemented a highly sophisticated groundwater management
program in an area with high intensity irrigation and high scrutiny due to interstate water
agreements. The district maintains and manually inspects an impressive number of metered
wells for both water level monitoring and water use tracking, made possible thanks in part to a
substantial budget. Further, URNRD utilizes a broad portfolio of tools and continually evaluates
and adjusts district rules based on experiences. URNRD has also been able to accomplish
its goal of compliance with the Republican River Compact while minimizing the impact of
compliance on water users in the district.
However, the long-term issue of declining groundwater level persists. While the groundwater
decline in the district is lesser today than what was predicted in a USGS 1988 study, the district
has so far been unable to stabilize groundwater levels (Figure 6.2, page 79).
The specific irrigation allocations have presented a challenge for the district as initial alloca
tions were large enough that many water users have large amounts of water “banked” for use in
future years. The result is that there may be reduced incentive to conserve water for the future.
The district has attempted to address this by introducing restrictions on carryover accounting.
While the stream augmentation projects have been very expensive (over $100 million
together, without operating costs), they have been successful in ensuring Republican River
Compact compliance for the URNRD and other NRDs in the Basin. Such programs have
potential to incur high political costs in addition to financial debt, energy costs, and potential
lost tax revenue. However, the projects in URNRD have been supported by the majority
of irrigators in the District as stream augmentation has prevented widespread irrigation
shutdowns previously proposed by Kansas to ensure Nebraska’s Compact compliance. Use of
groundwater from retired land could potentially exacerbate long-term groundwater decline
if pumping capacity exceeds the amount of irrigation water that otherwise would have been
applied to the land if left in production. The N-CORPE Board has expressed interest in
developing policies to ensure that long-term pumping for stream augmentation does not have
this effect. Compact calculations are complex across years. As a result, groundwater has been
pumped from the project in drought years, however, the projects will also likely not be used in
some drought years immediately following wet periods. For example, if either project had
existed in 2012 neither would have been used despite 2012 being one of the driest years on
record. Other regulatory approaches could have been used to help the District comply with
the Republican River Compact. However, the stream augmentation projects provide regulatory
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FIGURE 6.2

Groundwater change from 2006–2016
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certainty in compliance and allow the District to avoid imposing further direct water use
restrictions on irrigators, or worse, cutting off irrigation entirely for some users.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Upper Republican Natural Resources District:
• Strong regulatory authority with extensive data collection are used together to track
attainment of strict basin-wide goals.
• Regulations should be adjusted as needed over time based on external and internal
conditions.
• Strong enforcement of regulations is possible, even in tight-knit communities, when the
regulations are supported through outreach and communication.
• Projects that provide regulatory certainty may be preferred to incentive-based systems
despite relatively high costs.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Don Blankenau (Attorney for N-CORPE)
and Nate Jenkins (Assistant Manager, Upper Republican Natural Resources District) for their
time and input in constructing this case study.
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CASE STUDY 7 / OREGON

Deschutes River Basin
CHALLENGES FACED (SGMA UNDESIRABLE RESULTS)

Surface water
depletion

PREDOMINANT WATER USES
AUTHOR

Drew Palmer
Agricultural

Urban

TOOLS USED TO ACHIEVE MANAGEMENT GOALS
Regulatory
Limits on new wells
Permitting system for new and existing uses of
groundwater
Quantified pumping rights
Metering of wells (self-reported)

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Stream restoration projects
Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by agency)
Education and outreach
See page 87 for education and outreach tools to
achieve management goals.

Incentive-based
Offset program tied to water mitigation banks
Transfer system for flow mitigation credits
Flow mitigation credits
Fees

LESSONS LEARNED
 lose collaboration between state water agencies
C
(such as OWRD) and local non-profits (such as
DRC) results in constructive engagement that
helps determine best management practices
from both micro and macro perspectives.
Although it still has room for improvement, the
DRC Water Bank is an example of how a single,
central water bank can operate to meet strict
caps on new water use by trading new credits
for old water rights.
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 WRD’s incorporation of stakeholder feedback
O
gives local water users, non-profits, and nature
advocacy groups a voice that fosters effective
contributions to continuing improvement efforts.
Regular program evaluation and specific review
criteria allow OWRD to consistently evaluate
progress and adjust policy when needed to face
new challenges and ensure that long-term goals
are met.
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Background and governance
Historically, Oregon used primarily surface water to meet water demands, but new surface
water appropriations have been limited by the state since the early 1900s. When central Oregon’s
population and development soared at the end of the 20th century, growing municipalities,
small hobby farms, and recreational facilities began turning to groundwater to supply their
needs (Deschutes River Conservancy, n.d.-a). Legislation enacted during the same period (the
1970 Scenic Waterway Act, the 1987 Instream Water Right Act, and the 1991 Scenic Waterway
Flows) to protect Oregon’s rivers and streams fully closed new surface water allocations, leaving
groundwater as the only source of new access to freshwater. The region’s rapid growth and
associated increase in water demand were key drivers of the development of the management
program to reduce groundwater usage. They continue to be important considerations in
management strategies for the region, since current population projections show no signs
of slowing (Newton, Perle, & Polvi, 2006).
The Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD), irrigation districts, and other local and
regional authorities regulate all water usage in the Deschutes River Basin (Basin). The State of
Oregon holds all the waters (surface water and groundwater) of the State in trust for the public.
Agricultural production in central Oregon requires a significant amount of irrigated crop land—
over 240,000 acres (Deschutes Water Alliance, 2008). Along parts of the Deschutes River, roughly
90% of the river’s water is diverted from the stream for irrigation during the growing season
(Deschutes River Conservancy, n.d.-b). This is accomplished through a series of irrigation canals
and pipelines and is managed by various irrigation districts.
In 1970, Oregon passed the Scenic Waterways Act (Act), which designated certain rivers as “scenic
waterways”—including large sections of the Deschutes—and charged the state of Oregon with,
among other things, preserving the “free-flowing character of these waters in quantities necessary
for recreation, fish, and wildlife uses” (Scenic Waterways Act, 2007). The Act delegated management
of scenic waterways to the Oregon Parks and Recreation Department (Sussman, 2013).
FIGURE 7.1

Deschutes Basin Groundwater Mitigation Program
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The Act was amended in 1995 to include mandatory assessments of groundwater pumping.
The amendment required OWRD to assess whether new groundwater permits would “measurably
reduce” scenic waterway flows to the detriment of the “free-flowing character,” which required
OWRD to determine if there was a hydrological connection between groundwater and surface
water flows (Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.835; OWRD, 2008).
OWRD coordinated with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to survey the upper Deschutes
Basin section (shown as the Deschutes Basin Groundwater Mitigation Program area in
Figure 7.1, page 82). Covering around 4,500 square miles—66% publicly owned—the upper
Deschutes Basin has 220,000 acres of irrigated farmland (G. Hubert, personal communication,
May 15, 2017). Groundwater recharge consists mostly of natural precipitation and flows from
other basins; its discharge supplies over 75% of total streamflow downriver (Lieberherr, 2008).
The USGS provided key information about the relationship between groundwater and surface
water in the Deschutes Basin through the use of the Deep Percolation Model, developed in
Bauer and Vaccaro (Gannett et al., 2001), to quantify complex interactions including evaporation,
snow accumulation/melt, runoff, and recharge.
The model results confirmed prior studies by finding a definitive hydrologic connection
between groundwater and surface river flow in the Upper Deschutes Basin, indicating the
potential for groundwater pumping beyond the level at the time of the study’s publication
to violate the “measurable reduction” stipulation in the 1995 legislation.
In response, OWRD suspended all pending applications for groundwater permits
(Lieberherr, 2008). Then, OWRD assembled a broad coalition, the Deschutes Basin Steering
Committee, to develop mitigation strategies to facility streamflow reductions (Sussman, 2011).
This committee was unable to reach consensus on which mitigation strategies should be
implemented and the task of designing a mitigation plan was instead passed off to OWRD’s
Water Resources Commission (Lieberherr, 2008).
In 2001, state legislation authorized the creation of a mitigation program using
a system of credits and banks. The Water Resources Commission (WRC) conducted
multiple rounds of public hearings, requests for comment, and input from over 250 local
citizens and organizations, and officially enacted the Deschutes Basin Groundwater Mitigation
Program (GMP) (Figure 7.1) and the Mitigation Bank and Credit rules in September 2002.
These rulings were immediately met with a lawsuit in November 2002, filed by WaterWatch
and 13 other local groups. This lawsuit was largely centered on the timing of impact of the
increased groundwater extraction. WaterWatch asserted that while the mitigation program
would increase streamflows during the summer, it would actually reduce them in the spring
and fall, when flows are most important to fish populations. In 2005, the Oregon Court of
Appeals struck down the rules. The legislature then codified the WRC plan later that year,
reinstating the GMP (Sussman, 2013).
ADDITIONAL RESOURCE: For more information on the process of developing the mitigation
program, see the September 2002 report found at http://apps.wrd.state.or.us/apps/misc/wrd_
notice_view/Default.aspx?notice_id=41

Program management goals
The purpose behind the Deschutes GMP is to protect the quantity of streamflow for recreational,
fish, and wildlife uses. The GMP contains the following three goals:
• To maintain scenic waterway and instream water right flows,
• Facilitate restoration of Middle Deschutes River flows, and
• Accommodate growth through new groundwater development (OWRD, 2008).
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ADDITIONAL RESOURCE: More information on wildlife and habitat issues in the Deschutes
Basin with links to various sources can be found from the Oregon Watershed Enhancement
Board website, available at http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/pages/index.aspx

Tools used to achieve management goals
The GMP is designed to allow for continued expansion of groundwater extraction without
subtracting from existing surface water rights or creating a “measurable reduction” to the
flow under the Scenic Waterways Act. In practice, this means that no new applications for
groundwater extraction permits can be approved until the corresponding calculated reduction
in streamflow can be properly mitigated.
The GMP is a cap and trade system, and accordingly uses a combination of regulatory tools and
incentive-based tools, as well as some education and outreach, to meet the management goals.

Regulatory tools
Limits on new wells
The GMP places an aggregate cap on the rate of groundwater that can be withdrawn through
new groundwater permits at 200 cubic feet per second (cfs) (OWRD, 2007). This cap can
be adjusted by OWRD during the course of routine program assessment, subject to a state
administrative rule change and engagement of a public rules advisory committee. Additional
legislation to expand the cap may be required in the future if the advisory committee cannot
reach consensus on adjustments.

Permitting system for new and existing uses of groundwater
This aggregate limit is allocated to groundwater permit applicants by the state through final orders.
The pie charts in Figure 7.2 (page 85) show breakdowns of the 200 cfs of groundwater allocation
as of 2012. By 2012, 71% of the total allotment had been issued as final orders or approved
permits, leaving 29% of the cap available. Almost 89% of total allocation was designated for
municipal or quasi-municipal use,with just over 8% for irrigation and the remaining fraction
for other uses (OWRD, 2014). Most pumping designated as “quasi-municipal” is done by private
water developers. The percentage allotment and its distribution have largely persisted since
2012. More recently, though, applications for new uses of groundwater have increased with an
upward trend in development (G. Hubert, personal communication, May 15, 2017).
OWRD is responsible for processing applications for groundwater permits. After OWRD
receives these applications, it sends the applicant an “Initial Review,” which lays out the
mitigation credit requirements for the application. When these credits are obtained, after a
30-day public comment period and a 45-day protest period, the application can be approved
and the final order and permit granted (Deschutes River Conservancy, 2016a). The time between
application and final approval is typically 6–12 months, but has been longer in the past (L. Wilke,
personal communication, August 11, 2016). A permit applicant has five years from the date of
the final order to secure the required mitigation. If the applicant does not secure mitigation
before the five-year deadline, the application is cancelled. This helps reduce speculation under
the cap (G. Hubert, personal communication, May 15, 2017).

Quantified pumping rights
Groundwater permits issued by the state define rights to pump a volume of water in acre-feet
(af) as well as a maximum allowed rate of pumping.

Metering of wells (self-reported)
OWRD requires that meters be installed on new wells whose pumping permits are approved.
Users are required to record water use monthly and self-report the amount of pumping
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FIGURE 7.2

Distribution of the 200 cfs allocation cap (2012)
Other uses 1.1 cfs
Irrigation 11.9 cfs

Municipal 63.9 cfs

Industrial 2.7 cfs

Quasi-Municipal 61.6 cfs

Amount of water in cfs of the 200 cfs allocation cap that has been allocated under
new permits and final orders.

Available 59 cfs
Permits 88 cfs

Final Orders 53 cfs

Amount of water in cfs of the 200 cfs allocation cap that has been allocated under
new permits and final orders by type of use.
Source: Deschutes Groundwater Mitigation Program, Five-Year Program Evaluation Report, 2014*
*Changes to Figure 7.2 were made on January 25, 2018 to correct a labeling error in the figure.

captured on these meters to OWRD annually to ensure that groundwater extraction remains
within their approved allotment (L. Wilke, personal communication, August 11, 2016).

Incentive-based tools
Offset program tied to water mitigation banks
In the Deschutes, the state requires newly permitted groundwater users to obtain adequate
mitigation credit to offset the effect of their pumping within the 200 cfs allocation cap in
order to preserve streamflow. These credits are measured in acre-feet of water, like groundwater
permits, to allow pumpers to adjust the number of credits they need to purchase based on
their water needs. However, mitigation credits do not offset the exact amount of water pumped,
but rather only the “consumptive” portion, which excludes the fraction of water withdrawn
that will not be consumed (for example, by a crop) but instead absorbed back into the ground.
Because credits only offset the consumptive portion of groundwater use, they operate slightly
differently than the groundwater permits allocated under the overall 200 cfs cap, which restricts
the total rate of groundwater use (OWRD, 2014). One mitigation credit is equal to one acre-foot
Case Study 7 / Oregon / Deschutes River Basin
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of annual consumptive volume of water, and on average 1.8 credits are needed per acre of
land for irrigation use each year (Deschutes River Conservancy, 2016b). Examples of offsets
include leasing water to instream flow, permanent transfers of water instream, allocations of
conserved water, and releases of stored water (OWRD, 2008). Underlying water rights for this
protected water must have a priority date sufficient to reliably secure allocations and create a
streamflow benefit.
FACT: Irrigation in central Oregon typically requires 3 acre-feet of water per acre per year. Of
this, 60% is generally considered to be “consumptive,” which yields a conversion factor of
1.8 af per acre each year of mitigation requirements. For quasi-municipal uses, 50% of water
use is considered consumptive, due to large irrigated areas or golf courses. Typically, 40% is
considered consumptive for municipalities (G. Hubert, personal communication, July 11, 2017).
The GMP does not require strict drop-for-drop mitigation at the exact site of pumping.
Instead, water mitigation is balanced through seven “zones of impact.” OWRD uses the
zones of impact, which were delineated at the time of the development of the mitigation
program, to assign each application for groundwater pumping a zone where the extraction
will reduce streamflow; the corresponding credit to offset this well must be purchased from a
water right in the same zone. Six of these zones are stream- or reach-specific while the seventh
is assigned to a new groundwater applicant when their pumping may affect more than one
localized zone. This scheme ensures that areas of the basin that are more heavily pumped
for groundwater are also being replenished equivalently into the river or stream that is most
affected by the extraction.

Transfer system for flow mitigation credits
The main mechanism for purchase and sale of mitigation credits are state-chartered water
banks, which act as a virtual coordinator between parties. The Deschutes River Conservancy
(DRC), a local non-profit involved in many facets of sustainability, preservation, and water
leasing in the basin, operates the main water bank, the DRC Bank. Applicants for new
groundwater pumping purchase credits from the water bank to offset the loss of discharge
to the stream created by the pumping. Current holders of surface water rights may sell or
lease existing rights to the water bank. The leases, held in trust by the state, reduce the amount
of stream water they are permitted to divert. The DRC has conducted instream leasing, or
buybacks of water rights, to increase the amount of flow protected instream in the basin—
even before the groundwater mitigation program began.
FACT: From its founding in 2003 until 2008, the bank was known as the Deschutes Water Exchange.
Banks are not the sole source of mitigation, and not all mitigation transactions are facilitated
through water banks (Aylward, n.d.). Surface water rights holders can also directly lease their
rights to instream use purely to restore streamflow or for flow restoration associated with a
mitigation project. They can also permanently sell their rights to someone else. Only the DRC’s
state-chartered bank can apply for, market, and convey temporary mitigation credits from
instream leases, and it must be party to the lease. Any party may hold credits based on an
instream transfer or other type of permanent mitigation project (L. Wilke, personal
communication, August 11, 2016).
FACT: If the water right is in an irrigation district, the district must have a policy that allows leases
and transfers of water. The lease or transfer of water requires landowner and district signatures
(G. Hubert, personal communication, May 15, 2017).
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Flow mitigation credits
There are two types of mitigation credits used as offsets: temporary and permanent. Temporary
credits are purchased and renewed on an annual basis using temporary instream leases of existing
water rights. As of 2016, temporary credits can be purchased from the DRC Bank for $120 per
credit per year and a fixed $250 one-time setup fee. These credits must be re-purchased annually,
and availability is not guaranteed. Because of the high turnover and temporary nature of
the mitigation credits, the ratio of water protected instream to groundwater pumped must be
2:1. This rule forces the bank to hold one purchased credit in reserve, as a back-up, for every
temporary credit actually used in case the water right source of the credit used for the mitigation
becomes unavailable, or else risk permit regulation or cancellation (Deschutes River
Conservancy, 2015). Temporary credits need to be purchased on an annual, calendar-year basis
and are not pro-rated for periods less than a year (Deschutes River Conservancy, 2015).
Permanent credits, on the other hand, constitute one-time purchases that permanently
transfer an existing water right instream to create mitigation credits that can then be used to
mitigate for new groundwater permits at a 1:1 basis. As of 2016, permanent credits typically sell
for between $2000 and $3000 per credit (from the DRC’s Bank), depending on the source of the
water right and the zone of impact. Permanent credits sold by water right consultants can cost
up to $6000 per credit or more, but few are sold at this price (G. Hubert, personal communica
tion, May 15, 2017). While credit prices are currently centrally determined by the bank, the DRC
had in the past experimented with an auction to determine the price of mitigation credits.
NOTE: A large backlog of demand for mitigation credits had developed by 2004. In order to
develop the market and get a signal on the appropriate value of the credits, the Deschutes River
Conservancy Bank offered 36 credits up for auction. The design was an online/telephone firstprice, ascending-bid auction. The auction resulted in only two sales, since few bids exceeded the
confidential reserve price of $2,500/credit.

Fees
Anyone applying for a new groundwater permit must participate in the mitigation credit market
if they are not already operating their own mitigation project (OWRD, 2008). Application for
groundwater permits are submitted to and processed by OWRD. Since 2013, this one-time
application has a base fee of $1150. Additional fees based on several factors can bring this
total to over $3000 and may be subject to increases in future budget cycles.

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Streamflow restoration projects
In addition to maintaining the water mitigation bank, the DRC works closely with local
landowners and irrigation districts, state and federal agencies, and other partners to implement
flow restoration projects (DRC, Upper Deschutes Watershed Council, & Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife, 2008). The DRC’s efforts have concentrated on reducing diversions along the
middle reach of the Deschutes River by helping to implement water delivery efficiency projects,
for example by installing canal piping that reduces seepage, and water rights transfers and
leases to instream flow. These projects have generated a five-fold increase in Middle Deschutes
stream flows during summer months, which is when hot temperatures and irrigation diversions
most threaten fish and wildlife (DRC, n.d.-b).

Education and outreach
In accordance with the mandatory legislative evaluation of the program, OWRD solicits
feedback from stakeholders in the region to give them a chance to express concerns or propose
improvements to the GMP and its associated rules and policy. This gives state and local
interested parties a voice to modify the GMP to fit the changing needs of society.
Case Study 7 / Oregon / Deschutes River Basin
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Monitoring and enforcement
The DRC Water Bank and OWRD work together to ensure compliance on both sides of the
mitigation program: instream flows and groundwater pumping. Instream flows are monitored
using remote telemeters as well as random inspections from both DRC and OWRD staff. Local
irrigation districts, which provide much of the water leasing supply to DRC, also perform their
own compliance inspections (DRC, 2015).
Compliance by the groundwater user is more difficult to enforce. Well owners self-report the
amount of pumping captured on their meters to ensure that groundwater extraction remains
within their approved allotment. The amount of pumping approved is calculated to provide
adequate supply for the determined consumptive use based on the type and size of the property.
OWRD retains the right to require additional mitigation if the estimated consumptive portion
becomes higher than originally calculated (L. Wilke, personal communication, August 11, 2016).
Problems can arise with failure to re-obtain temporary credits for the upcoming year, or
from property ownership transfer. OWRD has revoked permits of users that remain delinquent
on mitigation credits for an extended period of time. OWRD estimated that there are 4 to 5
permit holders who habitually fall into this non-compliance category, and the department is
working on the best way to curtail these problems in the future (L. Wilke, personal communi
cation, August 11, 2016).

Financing
The annual per-credit fee of $120 plus additional application fees fund the operations of the
water bank and mitigation programming. From the inception of the DRC Water Bank until 2007,
credit fees were lower ($70) because the bank was subsidized to help it get started. The price
increased to $105 when the Bank became self-funded in 2008 (DRC, 2015) and to $120 per credit
in 2016 to cover higher lease payments and increases in state lease fees (G. Hubert, personal
communication, May 15, 2017). These revenues fund the leasing of instream water for mitigation
and reserve credit holdings (52%), staff and other administrative expenses (38%), and a fund
set aside for non-mitigation related restoration projects (10%) (DRC, 2015). Rapid growth and
development in central Oregon may require the DRC Bank to increase future credit prices to
cover added bank operation and staff costs, as well as an incentive program to increase the
amount of water leased instream to meet new demands.
More detailed financial information on the costs and revenues of the Deschutes GMP is not
readily discerned. There are two major operators of the mitigation program—OWRD and the
DRC. Since OWRD is a state agency and oversees many basins and groundwater programs, there
is not a breakdown of the staffing and operational costs of the Deschutes program specifically.
Likewise, the financial reporting of the DRC—a 501(c)3 non-profit organization which operates
many water leasing and other programs aside from GMP—aggregates costs and revenues across
projects, and does not give a specific breakdown of the costs of running its groundwater
mitigation bank.

Evaluation
The fundamental objective of the GMP is to prevent the loss of instream surface water flow due
to groundwater pumping. So far, instream flow requirements established by the mitigation
program have been met (OWRD, 2014). The OWRD has to conduct annual and five-year reviews
of the GMP to ensure continuing compliance.
The annual review details data on all aspects of the program, from participation and permit
metrics to discussion of development and mitigation activity. These reports provide a look back
at the past year, while the five-year evaluations examine long term trends and provide assessment
of policy efficacy and changes to the design of the program.
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The Water Resources Commission of the OWRD conducts the five-year reviews. There are three
stated “mitigation review criteria” that the WRC uses to evaluate the groundwater mitigation program:
• Whether scenic waterway and instream water right flows continue to be met on at least an
equivalent or more frequent basis as compared to long-term, representative base period
flows established by the Department;
• Evaluation of the mitigation program, associated mitigation, and the zones of impact; and
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of mitigation projects and mitigation credits that involve
time-limited and permanent instream transfers, instream leases, and allocations of
conserved water from canal lining and piping projects (OWRD, 2014).
The Commission uses two tools to evaluate the program to measure its success against
these stated criteria: an instream flow model and tracking of data from groundwater permits,
mitigation projects, and mitigation credit transactions (OWRD, 2014). OWRD developed the
instream flow model and calibrated it using historical flow data in the region from 1966–1995
from various gauging stations. The model then calculates and estimates effects of mitigation
projects and groundwater pumping on overall streamflow in the basin (OWRD, 2008). This
allows OWRD to evaluate the net impact of the GMP on surface flows and assess whether the
legislative requirements are being met.
While the program is currently maintaining baseline conditions on an annual basis, the
GMP faces some challenges. A common concern expressed by many stakeholders was problems
associated with zones of impact. Currently, as part of the permit application approval process,
OWRD determines in which zones of impact mitigation must be provided for each project.
A problem raised in the feedback process was that this system of determination is detrimental
to areas that might be a secondary zone of impact. As one river conservation group explained,
a proposal with 70% of its impact on River Basin A and 30% of its impact on Basin B will only
have to mitigate for Basin A, since it is the “main” recipient of impact.
One potential solution to this problem would be a system to allocate fractions of credits
to different zones of impact. In the example above, instead of allocating entire credits to one
zone, the Water Bank could use 70% of the price of each credit to mitigate in Basin A and the
remaining 30% for Basin B. While this may induce a larger administrative burden on the Water
Bank to calculate these shares and work with fractional credits, it has the potential to more
equitably distribute mitigation around the various zones of the basin. Similarly, surface water
availability and the cost of protecting water to provide credits can vary from zone to zone, but
could be allocated accordingly (G. Hubert, personal communication, May 15, 2017).
Another concern, as previously mentioned, is that the GMP does not adequately ensure com
pliance with the mitigation requirements for temporary mitigation credits. This problem highlights
a fundamental tradeoff between the costs and benefits of stricter compliance scrutiny. Due to
the extremely large geographical size of the Basin, OWRD would need to spend significant time
and resources to increase the number of random inspections or to implement universal inspections.
OWRD would need to weigh the cost of performing these additional expenses against the
benefits of potential increased compliance and decrease in potentially inaccurate self-reporting.
Another concern relates to the impacts on ecosystems. The water banking system of
mitigating groundwater pumping through restored stream flow bolsters flow during the
summer at the expense of winter flow. This is because most instream transfers to generate
mitigation credits only occur during the summer irrigation season, while groundwater pumping
occurs year-round. The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) expressed that,
while total streamflow volume has increased on an annual basis as a result of the program, the
volatility of how this mitigation occurs can be harmful to fish and wildlife that need sufficient
streamflow even in the irrigation off-season (OWRD, 2015b). Additionally, the timing of impacts
to aquatic habitats from pumping themselves is not well-known.
Case Study 7 / Oregon / Deschutes River Basin
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Also, even when groundwater pumping is fully mitigated instream on a volumetric basis, there
is still an effect on temperature. Pumping decreases the rate of natural flow of cold groundwater
into the river system (baseflow). This has raised average temperatures in some parts of the river
system, which can upset temperature-sensitive habitats of fish and plants (OWRD, 2015a).
ODFW recommended changes to how OWRD collects and reports streamflow data. They
urged the department to take into account this seasonal variability and asserted that annual
and seasonal aggregate reporting can overlook acute events in the flow data that would be
catastrophic to fish populations. ODFW suggested that reporting on the variability of flows
and in time periods that are crucial for fish will help increase transparency of the effect of the
program on these species (OWRD, 2015b).
The 2015 Deschutes Mitigation Draft Report also listed several other minor concerns and
challenges that are being addressed moving forward. One concern noted was the possibility of
the 200 cfs allocation cap inducing speculative permits in anticipation of a future moratorium
due to the cap being reached. The report noted, however, that the long process required to
obtain final mitigation, several years at the least, currently has provided an effective deterrent
for this behavior. This type of speculation has also been deterred by the 5-year time limit from
the issuance of the final order to obtain mitigation (DRC, 2015). If no mitigation is provided
within this period, OWRD will cancel the final order and not provide a permit.
Another concern raised was the increase in the number of projects, especially suburban
housing developments, using loopholes in the program. Developers have begun to circumvent
mitigation requirements by drilling one well for every three houses, which places them in the
“exempt-use” category and allows them to avoid having to provide mitigation. If this continues
to happen, the cumulative effects of this mitigation evasion may end up having noticeable
impact on stream flows (DRC, 2015). The Oregon Legislature has not authorized any changes to
these statutory exemptions at this point. Currently, the exempt use of groundwater for domestic
purposes limits the amount of water that can be pumped from a single well (regardless of the
number of homes it serves) to no more than 15,000 gallons (0.05 af) of water per day (L.
Jaramillo, personal communication, May 17, 2017). *This sentence was modified on January 25,
2018 to correct a conversion error.
Currently, it appears that the relatively small numbers of buyers and sellers on both sides
could hinder the expansion of direct mitigation apart from the water bank, but this could
change if the number of program participants grows to a size where more flexibility becomes
a clearer incentive in the system.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Deschutes River Basin for western groundwater
management.
• Close collaboration between state water agencies (such as OWRD) and local non-profits
(such as DRC) results in constructive engagement that helps determine best management
practices from both micro and macro perspectives.
• Although it still has room for improvement, the DRC Water Bank is an example of how a
single, central water bank can operate to meet strict caps on new water use by trading new
credits for old water rights.
• OWRD’s incorporation of stakeholder feedback gives local water users, non-profits, and
nature advocacy groups a voice that fosters effective contributions to continuing
improvement efforts.
• Regular program evaluation and specific review criteria allow OWRD to consistently
evaluate progress and adjust policy when needed to face new challenges and ensure that
long-term goals are met.
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Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Gen Hubert (Water Leasing Program
Manager, Deschutes River Conservancy), Lisa Jaramillo (Transfer and Conservation Section
Manager, Oregon Water Resources Department), and Laura Wilke (Flow Restoration Program
Coordinator, Oregon Water Resources Department) for their time and input in constructing
this case study.
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CASE STUDY 8 / TEXAS

Edwards Aquifer Authority
CHALLENGES FACED (SGMA UNDESIRABLE RESULTS)

Lowering of
groundwater
levels

Degraded
groundwater
quality

Reduction
of storage

Surface water
depletion

PREDOMINANT WATER USES

AUTHORS

Kanishka Singh
Matthew Zaragoza-Watkins

Agricultural

Urban

TOOLS USED TO ACHIEVE MANAGEMENT GOALS
Regulatory
Permitting system for new and existing wells
Quantified and allocated pumping rights
Metering of wells (self-reported)
Best management practices without cost-share
(user pays)

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Aquifer storage and recovery
Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by the agency)
Education and outreach
See page 100 for education and outreach tools to
achieve management goals.

Incentive-based
Fees
Transfer system for groundwater rights
Offset program for conservation efforts

LESSONS LEARNED
 trading program can be an effective tool for
A
groundwater management. In the Edwards
Aquifer, a cap and trade program successfully
reduced annual pumping and maintained
minimum spring flow levels, despite the recent
drought. The program’s success appears to be
due to:
• An explicit, specific cap as defined in state law.
• Minimizing transaction costs.
• A straightforward online trading platform.
• No constraints on how users divide their
allocations.
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 obust and constructive public feedback
R
coupled with program evaluation can build trust
and encourage buy-in from program participants
and other stakeholders.
Challenges to groundwater management
implementation include initial opposition to
protecting species and surface water.
Making water use data publicly available
increases transparency, which builds trust
and helps to ensure buy-in from program
participants.
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Background and governance
The Edwards Aquifer (Figure 8.1), which is considered one of the most productive aquifers in
the U.S., spans a 4,350-square-mile area and underlies parts of 11 counties in west-central Texas
(Smith et al., 2005). The aquifer is the primary source of water for approximately two million
people who reside within and around its boundaries in the City of San Antonio, as well as for
downstream users in the Nueces, San Antonio, Guadalupe, and San Marcos river basins
(Votteler, 1998). It also provides habitat for numerous aquatic and subterranean species, a
number of which are threatened or endangered.
The sources and volume of recharge can vary greatly from year to year. While it is not certain
how much water enters the Edwards through inter-formational flow, such as from other adjacent
aquifers, estimates range from 5,000 to 60,000 acre-feet per year (EAA, 2011). Roughly 75–80% of
the Edwards’ water replenishment occurs when water runoff from the catchment area flows in
streams and rivers and percolates into faults along the recharge zone surface (Eckhardt, 2016a).
Other sources include precipitation that falls directly on the recharge zone; surface water
reservoirs; and neighboring groundwater systems such as the Trinity aquifer.
While most of the Edwards carries freshwater, a deeper portion of the aquifer is less pervious
and water is stored there for longer periods of time, absorbing minerals from the surrounding
limestone and becoming saline. Figure 8.2 (page 95) shows the hydrogeological features of the
Edwards Aquifer (Eckhardt, 2016a). In this area, freshwater typically flows closer to the surface
while saltwater is contained deeper underground. If the aquifer is overdrawn, the more saline,
generally non-potable, water may move further up, contaminating the freshwater and reducing
the total potable volume available. However, studies have indicated that such contamination,
if it does occur, may be temporary, as new recharge will force the saltwater back down (Ewing &
Wilbert, 1991). The residence time of the water within the aquifer, which determines its salinity,
varies from a few hours to several years, and depends on a number of factors including depth
and location.
FIGURE 8.1
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FIGURE 8.2

Hydrogeological features of the Edwards Aquifer
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Groundwater is either naturally discharged from springs, many of which are clustered within
the Comal and San Marcos systems, or withdrawn from drilled wells (USGS, 2016). While the former
is used for sustaining important species habitat, providing freshwater flows to the bay and estuary,
and supporting the recreational economies in the Cities of Braunfels and San Marcos, the latter
provides a significant amount of the agricultural, municipal, and industrial supply in south-central
Texas. Cities such as San Antonio, New Braunfels, Uvalde, and San Marcos were founded around
the Edwards’ prolific artesian springs and over time, as population increased and technology
advanced, several wells have been drilled to supplement the yield from natural discharge. In
recent decades, water scarcity and quality issues, together with increasing municipal demand,
have impacted wildlife that depends on the aquifer’s spring-flow and associated habitat, and
some species, such as the Texas Blind Salamander, the Fountain Darter, the Comal Springs Riffle
Beetle, and the San Marcos Salamander, are now endangered or threatened (Eckhardt, 2016b).
Following a historic ten-year drought, the Texas Legislature established the Edwards
Underground Water District (EUWD) in 1959 to monitor the aquifer and support conservation,
but granted it no authority to limit the quantity of water pumped (Uddameri & Singh, 2012). For
decades, the EUWD surveyed the Edwards and argued that reducing withdrawals was a requisite
for sustainable groundwater use, but state legislators were disinclined to sanction such authority.
However, in 1991, environmental interests brought a lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), claiming that the Service failed to protect aquatic species and subterranean fauna
to the extent mandated by the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In part as a response to that suit, the
Texas State Legislature established the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA), granting it responsibility for:
• Sustaining federally protected aquifer-dependent species
• Ensuring effective management of the aquifer
• Identifying and addressing recharge initiatives for the aquifer
• Preventing water pollution.
In 1992, the USFWS recommended that the State of Texas, or a relevant regional groundwater
management authority, produce a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), or a dashboard of strategies
to ensure the preservation of aquatic biota. In exchange for this, the USFWS would, through powers
accorded it under the ESA, issue an Incidental Take Permit (ITP), absolving the Authority of
Case Study 8 / Texas / Edwards Aquifer Authority

95

culpability if their actions cause a certain amount of “take” of covered biota, which is broadly
construed to mean harm to but not necessarily elimination of (A. Hardberger, personal communica
tion, July 2016). In other words, the ITP waives the strict liability of the ESA to protect endangered
and threatened species, as long as the conservation measures delineated in the HCP are deployed.
In 1993, the Texas Legislature passed the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act (Act), which
authorized water regulators to govern withdrawals from the aquifer by mandating that
groundwater rights be permitted. The Act required that the State of Texas, via the EAA, maintain
continuous minimum springflow at the Comal and San Marcos springs to protect endangered
aquatic and subterranean species. The exact amount of continuous minimum springflow was
later determined to be 30 cubic feet per second (cfs) and the Act also established an annual cap
in aquifer withdrawals, both of which are detailed further below.
FACT: In Texas, groundwater rights are generally protected under the Rule of Capture, which
grants landowners the right to capture water beneath their property. Within the state,
groundwater use is regulated by Groundwater Conservation Districts across 16 groundwater
management areas.
The Act created the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Authority or EAA), which manages ground
water use in a portion of the San Antonio segment of the aquifer that underlies 3,600 square miles
of surface area, extending into eight counties: Atascosa, Bexar, Caldwell, Comal, Guadalupe,
Hays, Medina and Uvalde. Figure 8.1 (page 94) illustrates this region.
Over the years, the Act has been strengthened through the passage of additional pieces of
complementary legislation. Presently, the Authority, governed and directed under the most
current version of the Act, has jurisdiction over eight counties, and is comprised of a 17-member
board of directors who are advised and assisted on downstream water issues by the South
Central Texas Water Advisory Committee (SCTWAC). Fifteen of its members are elected, each
from a different district, and serve staggered four-year terms, while two nonvoting members are
appointed, one through a majority vote of the SCTWAC, and one by the Commissioners Court
of Medina County or Uvalde County, and serve four-year terms.
To achieve its conservation mandate, the Authority drafts and executes groundwater
management and strategic plans, monitors water quality, availability and compliance, and
coordinates with regional, state, and federal authorities and agencies to carry out different
programs. Additionally, the Authority enforces permit conditions and monitors and reports
on aquifer conditions. While it has been required to review and submit its Groundwater
Management Plan (GMP), which expounds its strategy to achieve these deliverables, to
the Texas Water Development Board every five years, as of the current Texas legislative
session, it no longer needs to seek Texas Water Development Board review, and can continue
operations independently.
The Authority also works with the San Antonio Water System (SAWS) to achieve springflow
protection. Through the development of the Edwards Aquifer Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP),
the Authority leases space to store regional water in the SAWS Aquifer Storage and Recovery
program (ASR) (SAWS, 2012). The Authority also collaborates with the cities of San Marcos
and New Braunfels, as well as Texas State University, to collect and analyze quality and quantity
data. The USFWS enforces the mandates set by the ESA, and monitors whether the Authority is
compliant with its regulations regarding covered species and spring-flows.

Program management goals
The Authority established and codified its initial goals based on suggestions provided by
USFWS, which were generated by analysis USFWS conducted using available data. These targets
were in accordance with what was determined to be an adequate level of water retained within
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the Edwards to support endangered species at times of record scarcity, benchmarked against
rainfall during the ten-year drought. The initial goals included:
• Aggregate direct pumping from the aquifer be limited to 450,000 acre-feet per year, to be
achieved by 2004
• Within 10 years, this limitation be further reduced to 400,000 acre-feet per year by 2008
• A special drought management plan be drafted and implemented during severe droughts,
or when water level in the J‑17 index well in Bexar County falls below 625 above mean sea
level, that further restricts aggregate pumping to 350,000 acre-feet per year
• Additional interruptible withdrawals of 88,000 acre-feet be allowed if water level in the J‑17
index well is above 665 feet above mean sea level
• All wells for domestic or livestock use be registered with the appropriate regional water
authority to monitor their impact on the aquifer (Spear, 1992).
In 2007, the Texas Legislature amended the EAA Act, raising the cap from 400,000 acre-feet to
572,000 acre-feet per year while codifying the EAA’s Critical Period Management Plan’s drought
reduction triggers and amounts and requiring the development of an HCP through the creation
of a partnership of regional stakeholders, called the Edwards Aquifer Recovery Implementation
Program (EARIP). The EARIP developed the HCP and associated springflow protection
measures, including a 30 cfs target. The plan was approved by USFWS in 2013. (EARIPESS,
2009). Additionally, the EAA adopted ancillary conservation plans.
The Authority’s 2016–2020 Strategic Plan goals can broadly be organized into two thematic
categories:
1. Aquifer management and protection goals, which include:
• Sustaining federally protected aquifer-dependent species.
• Ensuring effective management of the aquifer.
• Identifying and addressing recharge initiatives for the aquifer.
• Preventing water pollution (EAA, 2015).
2. Organization effectiveness goals, which include:
• Conducting research that enhances understanding and effective management.
• Developing an inclusive, service-oriented organization.
• Building shared value in the EAA mission.
• Sustaining fiscal stability (EAA, 2015).

Tools to achieve management goals
The portfolio of approaches used to meet the initial and current goals include some regulatory
tools and education and outreach, but are largely based on incentive-based tools and agency
supply augmentation and protection projects.

Regulatory tools
Permitting system for new and existing wells
State law requires all new and existing wells that withdraw water from the Edwards Aquifer first
obtain a permit from the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, 1993). Wells
drilled on or before June 1, 2013 are exempt from the requirement to obtain a withdrawal permit
provided that the well (1) is not capable of producing more than 1,250 gallon of water a day or
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(2) is metered and does not produce more than 1.4 acre-feet of water in a calendar year
(Edwards Aquifer Authority, 1993).

Quantified and allocated pumping rights
The groundwater management framework adopted by the Authority relies on an approach
commonly referred to as Cap and Trade, in which a maximum allowable level of water
withdrawals is established (i.e., the “Cap”), permits to extract the available resource are
allocated to individual pumpers based on their historic use, and pumpers can trade their
permits to match their usage to the allowable level of withdrawals (discussed below). The
Authority commenced operating the cap-and-trade program in 1996 and allocated the first
set of permits based on historical groundwater pumping and use rates to applicants who
paid the necessary application and registration fees and demonstrated, through corroborating
documentation, that they had beneficially used aquifer supply in any one year within the
1973–1993 period. This tool was adopted expressly for its ability to protect historic users
of the Edwards Aquifer and to meet the legislatively-mandated cap of 30 cfs at Comal and
San Marcos springs.
Since the cap’s adoption, the Texas Legislature has granted the Authority abilities under
its Critical Period Management Plan (CPMP) to reduce yearly withdrawals during scarcity by
a set percentage, interrupting access for even regular permit holders conditionally based on the
severity of the drought. However, the authority has set a floor, currently at 320,000 acre-feet per
year, below which withdrawals are not to drop (RECON Environmental, LLC et al., 2012). During
a critical period, all municipal, industrial, and irrigation-use permit holders are required to
submit monthly, rather than annual, reports.

Metering of wells (self-reported)
All municipal, agricultural, and industrial wells within the regional domain of the authority
must be registered, have meters installed, and permits must be granted for any water withdrawn
from them. However, a well may be exempt from regulation if: (1) it produces 25,000 gallons of
water or less for domestic or livestock use; or (2) it was drilled prior to June 1, 2013, and either
does not produce more than 1,250 gallons of water a day or is metered and does not produce
more than 1.4 acre-feet of water per year (EAA, 2016b). Municipal, agricultural, and industrial
users operating non-exempt, metered wells, are required to record their water withdrawals
monthly and report usage annually.

Best management practices without cost-share (user pays)
The EAA requires certain municipal, industrial, and irrigation permit holders to develop and
implement individual groundwater conservation plans, and to assist with this process, the
EAA develops a regional Groundwater Conservation Plan as a guide. Conservation under these
plans is to be achieved through the implementation of best management practices that have
documented improvements in water-use efficiency. Permit holders have flexibility to choose
their own appropriate best management practice, but they are required to implement some
type of approved best management practice as part of the individual groundwater conservation
plan (EAA, 2014). Well owners must also practice prescribed or voluntary conservation strategies.

Incentive-based Tools
Fees
An aquifer management fee is assessed on permitted agricultural and non-agricultural users
of Edwards Aquifer groundwater. The aquifer management fee for municipal and industrial
permit-holders is $40 per acre-foot of groundwater authorized to be pumped (EAA, 2016a).
Fees or agricultural users are charged on groundwater actually used during the preceding year
and this fee is limited to $2 per acre foot (per the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act) (EAA, 2016a).
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Transfer system for groundwater rights
EAA’s management approach creates flexibility by allowing permit holders to trade in a marketbased setting. Permit-holders can engage in voluntary trades, either to permanently transfer
their water rights or to lease them out over a specified period, and have a great deal of latitude
as to how to structure the transaction; in most cases, they may sell or lease all or any portion
of their entitlements at any price they deem appropriate. While the EAA reassures that there
are unlikely to be any detrimental or heterogeneous hydrogeological effects of pumping over
space, analysis conducted by the EARIP did conclude that decreasing pumping near the spring
systems has a positive impact on flow volumes, particularly in the case of San Marcos Springs
(EARIPESS, 2009). As such, when the Authority realized that a number of transfers occurring
between 2007 and 2009 enabled pumping to be localized around the springs in the eastern
region of its jurisdiction, it passed the only major local constraint, colloquially referred to as
the Cibolo Creek Rule, which restricts water users to the west of Cibolo Creek in Bexar County
from selling their entitlements to those east of it.
The Authority provides access to, but does not maintain, a voluntary online trading
platform which lists water permits for sale, along with seller contact information, permit
number, minimum and maximum acre-feet for sale, transfer type, and contract lengths
(North American Water Exchange, 2016). The online tools create a straightforward, transparent
process to facilitate purchases and sales with limited transactions costs. The mandatory caps
drive conservation within the district, and the trading system allows flexible redistribution of
resources within those caps (Ballew, 2014). When water is scarce and additional, conditional
caps are put in place due to drought or other supply and demand variances, the market can
respond dynamically with a change in value of the resource.

Offset program for conservation efforts
The HCP, which has a term of 15 years, contains conservation measures to ensure the protection
of species designated as endangered or threatened by the USFWS to the extent mandated at the
state-level in the Act, and at the federal-level in the ESA.
The Voluntary Irrigation Suspension Program Option (VISPO) allows eligible permitholders of irrigation rights to suspend all or a portion of their withdrawals for a specified time
in exchange for monetary compensation. If the water level at a certain index well declines to
or below 635 feet above mean sea level, measured by the Authority on October 1 every year,
then the program is deployed and participants cease withdrawals for the next calendar year
beginning January 1 (RECON Environmental, LLC et al., 2012).
The Regional Water Conservation Program (RWCP) provides municipalities with financial
remuneration to refrain from pumping half of conserved water for a period of 15 years, with
the goal of conserving 20,000 acre-feet of the total permitted or exempt volume (RECON
Environmental, LLC et al., 2012). The RWCP supports municipal water providers through
low‑flow toilet programs and leak detection.

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Aquifer storage and recovery
The Authority collaborates with the SAWS to carry out the Edwards Aquifer Habitat Conservation
Plan-related Aquifer Storage and Recovery (ASR) Program. SAWS conducted initial pilot projects
and studies for aquifer storage and recovery in the mid-1990’s and has since expanded its facility
by purchasing additional land for more storage capacity and improving treatment infrastructure.
The EAA began leasing water to the SAWS for storage as part of the regional Habitat Conservation
Plan for protection of spring flow and endangered species (RECON Environmental, LLC et al.,
2012). Excess Edwards Aquifer drinking water can be stored in the ASR facility when water supplies
are abundant and can be withdrawn later for use during times of scarcity, providing a baseload
supply during extended droughts and increasing reliability of the water supply (SAWS, 2012).
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Education and outreach
The EAA provides several education and outreach tools to assist water users in meeting
conservation requirements. As noted above, certain users are required to implement individual
groundwater conservation plans. The EAA develops the regional Groundwater Conservation
plan as a guide, which includes detailed information on various best management practices
that water users may implement to meet the plan requirements (EAA, 2014).
The EAA also hosts and participates in community events with conservation themes, and
provides educational programs for adults and children of all grade levels that address a variety
of water use, hydrology, and conservation topics. Additionally, the EAA provides a significant
amount of data and information to the public. For example, the agency is a host of “aquifer
awareness tools” designed to teach the public about the aquifer (EAA, 2017a).

Monitoring and enforcement
The Authority maintains a robust monitoring program of water use through the meters installed
on most wells. To minimize inaccuracies resulting from human error or tampering, a remote
well metering program has been implemented (EAA, 2017b). Additionally, the Authority sends
staff to all permitted wells once a year to take manual readings and ascertain that meters are
functioning as intended and maintains a database of several months of usage data, and this
information is publicly available.
Monitoring the pumping of permitted water through remote array readings and
manually inspecting the status of installed meters creates a significant incentive for
users to self‑report accurately. This is further supported by the considerable legal power
afforded to the Authority by the State of Texas to penalize infractions. In the event of an
infraction, the Authority may impose a penalty of no less than $100 and no more than
$1,000 per violation per day, and in extreme cases the Authority may revoke the violator’s
permit to pump (EAA, 2016b).
The mandates set by the Act are enforceable by state law, and in the case that a covered
facility violates them, whether related to withdrawals or contamination, the Authority may
impose an administrative penalty, generally a fine between $100 and $1,000 for each infraction
and each day that the infraction is not corrected. In some cases, the Authority may also file a
civil suit in a state district court to recover a penalty between $100 and $1,000 for each violation,
for every day the violation continues, and for attorney fees (EAA, 2016b). It also reserves the
right to seek injunctive relief regarding water use, and has the power to enter land to enforce it,
although it generally seeks permission in most circumstances.

Financing
The authority adopts an annual budget before the commencement of every fiscal year,
which aligns with the calendar year, and maintains its finances in accordance with the
enterprise fund system. Operations are accounted for in a manner similar to a private
business; revenues and expenses are recorded as they are earned and incurred, respectively,
regardless of when the cash flows occur. The budget is organized into two major areas:
the General Fund, for which revenues are derived almost completely from an aquifer
management fee of $40 per acre-foot of groundwater authorized to be pumped, levied on
all municipal and industrial permit-holders, as well as a fee of $2 per acre-foot of groundwater
actually pumped, levied on agricultural permit-holders; and the Edwards Aquifer Habitat
Conservation Plan Fund (EAHCP), for which revenues are primarily derived from an aquifer
management fee of $44 per acre-foot authorized to be pumped levied on municipal and
industrial permit-holders (EAA, 2016c). Revenues raised from this combined aquifer
management fee of $84 per acre-foot account for most of the authority’s budget. Total revenues
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for FY 2015 were recorded at $51,281,771, a slight decrease from $51,502,662 in FY 2014 and
$37,745,052 in FY 2013 (EAA, 2016a).
Payments made by municipal and industrial permit-holders account for virtually all
of the General Fund’s annual operating revenues, and an almost negligible amount of
annual non-operating revenues are also raised through miscellaneous sources including
permit application fees (EAA, 2016c). The General Fund capitalizes the authority’s daily
operations, such as staffing, debt servicing, legal and laboratory services, and conservation
grants. In addition to this, it is used to maintain several other, smaller funds established
for specific purposes, such as the Abandoned Well Closure Assistance Fund, through
which the authority provides financial assistance to low-income well owners who must take
certain measures to comply with standards regarding abandoned wells. Revenues raised
through compliance settlements are directed towards projects that aim to provide for
conservation and aquifer protection activities through the Conservation/Aquifer Protection
Fund (EAA, 2016c).
Funding from the EAHCP finances several conservation measures, such as VISPO and the
EAHCP-related ASR program.

Evaluation
Annual aggregate pumping in the Edwards Aquifer has consistently remained below the cap set
in 2007. According to data collected and furnished by the Authority, the average annual increase
in pumping between 1947 and 1997 was 6,100 acre-feet. Since then, following the commence
ment of the permitting program, this growth trend has stopped, despite a population increase
of ~670,000 in the regulated region. With the implementation of the CPMP strategies, summer
peak pumping rates have also stabilized.
Further, as illustrated in Figure 8.3, actual permitted pumping volumes in 2014 were
2.6 million acre-feet below what was predicted by a population growth model for the
period 1997–2014 (Hamilton & Winterle, 2017). Of the 2.6 million acre-feet, 1.95 million
acre‑feet have discharged at the spring systems, benefitting the aquatic ecosystem, and
FIGURE 8.3
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650,000 acre-feet have remained within the aquifer. Average flow has been ~90 cfs higher
at Comal Springs, ~45 cfs higher at San Marcos Springs, and the water level in the San Antonio
J‑17 index well has been ~17 feet higher, compared to counterfactual scenarios produced
by simulations modeling these statistics in the absence of the Authority’s system and
CPMP plan. Further, it is believed that Comal Springs would have gone dry and aquifer
levels would have been below what they were during the 1950s drought of record, had no
regulation been implemented.
Data collected on certain endangered species highlights a relatively steady revival as well
(Figure 8.4), and modeling conducted by EARIP indicates that the current management
framework should continue to support this trend (Debaere et al., 2014).
Based on spring flows, groundwater elevations, and the recovery of endangered species,
the management program seems to be adequate in maintaining water quantity and sustaining
threatened biota. The combination of management tools used by the Authority—from flow
augmentation and recharge to cap and trade—were key to this success. The EAA does not expect
to make any future adjustments to the cap.
As of this last legislative term, the Authority still operates under direction from the Texas
Legislature, however, it enjoys considerable independence with programs and initiatives
detailed therein.
Water trading is one increasingly utilized approach for mitigating issues typically realized
when managing a common-pool resource, such as scarcity, contamination, and biodiversity
loss. Proponents of water markets extol their efficiency and flexibility, arguing that negotiated
transactions provide a transparent process to determine the price of water and voluntary
exchanges of permits lead to the reallocation of water rights to those users who most value
them, or who use them most productively. Furthermore, they allow regulators to place a cap
onthe total number of permits issued over any trading period, and therefore, in this case, a
limit on the amount of water that can be withdrawn. The magnitude to which these benefits
are realized is generally contingent on the design aspects described above and discussed below,
such as the cap, scope, flexible mechanisms, ancillary programs, monitoring and verification,
and enforcement.
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Theoretically, setting a cap on use, as a policy instrument, can efficiently manage scarcity and
catalyze investments to increase efficiency, and therefore in the case of groundwater markets,
can reduce the intensity of water use. In practice, the degree to which this occurs depends on
the restrictiveness of the ceiling. As mentioned earlier, an analysis of permit trading at Edwards
reveals that, over the period from 1998 to 2012, few trades were executed—only eight percent of
all permits were transferred—and prices were fairly volatile. This could indicate that allocating
based on historical use happens to have been a relatively efficient distribution. Alternatively, a
historical, use-based allocation may not provide compelling incentives among those who have
been granted initial permits, as they are guaranteed an annual quota adequate to proceed without
making significant adjustments to their business-as-usual operations. While they may sell or
lease their excess permits to other permit-holders, the profusion of permits in the market would
create an excess of supply (and attendant lack of demand from existing users), diminishing the
permit price.
Another important dimension of good water markets is the minimization of transaction
costs. While trading is bounded to some extent over Cibolo Creek, within these regions there are
no other significant restrictions to the spatial reorientation of pumping, eliminating the cost of
physically transporting water. The online permit trading platform, and lack of constraints
governing how permit-holders divide up their allocation to sell or lease also contributes to the
reduction of transaction costs.
Still, despite growing demand from urban users, many of the trades that did occur were
between agricultural users. The thinness of trade out of the agricultural sector may reflect the
hesitancy of agricultural users to engage in transactions that are perceived to benefit industrial
or municipal use, a historically contentious issue among regional farmers.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Edwards Aquifer Authority:
• A trading program can be an effective tool for groundwater management. In the Edwards
Aquifer, a cap and trade program successfully reduced annual pumping and maintained
minimum spring flow levels, despite the recent drought. The program’s success appears to
be due to:
An explicit, specific cap as defined in state law.
Minimizing transaction costs.
A straightforward online trading platform.
No constraints on how users divide their allocations.
• Robust and constructive public feedback coupled with program evaluation can build trust
and encourage buy-in from program participants and other stakeholders.
• Challenges to groundwater management implementation include initial opposition to
protecting species and surface water.
• Making water use data publicly available increases transparency, which builds trust and
helps to ensure buy-in from program participants.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Julia Carrillo (Public Policy Analyst,
Edwards Aquifer Authority), Marc Friberg (Executive Director of External and Regulatory Affairs,
Edwards Aquifer Authority) and Amy Hardberger (Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University) for
their time and insights in constructing this case study.
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Subsidence District
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TOOLS USED TO ACHIEVE MANAGEMENT GOALS
Regulatory
Permitting system for wells
Quantified and allocated pumping permits
Metering of wells (self-reported and monitored)
Incentive-based
Price setting and disincentive fees
Best management practices

Agency supply augmentation and protection
Reservoir operation
Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by the agency)
Education and outreach
See page 113 for education and outreach tools to
achieve management goals.

LESSONS LEARNED
 goal to reduce groundwater pumping by a
A
certain percentage of demand is an effective
means to reduce subsidence, but may not be
effective in reducing overall water use.
Disincentive fees can encourage users to shift
from groundwater to surface water to meet their
water demands.
The strategy to convert from groundwater
to surface water shifts the supply from one
resource to another, but does not address
the long-term issue of demand reduction.
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 hifting from groundwater to surface water
S
requires significant funding for the infrastructure
necessary to change the source of water supply.
Infrastructure associated with surface water
augmentation projects can have negative
impacts on the environment that may offset
gains elsewhere.
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Background and governance
The greater Houston area in the upper Gulf Coast has been adversely affected by land subsidence—possibly more than any other metropolitan area in the United States. Land subsidence is
the loss of surface elevation due to removal of subsurface support, including the withdrawal of
fluids such as groundwater and petroleum (USGS, 2017).
In the Harris-Galveston region, subsidence has resulted from chronic water level declines
and has caused loss of groundwater storage, an increase in flood severity and frequency,
extensive damage to industrial and transportation infrastructure, and profound loss of wetland
habitat (Coplin & Galloway, 1999). In the coastal environment, by the late 1990’s, as much
as 10 feet of subsidence had shifted the position of the coastline (Coplin & Galloway, 1999),
threatening wetland-associated industries like outdoor recreation and commercial and
recreational fisheries. Further, due to the interrelated effects of sea level rise, loss of wetlands,
and reduced sediment supply, the shoreline was eroding at an average rate of 2.4 feet per year
and was projected to increase the sea level four inches by 2050 (Paine & Morton, 1986).
With strong municipal and industrial support, the Texas Legislature established the HarrisGalveston Subsidence District (District) in 1975 as a special district to regulate groundwater
withdrawal throughout Harris and Galveston Counties for the purpose of minimizing land
subsidence (HGSD, 2014) (Figure 9.1). The District regulates groundwater withdrawal in both
Harris and Galveston Counties, managing a 2,170-square-mile region of the upper Gulf Coast
(Neighbors & Thompson, 1986).
With over 4.5 million residents, Harris County is the most populous county in Texas and
the third most populous county in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). The county
includes the sprawling metropolis of Houston, an industrial and diverse city that extends to
Galveston Bay.
Galveston County is located on the plains of the Texas Gulf Coast, just south of Harris
County in the southeastern part of the state. Galveston’s population is significantly lower than
FIGURE 9.1
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Harris County’s at just over 300,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). Galveston is bounded on the
northeast by Galveston Bay, on the northwest by Clear Lake, and on the south by the Galveston
Seawall and the Gulf of Mexico (MapTechnica, 2017). The Galveston Bay estuary is Texas’ leading
bay fishery and also supports recreation and tourism industries (Coplin & Galloway, 1999). In
both Harris and Galveston Counties the majority of agricultural land is allocated for grazing
(Texas A&M IRNR, 2017a).
Land and water usage in the counties is similar. Galveston County is comprised of 85% nonworking land, 10% grazing land, 4.4% cropland, and under 1% dedicated to wildlife management
(Texas A&M IRNR, 2017a). In Harris County, 76% of the county is deemed non-working land,
15% is for grazing, 3.5% for crop, and 5% for wildlife management (Texas A&M IRNR, 2017b).
Public use accounts for the vast majority of groundwater withdrawals in the District, while
outdoor irrigation accounts for only 4% of total water use in both counties (Figure 9.2).
Groundwater withdrawal in the region is the leading cause of land subsidence, imperiling
the aquifers on which the counties rely. Well users in Harris and Galveston Counties pump the
majority of their groundwater from the Chicot, Evangeline, and Jasper aquifers, which are part
of the Gulf Coast System—a vast coastal aquifer system that extends throughout the margin of
the coastal plain of Texas and Louisiana into Florida. Because of the hydrologic connection
between these aquifers, water-level changes that occur in one aquifer can affect water levels in
the connected aquifer. Although water quality within the Chicot and Evangeline varies spatially
and with depth, groundwater is mostly determined to be fresh, but becomes more saline closer
to the coast.
To minimize land subsidence, the District manages groundwater withdrawals through
permitting and regulation. The District is led by a four-member District Management Team
including a general manager, monitoring and compliance deputy manager, permitting and
water conservation deputy manager, and an administrative officer. A 19-member Board of
Directors represents municipalities, industry, agriculture, and utility districts (Kasmarek et al.,
FIGURE 9.2

Groundwater withdrawal by year and use in Harris-Galveston management area
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FIGURE 9.3

Regulatory Areas within the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District
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Source: Harris-Galveston Subsidence District, Regulatory Plan, 2013

2015). The District aims to limit groundwater use to a fixed percentage of total water demand,
specific to three geographic subdivisions of the District. These subdivisions are referred to as
Regulatory Areas 1, 2, and 3 (Figure 9.3).
The District also oversees two Regional Water Authorities (RWAs), which exist in Regulatory
Area 3 as well as other ancillary agencies such as the City of Houston that secure adequate
surface water and reduce dependence on groundwater. The RWAs in Regulatory Area 3 (North
Harris County RWA and West Harris County RWA) were created to implement a Groundwater
Reduction Plan for each region, with the aim of replacing reliance on groundwater with surface
water use. These plans must be approved by the District by a majority vote from the Board. To
meet these goals of “converting” groundwater use to surface water use, RWAs fund and construct
water distribution infrastructure as well as set fees for groundwater and surface water use.

Program management goals
Groundwater districts across Texas are required to develop goals to provide the most efficient
use of groundwater (Texas Water Development Board, 2017). The legislative purpose of the
Harris-Galveston Subsidence District is to provide for the regulation of groundwater withdrawal
in the district to end subsidence, which contributes to or causes flooding in the district,
including rising water resulting from a storm or hurricane (TX SDLL § 8801, 2017).
The enabling legislation directs the board to formulate a plan to control and prevent
subsidence in the district, which must “reduce groundwater withdrawals to amounts that
will restore and maintain sufficient artesian pressure to control and prevent subsidence”
(TX SDLL § 8801, 2017).
The District has established specific water supply goals in its Regulatory Plan to achieve its
overarching purpose. Goals are established for each of the District’s three Regulatory Areas to
reduce groundwater withdrawals by specific deadlines.
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The District’s goal is to reduce groundwater withdrawal to no more than 20% of total
water demand in Regulatory Areas 2 and 3, and to no more than 10% in Regulatory Area 1.
Essentially, the District aims to change the source of water supplied from groundwater to
surface water sources.

Tools used to achieve management goals
The portfolio of approaches developed for the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District include
regulatory tools, incentive-based tools, supply augmentation and protection projects, and
education and outreach. To achieve the groundwater target objectives for each Regulatory Area,
the District has discretion to regulate groundwater withdrawals and to establish management
tools to meet the objectives. Additionally, the RWAs, under the purview of the District, carry out
the District’s management goals in Regulatory Area 3 by funding and overseeing surface water
distribution projects, setting prices for groundwater withdrawal and surface water, and sending
aggregated well data from customers to the District annually. Where municipal services are not
available, Municipal Utility Districts serve similar functions, namely, providing groundwater
utility services, enforcing prices and compliance measures for well customers, and collecting
pumpage fees.

Regulatory tools
The District’s enabling legislation gives it the authority to regulate and permit groundwater
withdrawals, require metering and reporting, adopt rules requiring the use of water
conservation measures to reduce groundwater withdrawals, and to coordinate with local
governments to establish water conservation goals, guidelines, and plans, among other
authorities (TX SDLL § 8801, 2017).

Permitting system for wells
New water wells are required to be registered through the District by submitting a registration
that solicits information on the well drilling company, well location, intended use, and current
water use practices. The District determines whether the well requires a permit or is exempt.
The District then begins the permitting process that includes a public hearing and board
approval. The permitting process takes between 45 and 90 days. The District grants a permit to
an applicant if the Board decides there is ample proof that there is no other available
supplemental source of alternative water supplies at prices competitive with those charged by
the District. Specific relevant factors include:
• The quality, quantity, and availability of alternative water supplies at prices competitive
with those charged by suppliers of alternative water supplies within the District.
• The economic impact of denying an applicant a permit in relation to the effect on
subsidence that would result.
• The applicant’s water conservation measures.
• The applicant’s compliance with other relevant requirements (TX SDLL § 8801, 2017).

NOTE: Wells that only serve a single family and have a casing diameter of five inches or less are
exempt from the District’s permit requirements. Additionally, the permitting requirements do not
apply to monitoring wells, leachate wells, dewatering wells, hand-pumped wells, or windmills. To
be exempt from having to meter a well, permittees must estimate their water use in their annual
pumpage report that is sent to the District.
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The District Regulatory Plan allows anyone who wants a well to have the ability to get a
permit if they stay within the limitations of the Plan. Well permits require an application fee of
$200 to authorize groundwater withdrawals for new wells, $50 for renewal applications, and
$500 to approve and drill an emergency well within seven days. These funds cover the costs of
issuing permits and performing the District’s regulatory functions.

Quantified and allocated pumping permits
Allocation of groundwater pumping is done at the Regulatory Area level. In Regulatory Area 3,
RWAs are free to implement their own strategies for reducing demand for groundwater and
converting groundwater pumping to use of surface water resources. For instance, the RWAs may
choose to aggregate the wells under one permit or they may choose to individually permit each
well, although no Authority has individually permitted wells to-date. Still, in every instance,
each permittee must operate within the pump limits established in the permit. It is a violation of
the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District Rules to pump any amount of water over the amount
authorized by the permit.

Metering of wells (self-reported and monitored)
The well owner or operator is required to keep monthly records on groundwater withdrawals
and provide these records to their RWA according to their rules and regulations. While there
are roughly 1000 wells within the RWAs, the District also receives pumping reports from cities,
industries, and individuals outside of the RWAs. A member of the District staff conducts a
personal inspection of each well annually. If it appears that an individual has violated the terms
or conditions of a permit or has failed to comply with the law, the District may file suit and
charge monetary penalties (Neighbors & Thompson, 1986).

Incentive-based tools
Price setting and disincentive fees
RWAs in Regulatory Area 3 set the cost of retail water in dollars per thousand gallons for both
groundwater and surface water. Generally, fees consist of a Base Fee that applies to all
authorized use, and a Disincentive Fee applied by the District to water users that are noncompliant with the Regulatory Plan (HGSD, 2013a).
Fees vary slightly across RWAs. For example, West Harris County RWA charges $2.25 per
1,000 gallons for groundwater ($750 per acre-foot) and North Harris RWA charges $2.40 per
1,000 gallons ($800/acre-foot) to pump groundwater (Figure 9.4, page 112) (Arrajj, 2016). These
fees are primarily set to cover budget costs of the individual RWA (WHCRWA, 2014), not to
encourage reduction in usage, which is primarily accomplished through the District-level
disincentive fee. The District lacks taxing authority, and RWAs set pumpage fees based on
individual water usage instead of levying a general tax, which would unfairly spread the costs
of high volume groundwater users over the entire community.
Although future water rates are not given in advance by the RWAs, some water providers
expect prices to rise to $5.00/1,000 gallons ($1,666/acre-foot) by 2025 as the county focuses on
reducing groundwater demand along with the rest of Texas. The rising cost of water is the
greatest conservation tool according to an RWA representative, though RWAs ensure customers
they commit to set water fees as low as possible for as long as possible.
To discourage groundwater usage over the percentage limits in each Regulatory Area, the
District mandates a disincentive fee of $8.46 per 1,000 gallons ($2,333/acre-foot) to be applied
to any groundwater withdrawal exceeding the Regulatory Area targets (HGSD, 2016). The
disincentive fee is designed to create an economic incentive for sustainable groundwater use
and to encourage compliance with the District’s Regulatory Plan. Some well users have decided
to pay the disincentive fee upon renewal instead of paying higher capital costs all at one time
(Michael Turco, personal communications, July 2016).
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FIGURE 9.4

Water pumping fees of regional water authorities
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Local authorities are raising water pumping fees in 2016 to help pay the cost of expensive new pipeline projects
Source: Community Impact Newspaper, 2016

Since 2001, only about $500,000 in disincentive fees have been levied out of a potential
$60 million annually if requirements were not met (Michel, 2006). This indicates that the
disincentive fee is effective and is working well to induce the transition to surface water sources.
The Board may exempt a permittee from a disincentive fee if a permittee:
• Lacks an alternative water supply.
• Is located outside of the service area of any regional water supplier.
• Provides an acceptable groundwater conservation plan to the District (HGSD, 2017).

Best management practices
Permittees with a total water demand greater than 10 million gallons per year can avoid the
disincentive fee through compliance with milestones contained in a certified Groundwater
Regulation Plan (GRP). In this scenario, a permittee may submit a GRP to the District’s
Board of Directors for certification. To qualify, the GRP must outline specific plans for
groundwater reduction including (1) infrastructure requirements and timetable of construction,
(2) explanation of how infrastructure costs will be financed, (3) identification of water supply
source and evidence of sufficient rights (HGSD, 2013b). The Board of Directors may, during
consideration of certifying a GRP, require additional information, milestones, or reports as a
condition of issuing the certification.

Agency supply augmentation and protection
With the District’s oversight, RWAs reduce groundwater dependence through the use of new
surface water distribution infrastructure.

Reservoir operation
In the 1940’s, upstream reservoirs and canals allowed the first deliveries of surface water to
Galveston, Pasadena, and Texas City, though groundwater remained the primary source until
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the 1970s. In 1973, the City of Galveston began converting to surface water supplied from
Lake Houston, an 18-mile reservoir on the San Jacinto River that stores water for municipal,
industrial, recreational, mining, and irrigation purposes. In the late 1970s, the cities of Pasadena
and Texas City converted from groundwater pumping to surface water supplies from the
San Jacinto River and the Brazos River, respectively. Today, the City of Houston receives most
of its water from Lake Livingston.

Infrastructure upgrades (paid for by agency)
Faced with increasing water demand due to population growth, Harris and Galveston Counties are
continuing to find ways to augment their water supplies. The Luce Bayou project began construction
in January of 2016 and is expected to be complete in July of 2019 (Coastal Water Authority, 2017).
The City of Houston is charged with the planning and development, and RWAs share the funding
costs. The $350 million project includes a 26-mile system of pipes and canals that will provide
up to 500 million gallons of water per day to communities in the greater Houston area (Coastal
Water Authority, 2017). The project will provide additional surface water deliveries by channeling
water from Trinity River to Lake Houston, where it can be treated and delivered throughout the
Harris-Galveston region through 107 miles of pipelines and canals (Coastal Water Authority,
2017). Once the water is in Lake Houston, the RWAs and the City of Houston will increase the
water treatment capacity to 400 million gallons per day by 2025 (Al Rendl, personal communica
tions, June 2016). An expansion of the Northeast Water Purification Plant, in addition to new
transmission lines, pump stations, and storage facilities will be constructed to deliver the water
to municipal utility districts (MUDs). Transfer of additional raw water supplies to Lake Houston
will allow counties to meet their objectives of converting groundwater to surface water. Districts
will not use all of this additional supply immediately, but increasing water capacity now will
help in future times of shortage (Al Rendl, personal communications, June 2016).

Education and outreach
Groundwater management strategies in the Harris-Galveston region extend beyond
enforcement and regulation. The District and Regulatory Area 3’s RWAs engage in community
outreach and youth education as a correlative strategy to promote conservation messages.
Working with Texas A&M University, the District’s Outdoor Irrigation Program encourages best
water management practices on residential and commercial landscapes using media and
outreach (Turco, 2016). The District has partnered with the “Water My Yard” program, which
sends automated emails or text messages to inform participants of the optimal amount of water
needed on their landscape based on local weather conditions (Turco, 2016).
Additionally, the District has partnered with local cities to implement the WaterWise Program
in elementary schools throughout the District. “Be a Water Detective” is a District-developed
classroom curriculum on the water-cycle, water conservation, and subsidence geared towards
4th and 5th grade students. In 2015, the program reached over 70,000 children in Harris,
Galveston, and Fort Bend Counties. With many new homes being developed with water-saving
fixtures, the program has expanded its effort to include additional water savings measures not
typically found in new homes, and widening the water conservation potential of the program.
WaterWise sponsors pay $35.40 for each student and in return, a groundwater credit is issued
to the sponsor in the amount of 84,000 gallons to be used over 20 years. Depending on a
groundwater user’s pumpage costs, participating in WaterWise could reduce expenses for users.
Groundwater credits can be used to offset the Regulatory Plan requirements when alternative
sources of water are scarce or otherwise unavailable. Sponsors are thus financially incentivized
to encourage conservation measures among future water users and utilize this program to
promote water conservation within their utility district or municipality.
Despite attempts at engaging communities, some MUD directors have expressed concern
over poor communication in the surface water conversion process. MUD directors in some
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districts believe RWAs have not adequately educated them and their customers about the
reason behind the rising cost of water, resulting in confusion and customer complaints.
However, according to the North Harris County RWA, most people in the community
understand the value of water conservation.

Monitoring and enforcement
Generally, a water meter is required for all permitted wells and at the point of connection for
all alternative water supplies used to meet District regulatory requirements. The well owner is
required to test the accuracy of each water meter and submit a certificate of the test results at
the owner’s expense. The owner must read each water meter and record the meter reading and
the actual amount of pumpage in a log at least monthly. The District may request a copy of the
log, or to inspect the log anytime during reasonable business hours. The well owner must read
the meter within 15 days before or after the date the permit expires and must report the
readings to either the regional water supplier or the District.
Board Members, the General Manager, and District agents and employees are entitled to
carry out investigations necessary to ensure compliance with these rules. After proper notice
or prior permission has been given, agency officials may enter the property to conduct an
investigation. The Board may authorize the General Manager to initiate a suit for injunctive
relief, or to recover a civil penalty ranging from $50 to $5,000 per day for each violation.
Other monitoring measures include two systems used by the Municipal Utility Districts to
measure the amount of groundwater and surface water that their districts receive. RWAs use a
computerized monitoring system to control water distribution among districts by triggering the
opening and closing of valves to release or retain water depending on a district’s needs.

Financing
The District’s expected budget for 2016 was $3.12 million in revenue with an estimated $3.54 million
in expenses. The District is funded primarily through well applications fees, annual permitting
fees, and disincentive fees. Infrastructure projects are largely funded through Regulatory Area 3’s
RWA pumpage fees and revenue bonds. All fees, with the exception of the disincentive fee, are
used for administrative and day-to-day operations of the District. The Science and Research Fund
is sourced entirely through disincentive fees. The District’s General Manager explained that the
District’s regulatory plan of curtailing groundwater use has had a negative impact on available
revenue (Al Rendl, personal communications, June 2016). Consequently, it is likely that District
fees will increase in the future. Additionally, increases in the retail price of water by the RWA’s
and the City of Houston require the District to raise the disincentive fee in the future to ensure
that the disincentive fee remains a disincentive.
In 2015, the District’s Board of Directors allocated $1.4 million from disincentive fees to
enhance the understanding and effective management of the Gulf Coast Aquifer System (HGSD,
2015). Projects recommended for the Science and Research Fund include: estimating the
subsidence-neutral yield of an aquifer storage and recovery project, determination of subsidence
impacts of brackish groundwater development, and the evaluation of the impact of groundwater
credit use during a prolonged period of drought. Estimated expense associated with these
projects was $450,000 for 2016 (HGSD, 2015). Future years will include a regulatory plan update
process that will begin in 2018, extend through at least 2022, and cost about $1.5 million.

Evaluation
The design of the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District is well-suited for the goal of converting
from groundwater use to surface water use. While there are still subsidence concerns in
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several areas of the region as described below, there is also ample evidence of overall success.
However, other factors, in addition to subsidence reduction, warrant consideration when
evaluating regional success from a larger scope. Specifically, issues of overall water demand,
environmental impacts, and availability of surface water resources should be considered
when analyzing the effects of the management strategy on the overall sustainability of the
Harris-Galveston region.
When the District first mandated groundwater withdrawal reductions in 1975, compaction
of subsurface sediments in the Chicot and Evangeline Aquifers began to subsequently slow in
eastern parts of the greater Houston region, near the bay system (Coplin & Galloway, 1999).
Additional water supplied from Lake Livingston in the late 1970s was sufficient to significantly
reduce groundwater use and ultimately led to a recovery of water levels over a large area.
A reduction in the rate of compaction was further observed with the curtailment of withdrawals
and conversion to imported surface water from Lake Houston on the San Jacinto River. In later
years, water levels in the aquifers began to recover and rise as much as 200 ft. in the Chicot and
240 ft. in the Evangeline (Coplin & Galloway, 1999). The slowing of compaction rates and rise of
water levels is concentrated on the eastern Harris-Galveston region.
Total groundwater use throughout the District continues to decline. Water level declines
have locally and temporally halted in eastern regions of the Regulatory Areas. However,
subsidence is occurring in northern and western Harris County due to increasing water use and
groundwater withdrawal for public and industrial use. Thus, the area of active subsidence has
shifted from the low-lying, tide-affected areas towards slightly higher elevations inland—
particularly in the area of the North Harris County Regional Water Authority.
Currently, the regulation and pricing mechanisms put in place by the District do not directly
induce reductions in water demand. Rather, they provide economic incentives to invest in surface
water capital projects that will replace groundwater pumping. This strategy directly addresses
the problems of subsidence that groundwater pumping causes, but may not effectively curb
demand. Since groundwater reductions are mandated in terms of percentage of total demand,
rising overall demand may not necessarily reduce the level of groundwater extraction. For
example, a “tightening” requirement that lowers allowable groundwater pumping from 20% of
demand to 10% will have zero effect on the amount of groundwater pumped if demand doubles
over that same period. Reducing total demand, then, plays a key role in ensuring that percentage
reductions in groundwater withdrawals translate into reductions in the actual amount of water
used. Thus, the implication and lesson is that restricting groundwater pumping based on a
percentage of overall demand may work towards achieving a goal aimed at reducing subsidence,
but it may not be effective at reducing overall water use.
Another key challenge faced by the District is the availability of infrastructure and
resources (Michael Turco, personal communications, July 2016). While the region contains
an abundance of water resources from ample precipitation and bodies of water, meeting
growing water demands requires augmenting surface water distribution while focusing on
conservation strategies.
With the regulatory strength of the District, RWAs have committed billions of dollars to
convert from groundwater to surface water use, while the District has addressed the concerns
of RWAs regarding short term alternative supply loss. Until the Luce Bayou and associated
projects are complete, the Harris-Galveston region lacks additional sources of water. In the
event of a treatment plant malfunction—as occurred in 2012—RWAs will be faced with the
challenge of transporting water among cities. The president of the North Harris County RWA
explains that none of their districts have run out of water in the past 70 years, and attributes
the region’s reservoirs to the “foresight of Houston’s forefathers” in taking early measures to
ensure Harris-Galveston maintains adequate water supplies (Al Rendl, personal communica
tions, June 2016). These reservoirs, along with other water distribution infrastructure, address
Harris-Galveston’s biggest challenge: getting surface water to the regions that need it. As Harris
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and Galveston Counties are compelled to reduce groundwater pumping, the District and RWAs
will look toward surface water projects to meet conversion objectives.
While extremely helpful to the reduction of groundwater usage, surface water conversion projects
have raised environmental concerns. The Luce Bayou project is projected to impact one of the
nation’s most productive and commercially valuable bay and estuary system, and some critics
claim the project perpetuates an endless cycle of meeting growing water demands by building
more pipes, canals, reservoirs, and dams.
An analysis conducted by the National Wildlife Federation suggests that increasing
freshwater withdrawals from the Trinity, San Jacinto, and other tributaries would destroy over
200 acres of protected wetlands and threaten the health of Galveston Bay by increasing salinity
(Johns et al., 2004). Further, Luce Bayou’s environmental impact report reveals that the project
may also introduce invasive plants and animals to the watersheds, which would affect water
quality, infrastructure, and wildlife. In response to these critiques, the Coastal Water Authority
agreed to donate 3,000 acres of protected wetlands to offset the damages and move forward with
the Luce Bayou project.

Lessons learned
The following are key lessons from the Harris-Galveston Subsidence District:
• A goal to reduce groundwater pumping by a certain percentage of demand is an effective
means to reduce subsidence, but may not be effective in reducing overall water use.
• Disincentive fees can encourage users to shift from groundwater to surface water to meet
their water demands.
• The strategy to convert from groundwater to surface water shifts the supply from one
resource to another, but does not address the long-term issue of demand reduction.
• Shifting from groundwater to surface water requires significant funding for the
infrastructure necessary to change the source of water supply.
• Infrastructure associated with surface water augmentation projects can have negative
impacts on the environment that may offset gains elsewhere.

Resources
Interviewees and case study reviewers: Thank you to Al Rendl (President, North Harris County
Regional Water Authority), Shah Sachin (Hydrologist, United States Geological Survey), Robert
Thompson (Deputy General Manager, Permitting and Water Conservation, Harris-Galveston
Subsidence District), and Michael Turco (General Manager, Harris-Galveston Subsidence District) for their time and input in constructing this case study.
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Nick Brozović is Director of Policy at the Daugherty Water for Food Global Institute at
the University of Nebraska. He works to ensure that the Institute’s programs inform public
and private sector needs around agricultural water management. Nick has over 15 years
of experience in water policy worldwide. A particular focus of his research is on evaluating
policies and governance structures for water management, including water market
design and implementation. He holds doctoral and master’s degrees in agricultural
and resource economics from the University of California, Berkeley, a master’s degree in
geology from the University of Southern California and a bachelor’s degree in geology from
Oxford University.
Anthony Saracino has over 30 years of experience in water resources consultation. He is a
widely recognized expert in California water policy, and has consulted to a variety of state,
federal, agricultural, municipal and environmental clients. He was a member of the California
Water Commission from 2010 to 2015, serving as Chair of the Commission for the first two years
of his term. Anthony holds a bachelor’s degree in geology from California State University,
Fresno, and a master’s degree in geology from Colorado State University.

118

THE FUTURE OF GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA

Ann Hayden is a senior director for EDF’s California Habitat Exchange & Western Water
Programs. She works to build broad coalitions of state and federal agencies, non-profit
partners, landowners and the private sector to support the development and implementation
of environmental markets that help increase California’s healthy freshwater and terrestrial systems
and improve delivery of the environmental services these habitats provide. Ann holds an MESM
from the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Maurice Hall is an associate vice president of water for the Ecosystems Program. He oversees
Environmental Defense Fund’s work to revitalize working rivers and their ability to provide
a resilient water supply. He focuses on developing collaborative water management approaches
to meet ecosystem needs alongside the needs of farms and cities. A registered Professional
Civil Engineer in California, Maurice holds a PhD in earth Resources, watershed sciences
from Colorado State University and a BS in chemical engineering from the University of
Tennessee, Chattanooga.
Sandra Zellmer is the Robert B. Daugherty Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska’s
College of Law. She teaches and writes about natural resources, water law, public lands, wildlife,
environmental law, and related topics. Zellmer has published several dozen articles and is a
co-author and principal editor of a casebook, Natural Resources Law (with Professors Laitos
and Wood) (West 2d edition 2012), Principles of Natural Resources Law: A Concise Hornbook
(with Laitos) (West 2014), and Water Law in a Nutshell (with Amos) (West 5th edition 2015).
Sandra serves on the Faculty Advisory Panel for the Daugherty Water for Food Global Institute,
and is on the Board of Directors for the Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Foundation and the Society for
Wilderness Stewardship.

Additional authors—case study reports
Justin Ebrahemi is a Communications and Engagement Manager at CounterPulse—a
community arts organization and performance arts theatre in San Francisco—where he
strategizes marketing campaigns and engages new audiences. His Master’s thesis offers policy
recommendations for equitable groundwater management in California using hydrogeology
research, policy analysis, and stakeholder interviews. He holds an MA in environment and
community from Humboldt State University and a BA in journalism from California State
University, Monterey.
Jennifer Hiatt is an urban planner and practicing lawyer in Nebraska. She is currently employed
with South Central Economic Development District, Inc., guiding rural communities through
the planning process. Jennifer’s areas of practice include land use development, natural resource
conservation, and the promotion of sustainable practices. Jennifer holds a JD from the College
of Law at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln and an MA in community and regional planning
from the College of Architecture at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Drew Palmer is a law student at Harvard Law School, interested in macroprudential regulation,
administrative law, and economic policy making. Prior to law school, Drew held a two-year
position in macroeconomic research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,as well as a
summer positions at Analysis Group, an economic consulting firm, and at the Environmental
Defense Fund conducting economic and policy research. Drew holds a BSc in statistics and a
BA in economics from Loyola University Chicago.

About the authors

119

Katherine Rittenhouse is currently a PhD Student in the Economics Department at the
University of California, San Diego. Previously, she served as an Economic Analyst in the Office
of Economic Policy and Analysis at the Environmental Defense Fund, where she helped to
research and write economic analyses of energy and environmental issues. Katherine holds
a BA in environmental studies and law, letters, and society from the University of Chicago.
Kanishka Singh is an MS candidate in Natural Resources and MPA candidate in Environmental
Policy at Cornell University. His prospective theses explore the application of systems theory
frameworks and quantitative modeling to watershed management. In the future, he is interested
in modeling dynamic mountain systems to better design resilience programs, specifically in the
event of glacial lake outburst floods in the Lower Himalayan Ranges.
Paige Orcutt worked as a policy research intern for the Daugherty Water for Food Global
Institute from May to December 2016. After graduating from the University of Nebraska Colleges
of Law and Business Administration in 2016, Paige successfully completed the Minnesota Bar
Examination and currently works as the law clerk to the Honorable Eric L. Hylden, Judge of the
Sixth Judicial District of Minnesota.
Chris Kuzdas is an environmental social scientist with a diverse background in the decision
sciences, international development and project management. As a member of EDF’s Colorado
River team, Chris works with partners to explore flexible water management solutions that
address future water uncertainty in a just and sustainable manner. He also serves as an associate
editor of UNESCO’s Global Water Forum, an international hub for resources and discussion
related to freshwater governance. Chris holds a PhD in sustainability and a Master of public
administration from Arizona State University.
Matthew Zaragoza-Watkins is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University
and an Affiliate at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. He has
previously held positions as the High Meadows Senior Economist in the Office of Economic
Policy and Analysis at the Environmental Defense Fund and as an Air Pollution Specialist in
the Office of Climate Change at the California Air Resources Board. His research focusses on
the design and performance of electricity, natural gas and greenhouse gas markets, and the
application of econometric techniques and randomized experiments to evaluate the impact
of policy. Matthew holds a PhD in agricultural and resource economics and an MSc in business
and public policy from the University of California, Berkeley and a BSc in applied economics
and management from Cornell University.

120

THE FUTURE OF GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA

Blank Inside Back Cover

257 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010
T 212 505 2100
edf.org

Nebraska Innovation Campus
2021 Transformation Drive
Suite 3220
Lincoln, NE 68508
T 402.472.5145
waterforfood.nebraska.edu

